The Mediated Myth of Lin Zexu by Cimino, Angelo Maria
  
 
The Mediated  
Myth of Lin Zexu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis accepted by the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the 
University of Cologne 
for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Candidate: Angelo Maria Cimino                                   
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Stefan kramer 
                                                                                       Second Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Huang Weiping 
	   2	  
Abstract 
 
The present study aims at determining the role played by the media representations 
of the myth of Lin Zexu in China. It precisely attempts to illustrate how, as a media 
form of popular culture, the myth of Lin Zexu epitomizes precise practices of 
representations embedded in a wider cultural network whithin which, determined 
actors, agencies, signs, and practices – somewhat struggling and interacting over 
the production, communication and consumption of specific meanings and 
ideologies – give shape to a peculiar articulation of the social and cultural texture of 
Chinese society. The subject of this study are thus a series of representations of Lin 
Zexu conveyed by distinct Chinese media since 1978. I endeavour at analysing how 
Lin Zexu is a meaning-making resource produced and communicated by specific 
Chinese media such as Television products and various Internet content, and 
consumed by Chinese media users through a multiplicity of media forms – movies, 
documentaries, digital images, cartoon, songs, Internet database research engines, 
microblogs, and digital photographs – in order to allow the constructed myth of Lin 
Zexu of upholding Chinese society’s institutions, to legitimize its rulers, to 
celebrate their values, and more generally to preserve China’s trajetory and the 
specific way of life that follows it. By semiotically examining Lin Zexu 
representations’ content and meaning, their political economy of production, and 
partially the users’ reception and response to such media representations, I try to 
weave the cultural network that they generate and are simultaneously part of. This 
work also wishes to address the specific modalities through which the media forms 
of the myth of Lin Zexu exemplify a diversified cultural phenomena that I 
understand as the mediatisation of historical knowledge, that is the process through 
which the historical is culturally produced by the Chinese media – TV products, 
movies, Internet various content – in the form of a myth (Lin Zexu’s), supposedly 
conveying historical truth, and thence becoming facilitators of specific cultural 
experiences that people are taught and/or encouraged to recognize as Chinese 
history, namely their past.   
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The present study aims at determining the role played by the media representations 
of the myth of Lin Zexu in China. It precisely attempts to illustrate how, as a media 
form of popular culture, the myth of Lin Zexu epitomizes precise practices of 
representations embedded in a wider cultural network whithin which, determined 
actors, agencies, signs, and practices – somewhat struggling and interacting over 
the production, communication and consumption of specific meanings and 
ideologies – give shape to a peculiar articulation of the social and cultural texture of 
Chinese society.  
This work also wishes to address the specific modalities through which the media 
forms of the myth of Lin Zexu exemplify a diversified cultural phenomena that I 
understand as the mediatisation of historical knowledge, that is the process through 
which the historical is culturally produced by the Chinese media – TV products, 
Movies, Internet various content – in the form of a myth (Lin Zexu’s), supposedly 
conveying historical truth, and thence becoming facilitators of specific cultural 
experiences that people are taught and/or encouraged to recognize as Chinese 
history, namely their past.   
Lin Zexu (林则徐; August 30, 1785 – November 22, 1850) was a Chinese scholar 
and official during the Qing Dynasty (清朝). Today, Lin Zexu is a Chinese 
historical figure1 recognized for his constant uprightness and high moral grounds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 1838, Lin Zexu (till then Viceroy and Governor of Hunan and Hebei Provinces), was appointed Imperial 
Commissioner by-then Emperor Daoguang (道光帝), and sent to Guangzhou to put an end to the importation of British 
opium to China. Lin Zexu’s attitude and policy toward the problem of opium consumption in Guangdong Province, led 
within a few months to the arrest and detention of more than 1.700 Chinese opium dealer, confiscating more than 
70.000 opium pipes, and the sizing of 1.2 million kilograms of British opium which was destructed in the by-now 
famous burning of opium at Humen beach, in Guangdong Province. This action is considered to be catalyst of the 
Opium war and of the consequent defeat of the Qing Dynasty’s army against the British military fleet, which led to the 
signing of the first so-called unequal treaties, the Nanjing treaty (1842). The treaty granted an indemnity and 
extraterritoriality to Britain, the opening of five treaty ports, and the cession of Hong Kong Island. The harsh outcomes 
of the Opium war and the following growing influence of the European powers over China’s territory untill the 
establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, has been treated historically as a watershed in Chinese history. 
The humiliation suffered by China and Chinese people in those years of foreign occupation and rule, had provided the 
PRC with an important ideological instrument serving two main and different political visions. As a national hero Lin 
Zexu’s high moral ground have been employed during the Maoist era of the PRC, for the ideological identification of 
anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-bourgeois values and beliefs, defending, legitimizing and symbolically 
represent Mao’s thought of “class struggle”, “anti-imperialism”, and “Marxism-Leninism” among the most important. 
Since 1978 though, Lin Zexu’s representations came to symbolize the ideological shift of China’s new trajectory, 
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expressed mostly in his fight against the British in the late 1830’s and early 1840’s. 
Lin Zexu’s forceful opposition to the opium trade in Guangzhou, and his famous 
action of sizing and burning – in Humen (Guangdong Province) – the British 
opium, is considered to have ultimately led to the outbreak of the so called Opium 
War (鸦片战争), 1839-1842. His firm resistance to foreign aggression, but also his 
proven openess and interest to the outside world2, made him to be regarded as a 
national hero (民族英雄) and a patriot (爱国者) of modern and contemporary 
Chinese history.  
The subject of this study are thus a series of representations of Lin Zexu conveyed 
by distinct Chinese media since 1978. I endeavour at analysing how Lin Zexu is a 
meaning-making resource produced and communicated by specific Chinese media 
such as Television products and various Internet content, and consumed by Chinese 
media users through a multiplicity of media forms – movies, documentaries, digital 
images, cartoon, songs, Internet database research engines, microblogs, and digital 
photographs – in order to allow the constructed myth of Lin Zexu of upholding 
Chinese society’s institutions, to legitimize its rulers, to celebrate their values, and 
more generally to preserve China’s trajetory and the specific way of life that 
follows it. By semiotically examining Lin Zexu representations’ content and 
meaning, their political economy of production, and partially the users’ reception 
and response to such media representations, I try to weave the cultural network that 
they generate and are simultaneously part of. I intend to understand and show how 
the media productions, communications, and consumptions of the myth of Lin Zexu 
become multiple point of access to a broad cultural network, within which issues of 
identity formation, of national belonging, of production of the self and of the other, 
of social behaviours, of political legitimacy, of economic interests and domination, 
and of nation-building process are peculiarly embedded.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Reform and Opening up’ (改革开放, gaige kaifang), which introduced market 
principles within a state-led economic system. Furthermore, the introduction and diffusion of media such as the TV and 
the Internet mainly, has allowed a sophistication of both the media representation of Lin Zexu and of its audience, 
allowing the interrelation of many disparate discourses (addressed in the present work) to be conveyed by, and 
associated with, the production, communication, and consumption of the myth of Lin Zexu. 
2 Lin Zexu felt the need of understanding the foreigners in order to provide (Qing) China with the means and theories to 
advance technologically, an effort underlined by the collection of geographical material (Geography of the Four 
Continents 四洲志)that Lin Zexu handed to Wei Yuan (魏源) for the compilation of the 1843 “Illustrated treatise on 
the Maritime Kingdoms” (海國圖志).	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Moreover, I seek to deal with the mediatisation process of a specific form of 
historical knowledge produced by Chinese media through the representations of the 
myth of Lin Zexu. Specifically, I aim at examining how different media forms of 
Lin Zexu are representative of the growing media practices, critically displacing the 
production of “historical knowledge”, the formation of a precise “sense of history”, 
as well as the way the “historical” is engaged and treated by people. Therefore, I 
point at showing how the myth of Lin Zexu as a form of historical knowledge is an 
agency to mainstreaming national feelings, and how it’s (media) appeal is catalyst 
of a current dissociation from (apparently) formal ideological standpoints, 
becoming in the eyes of its audiences alternative aesthetical forms3, engaged and 
consumed within a media-promoting everyday life.   
Understanding the myth of Lin Zexu means to get hold of the motivations that have 
engendered its production and communication, which in turn means to 
acknowledge the discourse by way of the signification uttered (Barthes, 1957). The 
1980’s and 1990’s in China – the years following the ‘Reform and Opening up’ 
policy (改革开放) – have on the one hand, been characterized by the superseding 
of the existing planned economy by a socialist market economy, which involved the 
gradual injection of liberal economic principles within the Chinese economic 
system, and the introduction and development of new communication technologies 
as integral elements of these changes; whereas on the other hand, society at large 
faced new signs of defiance in which new social contexts emerged, challenging the 
CPC’s4 ideology, the government’s autonomy, and by transforming the hitherto 
people’s passive role in terms of personal and individual engagement and 
involvement with media technologies and representations. The marketization of the 
economy and the settlement of an articulated – and always transforming – 
indigenous Chinese media system, brought about the emergence of a heterogeneous 
commercial popular culture, whose only shared (economic and ideological) value 
was, and still is represented by consumption. “Commercial popular culture is by 
nature a materialist space of sensuality, wealth and material and bodily desires, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Form is intended here as a thing which is defined not only by the substance with which is made visible in the sensible 
world, but also by its functionality. Barthes in explaining what a myth is, maintains that “myth is a system of 
communication, that it is a message. This allows one to perceive that myth cannot possibly be an object, a concept, or 
an idea; it is a mode of signification, a form” (Barthes, 1972: 107).  
 
4 Communist Party of China.	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with all the images and styles reproduced and circulated for consumption by the 
populace and for creating the desires for such consumption” (Liu Kang, 2004: 76). 
Although Deng Xiaoping’s and later on reforms, emphasized the need of legitimacy 
by depoliticizing peoples’ commitment to any ideological involvement with 
political issues – thus deprioritizing principles such as “mass struggle” (群众斗争), 
and “revolutionary theory” (革命理论) – the absence of a firm political stand, 
capable of leading and bridging the people towards the new China’s trajectory, 
precipitated the legitimation crisis.5 The Chinese media (television and Internet 
products mostly) attempt to provide popular forms of culture among which the 
myth of Lin Zexu is an influencial one, inducing consent to specific political issues 
and imaginings, and at the same time disseminating such media forms as 
commodities, enabling the audience/users to participate to the media celebration of 
the everyday life, where both economic development, national policy (that is 
nationalism), and people’s experientiality, are strictly connected within a consumer-
driven national agenda contented by the Chinese media. Indeed in their everyday 
ground, the media are fast becoming an intrinsic part of people experiences, 
providing the way of looking at, and understanding the social world which only 
deceptively exists as an endless, enduring entity. Chinese media are literally 
bombarding (and evidently creating) the social texture with an infinite flow of 
images and information, creating a cultural environment increasingly sustained by, 
and accessed through the media. Movies, documentaries, online websites, cartoons, 
music, social network and the vast Internet’s repository of digital images, are just a 
tiny portion of the overall network of symbols produced and communicated by the 
Chinese media. Narratives become “the quintessential form of customary 
knowledge” (Lyotard, 1984: 20), connoting meanings and ideologies that in a very 
important way shape people’s integration with a precise imagining of 
reality/society. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of media forms that make up the 
alleged Chinese cultural landscape, suggest that representation and communication 
always draw on a multiplicity of modes (multimodality) of production and 
consumption (TV and the Internet), all of which contribute to meaning. In fact, the 
vast assortment of media representation of the myth of Lin Zexu disclosed in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As Liu Kang maintains “the political mechanism of the state and the CCP has become increasingly dysfunctional in 
the course of the reform….the revolutionary ideology and its discourses, which legitimated the rule of the CCP in the 
past and are still being used by the post-Deng regime today, have lost their legitimating power” (Liu Kang, 2004: 13). 
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following chapters (movie, digital images, documentary, cartoon, music and 
photographs), aim precisely at addressing the various modes through which the 
myth of Lin Zexu is uttered, naturalizing specific meanings and ideologies.  
These are the questions that I seek to answer: What is the myth of Lin Zexu? How 
is the myth of Lin Zexu linked to media practice and culture? What are the means 
by which Lin Zexu, as a media representation, can be said to produce meanings and 
ideologies that influence and shape people’s views? What are the socio-cultural 
networks in which Lin Zexu’s media forms are embedded? Do Lin Zexu’s 
representations correspond to one coherent and uniform mode of knowledge? What 
is the relationship between Lin Zexu’s media form and the social space, both 
physical and media space? How, as a media discourse, the myth of Lin Zexu is to 
be regarded as a form of historical knowledge? As an important and long-standing 
reference of Chinese past, what kind of mediatisation is the figure of Lin Zexu 
expected to trigger, and what are the consequences of such process?  
Following these particular questions, there are a few more general ones that need to 
be addressed: Is Lin Zexu associated to a precise idea of Chinese modernity? What 
is a representation? What does it mean for an image of Lin Zexu to be an 
expression of popular culture in the everyday life?  
I attempt to answer these questions with the main aim of bestowing the 
representations of Lin Zexu with their historical character, with their dignity. In this 
sense, I employ an interdisciplinary approach that involves a stranscultural 
understanding of the media processes put in place to produce, communicate, and 
consume the media forms by which the myth of Lin Zexu is uttered. A transcultural 
mode of inquiry, as a matter of fact, aknowledges the need of exploring cultural 
practices by following the flows of communication that cross traditional 
disciplinary boundaries and cultures. A realm in which different cultural systems 
and accessible temporal horizons are seen and treated as essential assets in order to 
provide an analysis that takes into account heterogeneity and asymmetries, and that 
considers the hybrid nature of discourse and practice formation. It is in this context 
of diversified disciplinary forms that the present study wishes to collocate itself. 
Thence, I rely on, and deal with multiple aspects of different academic disciplines, 
among which particular features of Chinese history (Late Qing Dynasty, the Opium 
War period, the Dengist era and afterward), cultural anthropology (interpretive 
ethnography, culture as text), cultural semiotics (culture as system of signs), media 
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studies (mediatisation, media logic, media culture), cultural geography (the 
interrelation between culture and space), and social theory (actor-network theory), 
arise as the subjective and partial ensemble of knowledge, employed by the author 
of this work to gain access to the symbolic cultural network that unfolds through 
the Chinese media representations of Lin Zexu.   
In the chapters that follow, I attempt to demonstrate how the media cultural 
representations of Lin Zexu are involved in broad critical aspects of the Chinese 
society (the formation of individual identities; the identification of the self and of 
the other; the characterization and commodification of styles and ideas in the 
everyday life), of the Chinese nation (the formation of collective identities; the 
ideological apparatus that sustains the nation-building process; the deployment of 
banal nationalism), and of the Chinese media (the particular relationship between 
the Chinese media, the State/government’s institutions, and the market; and the 
peculiar engagement of people/users with media-generated popular history).  
What needs to be pointed out is that, although the 1989 is clearly a turning point, 
with regard to the relationship between the media system and the political 
institutions in contemporary China, the main concern here is not focused on 
censorship and on Beijing’s strengthened control over the Chinese media system, 
rather this study is conducted in order to draw the attention on the production of 
narratives and discourses that instead of denying and ban certain type of messages 
and meanings, promote through unambiguos strategies (the production of the myth 
of Lin Zexu, though not limited to it), the communication of beliefs, behaviours and 
values that reflect the need for the construction of a nation, the Chinese nation. 
Thereby, I analyse the role of the myth of Lin Zexu as an “instrument of cultural 
policy” (Andrea Zlatar, 2003), as well as its ambiguous nature of being at the same 
time a form of, and a producer of cultural practice. However, the need to address 
the media representation of Lin Zexu as a form of historical knowledge, will allow 
this study to shed light on certain state-led censoring practices that shape to a 
certain extent (at meaning level) the power of the media of creating the cultural 
network within which the myth of Lin Zexu is acknowledged. Having said so, in no 
case such issues of censorship and of media control will be weighted with biased 
ethical and moral arguments, on the contrary I’ll underline these practices where 
and when, as concrete constitutional procedures, they alter (empower or weaken) 
the representations of Lin Zexu, and consequently the media independence.      
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Moreover, the following study wishes to differentiate itself from other studies in the 
way the Chinese social, political and cultural contexts are expressed. As a matter of 
fact, the structure of this work does not set out an all-encompassing theoretical 
framework that precedes and carries out the analysis of the empirical data 
illustrated by Lin Zexu’s media representation. Instead, I have opted for an 
interpretive examination of the data collected, that allows me in each chapter to turn 
and adopt a course of action that I subjectively, and thus partially, consider suitable 
and appropriate with regard to the discrete representations displayed in this study. 
In this sense, the employment of the above mentioned academic discipline 
(anthropology, media studies, semiotics and so on) should be considered as 
conceptual and empirical tools that, far from integrating an exclusive grand theory, 
alternatively provide heterogeneous and asymmetrical perspectives from which is 
possible to stress different traits and qualities. To quote Clifford Geertz “studies do 
build on other studies, not in the sense that they take up where the others leave off, 
but in the sense that, better informed and better conceptualized, they plunge more 
deeply into the same things” (C. Geertz, 1973: 25).  
This work will explore how the media representations of the historical figure of Lin 
Zexu ultimately contribute to the construction and strengthening of a strong sense 
of nation. In order to provide an overall understanding of the multimodal qualities 
of the representations of Lin Zexu communicated by the Chinese media, I intend to 
provide an account in which the identification of different representational 
strategies will allow an analysis of the media practices and discourses 
representative of a dominant ideology, addressing specific behavoiurs and ideas, 
self-conscious practices, and ways of thinking, as fundamental features of a nation-
building process, thus legitimating the present ruling class and China’s trajectory. 
Lin Zexu, being representative of a Chinese historical past, will be accounted as a 
national model (the hero, and the patriot), serving as a prominent incarnation and 
symbol (the myth) of the new values that have been emerging since the ‘Reform 
and Opening up’ (individualism, consumerism, economic liberism), a model of 
moral integrity, of virtuous ethical principles, and of righteous beliefs;  
The illustrations of Lin Zexu, its varied depictions over time, the widespread of its 
images through specific media technologies, the distinguishing design of its 
characteristics, all these points will be investigated considering also the role of the 
visual dimension tied up to such representations. The meanings, values, and other 
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ideological social definitions like class and identity uttered by the mediated myth of 
Lin Zexu, will be taken into consideration by regarding “the centrality of visual 
experience in everyday life” (Mirzoeff, 1998: 7).   
This work has been structured following the principles delineated above, that is, I 
avoided the setting out of a preliminary chapter, in which both context and 
methodology would have been disclosed as a given, necessary stage or background 
against which the following analysis would stand. Instead I chose to let the 
specificity of the data analysed in each chapter, to make up their own cultural 
context (network) and to resort to a functional theoretical approach able to weave, 
every time accordingly, the cultural network within which the representations of 
Lin Zexu are actively involved. I have thence made an accurate selection of the 
media forms illustrating Lin Zexu, observing, inspecting, and actively seeking such 
representations in two different Chinese media, TV and the Internet, collecting a 
miscellaneous of media representations that range from the 1997 Chinese movie 
“The Opium War” (鸦片战争, Yapian Zhanzheng), to the televisual documentary 
“The misterious death of Lin Zexu” (林则徐死因之密, Lin Zexu siyin zhimi); from 
the Internet cartoonish digital-born image, to the children’s song “Lin Zexu bans 
opium” (林则徐禁鸦片, Lin Zexu jin yapian); from the digital photographies of the 
former residences, the memorial, and the square of Lin Zexu, to the online video 
game FC “Lin Zexu bans opium” (林则徐禁烟, Lin Zexu jin yan); from the Baike 
Baidu online encyclopedia (at the entry “Lin Zexu”), to the digital image in a 
Chinese touristic web site. These and other media representations of Lin Zexu are 
the core data of this work, and they have been appropriately assembled in  four 
different chapters, in respect of the qualities they showed.  
In Chapter one I provide an analysis of Xie Jin’s 1997 movie “The Opium War”. 
The main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the historical figure of Lin 
Zexu is cinematically produced in order to clearly convey its mythological status, 
whose function is that of naturalizing and normalizing a series of ideological 
practices and national policies, and depoliticizing historical contingencies. In this 
regard, in the first part of the chapter I will examine the political economy of 
production of the movie, which has been released on July 1, 1997 to coincide with 
the ceremony of the historical handing back of Hong Kong from the British to 
China. I will argue that, as an expression of popular culture and as a product of a 
media and mediated representation, “The Opium War” offers an important account 
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of the relationship between the state-government, the society and the market, 
throughout the 1990’s. I will thus attempt to underline the growing importance and 
impact that a new system of values and of forms, within the emerging everyday 
sphere produced by the media in China, served and still serve distinct aspect of 
Chinese nationalism and precise forms of territorialization. In the second part of 
chapter one, I undertake a semiotic approach to the movie by analysing the 
linguistic and cinematic codes that construct both the myth of Lin Zexu, and the 
Chinese history that its myth sustains and legitimizes. Thus the main aim of this 
section is to examine the motivations behind the representation of the myth of Lin 
Zexu in Xie Jin’s “The opium War”. By means of an analysis that takes into 
consideration camera positionings, lightings, music, costume drama, dialogues and 
other central aspects in the staging of Lin Zexu (voice-over, furniture and so on), I 
wish to show that “The Opium War” is the bearer of an open nationalism, an 
essential background which serves legitimacy to the CPC, and to the government 
policies (both internal and external), celebrating particular values and societal 
trajectories through the mediation of the myth of Lin Zexu. 
In Chapter two I attempt to get an insight on Chinese modern aesthetics through the 
analysis of a collection of images of Lin Zexu that I have gathered up from 
different Internet’s web sites. The introductory part of this chapter copes with the 
images of Lin Zexu in the attempt to unveil some modern conventions and social 
discourses present in the arrangement and functioning of the modern aesthetics in 
China. In fact, by engaging directly the very notion of (modern) representation, and 
by analyzing the specifics of these representations exemplified in the images of Lin 
Zexu, I aim to address these images by inquiring the idea of representation itself, 
and by questioning its self-evident character through which the acceptance of 
certain knowledge depends on. With this purpose in mind, I will employ Timothy 
Mitchell’s critics to the metaphysics of representation to show how a system of 
certainties, peculiar of the modern constitution, to use Latour’s terminology, has 
been subordinated to a specific “ordering, distributing and enframing”6 of the 
historical actor commonly known as representation. I shall also risort to Cordell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Timothy Mitchell, “Colonizing Egypt”, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
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Yee‘s “Chinese Cartography among the Arts”7 to address specific features of an 
alleged Chinese “way of seeing”, as it is deduced from Yee’s history of the 
entanglements between cartography and the arts (painting and calligraphy). In the 
second part of the chapter I will endeavour to analyse all the data collected, that is 
the digital images of Lin Zexu found on different online Chinese web sites. Indeed, 
each image, adequately isolated by the others, will be analysed considering the 
social discourses that through the grand narratives of enlightenment, rationality and 
humanism, stage and perform that official culture that we call Chinese culture. The 
cultural network that I will try to trace back through the images of Lin Zexu, is 
often secluded between the apparent attractiveness of the image, its design – in the 
case of Lin Zexu’s images by its physiological arrangement – and the ideological 
message or meanings they convey. For these reasons I will provide both a detailed 
analysis of the technological features through which these images have been 
(digitally) produced and came to be visualized, and a textual-analysis able to make 
sense (interpretively) of the symbolic system displayed by these varied media forms 
of Lin Zexu. 
In Chapter three I will deal with the media representations of Lin Zexu’s 
commemorative spaces in China. Here, I’m interested in understanding what 
processes are involved in the production of media images (photographs and texts) 
that supposedely are representative of actual spaces – memorials, museums, 
squares, landscapes – all dedicated and/or entitled to the historical figure of Lin 
Zexu. The representations analysed in this study are, ostensibly, rendition of urban 
places and landscapes which, seemingly, are naturally  bound to the mythical figure 
of the historical Lin Zexu, and thereby mythical themselves. These visual renditions 
of Lin Zexu’s representational spaces, materialize in the form of (digital) 
photographs on different Chinese web sites, and in most cases are accompained by 
parasitic texts that sublimate the images (Roland Barthes, 1977: 25). Here, I aim at 
demonstrating whether Lin Zexu’s media representations are used as complement 
to architecture, urban settings, historical artifacts (as in the case of musuems), as 
well as to speeches and written texts in the production of (its) space. By reflecting 
on the role and significance of a particular aspect of landscape practices – a socially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Cordell D. K. Yee, “Cartography in China - Chinese Cartography among the Arts: Objectivity, Subjectivity, 
Representation”, in J. B. Harley and David Woodward (Eds.), “History of Cartography, (Volume Two) Cartography in 
the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies, published by the University of Chicago Press,1994.  
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constructed form of knowledge (Harley, 1988) able to articulate and structure our 
understanding, and consequently our experience of the social in the peculiar 
practice of ‘taking a photograph’ – I propose an analysis of the ways in which 
landscape “as part of the broader family of value-laden images” (Harley 1988: 278) 
may elucidate how the media discourse, exemplified in Lin Zexu’s media images as 
a language of power, spatializes knowledge in the attempt to produce social space. 
The focus of this chapter is then on a number of (digital) photographs, five to be 
exact, found in different Chinese Internet web sites, representing spaces – places 
and landscapes – commemorative or celebratory, probably both, of the historical 
figure of Lin Zexu. Spaces whose sense of history and past seem to be deeply 
rooted into the ground belonging to such sites. I therefore attempt at mapping a 
portion of the media terrain8 in China, intended as the battleground in which 
knowledge and culture are caught up merely as contingencies, in the moment of 
their production and communication, transversed by objects and people and their 
relations, united by system of ideologies that reproduce dominant social 
conventions (Douglas Kellner, 1980), and ripped apart by tensions and 
contradictions. 
In Chapter four I will try to provide an understanding of some media 
representations of Lin Zexu, by analysing their qualities as a broad attempt to 
produce and communicate historical knowledge. I endeavour to account for the 
mediatisation of a specific form of historical knowledge epitomized by Chinese 
media through the representations of the myth of Lin Zexu. I will therefore analyse 
different media forms such as movie, documentary, cartoon, videogame, born-
digital images, music, Baike Baidu database information technology, and blog, to 
emphasize the peculiar impact that each of these media technologies and products 
have in representing the Chinese mythological figure of Lin Zexu within/as Chinese 
society, suggesting that the use of different media technologies, serve and frame the 
communication of the myth itself, and consequently provide and sustain distinct 
ways of experiencing popular forms of historical knowledge in China. In this 
chapter, I thus point at developing a theoretical framework able to account for the 
ways in which historical knowledge in China is produced and made circulating as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The media terrain seen as a moment of interaction and convergency between actors, agencies, and mediators; each 
with its own profusion and/or scarcity of power, inspiration, leverage, impact, bias, and weakness that can only be 
assessed by examining case by case the circumstances in which such qualities, as well as others, are carried out.  
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media influenced commodity-sign (Jansson 2002), on account of the various media 
illustrations of the myth of Lin Zexu. 
Lin Zexu’s media representations, wouldn’t thus be seen only as mediated cultural 
forms representing a genre9 of Chinese historical knowledge, but also as processes 
changing the very ideas and authority of historical knowledge in China. This would 
perhaps mean that the production, communication, and apprehension of what is to 
be considered the “historical” in China, is almost exclusively negotiated by the 
media itself, transforming people’s access and interaction with their past.  
The central idea that this entire study wishes to develop, is how the Chinese media 
representations of the myth of Lin Zexu disclosed in the following chapters, 
contribute to a peculiar mode of understanding the present by using different ways 
of imagining Chinese history, as well as engaging with the past through the 
distinctive activity of the Chinese media in framing and staging the myth of Lin 
Zexu, which by means of the connoted meanings and ideologies that its various 
media forms convey, evoke and encourage the acknowledgment of a precise sense 
of nation, of particular collective values and beliefs, but also of individual 
behaviours and practices. As has been suggested by Chu Godwin (1978), it is 
through symbolic processes, often supported by the representations of authority 
figures, that people are made to learn determined values and beliefs. “The whole 
point of a semiotic approach to culture is to aid us in gaining access to the 
conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense 
of the term, converse with them” (C. Geertz, 1973: 24). Thereby, I explore the 
power that Chinese media, with respect to the State/government’s policies and 
rules, and the market intervention, have in costituting and shaping a cultural 
symbolic environment, within which the production of knowledge is strictly bound 
up to the type of technology employed, to the arrangement of signs that such 
technologies convey, to the sort of narrative that these signs communicate 
(considered also the official ideological orientation), to the market-dictated 
popularization of the forms represented, and last but not least to the people’s 
uncertain reception and consumption.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The term genre indicate the production of recurrent cultural codes historically combined (during the production 
process) within a cultural product (literature, cinema, music and so on), that become intrinsic of a specific way of 
representing. Genre is a mode of structuring language that expresses precise cultural ideologies. See Jacques Derrida 
and Avital Ronell, “The Law of Genre”, The University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
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In conclusion, with the present study I aim to address the problematic matter of the 
interpretation of various media-cultural expressions and issues, which remains an 
aspect that cannot be ignored when approaching an alien culture, either when 
dealing with the Chinese media reresentations of the myth of Lin Zexu or with 
Chinese culture in general. This entails the aknowledgement that any investigation 
rather then providing a universal explanation, results instead in a negotiation 
between the researcher-observer and his informers (M. Kilani, 1994); a research 
approach ruled by participation, identification, comprehension, interpretation and 
evocative representation of the symbolic dimension; a mediation, therefore, 
between the observer and the observed, never forgetting that the final result 
accomplished is a second degree result (Geertz, 1973). Through the recognition of 
the symbols present in the specific alien situation which is subject matter of the 
research, and by means of the intellectual efforts made by the researcher in the 
investigation, it is possible to evoke their potential engagement in inducing and 
communicating a subjective, though multi-perspectival, knowledge. 
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Chapter I 
Lin Zexu and “The Opium War” 
 
 
The present chapter attempts to analyse the mediated myth of Lin Zexu with the 
aim of disclosing to what extent, by means of its cinematic media form, China’s 
national hero serves the need of staging China’s contemporary cultural identity by 
virtue of a precise access and imagining of its past embodied in the representation 
of Lin Zexu. On the eve of the handover, in Beijing and Hong Kong, Xie Jin’s (谢
晋) 1997 epic movie “The Opium War” (鸦片战争,	   yapian	   zhanzheng) was 
screened for the first time as part of the Chinese ceremony that celebrated the end 
of a period of shame. As a matter of fact, on July 1, 1997 Hong Kong was handed 
back to the Chinese authorities as expected by the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
signed on 19th December, 1984. The handing over of Hong Kong ended more than 
150 years of British colonial rule, putting an end to a humiliating condition that had 
begun in China with the Opium War. The ceremony that accompanied the official 
handover of Hong Kong saw many people on the streets celebrating what 
everybody understood being a big moment in history. Hundred of fireworks 
exploded, marching bands lightened up the atmosphere, and flags had artificial 
breeze to flutter in.  
In Hong Kong the movie had three well-attended premieres. Popular charity 
Operation Smile, which operates in China sponsored a gala attended by more than 
300 celebrities and moneyed locals. Among them were the former Chief Secretary 
Sir David Akers-Jones, socialite fund-raiser Alice Chiu, and the art-house filmaker 
Wong Kar Wai. 
The film’s promotional brochure declared, it is “dedicated to a great moment in 
history”. This great moment, useless to say, was the return of Hong Kong to China, 
and therefore the strengthen of China’s authority over its territory. 
“The Opium War” initial budget was backed by the China National Culture 
Promotion Society, The Sichuan Chengdu United Bank, and Xie’s own Xie Jin-
Hengtong Film and Television Company, which at the end of the production 
amounted to almost 15 million dollars, making it the most expensive production in 
Chinese movie history, until then. 
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“The Opium War” tells the story of the Emperial Commissioner Lin Zexu (钦差大
臣林则徐), which in 1838, is sent to Guangzhou by then-Emperor Daoguang (道光
帝) of the Qing Dynasty (清朝), to stop the British merchants from selling opium to 
their Chinese counterparts, that through its trade had rendered the population weak 
and addicted, and caused the growth of corruption at all levels. 
Lin Zexu then, started to fight the commerce of opium in Guangzhou by punishing 
Chinese traders and officials who had offended the Celestial Empire (天朝大国) 
with their behaviour, and decided to seize and publicly destroy all the opium 
confiscated to the foreign traders10. Unexpectedly, England resolved by sending 
military navy, and attacked the Qing Empire (清帝国 ), which due to its 
underestimation of the situation, and its weak military power, had been forced to 
recognize their own defeat, and eventually signed the treaty of Nanjing (南京条约) 
on 29th August, 1842, relinquishing the territories of Hong Kong to the British 
Empire. 
Superficially, “The Opium War” is an important example of independent film 
production, and many of the positive reviews from China and abroad – influenced 
by the fact that the funding of the project derived from privately raised funds – 
showed astonishment in discovering that the movie couldn’t be charged as pure 
government propaganda, as many were perhaps expecting. Although, a more 
attentive analysis of the film, shows that the government involvement has been of 
great importance for the production of the movie; an involvement granted through 
direct and indirect support accorded by, for example, then-president Jiang Zemin (
江泽民), who’s meeting with Xie Jin assured him public visibility, or the retired 
warships provided by the navy for the scenes displaying the British military attack, 
or the free airfares to Xie Jin’s crew and cast to and from England received by 
China International Airlines, or yet the government support at the box office by the 
sponsoring of group viewings, and many other forms of encouragements as pointed 
out by Xiao Zhiwei11 in his essay on Xie Jin’s “The Opium war”. A further 
examination however, makes clear that the film is pervaded by nationalistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes, Standford University Press, 1958. Hsin-pao Chang, 
Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.         
11 Xiao Zhiwei, Nationalism in Chinese Popular Culture: A Case Study of The Opium War, in Exploring Nationalism of 
China: Themes and conflicts, Edited by C. X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu. Greenwood Press, 2000.	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elements, which served the economic and political policy of the Chinese regime in 
the 1990’s; or we could say that the new economic path undertaken by the Chinese 
government in the 1990’s, and started at the beginning of the Dengist era back in 
the 1980’s, has been also largely sustained by the deployement of nationalistic 
features in the film as part of its political strategy. 
As an expression of popular culture and as a product of a media and mediated 
representation, “The Opium War” offers an important account of the relationship 
between the state-government, the society and the market, throughout the 1990’s. 
This relationship, far from being understood as an immobile monolithic paradigm, 
should be rather approached, and comprehended with an awareness of the 
complexities, ambiguities and contradictions that distinguish any culture. Even 
words such as state-government, society and market above mentioned, remain 
empty semantic expressions, if not provided with the heterogeneous array of 
meanings and the different backgrounds whereby they arise from, running the risk 
of letting them vanish and become indefinite, and incapable of grasping any secure 
land, which is the very place upon which any analysis should start building its 
validity. The contingent features that characterize the cinematic expression, as well 
as other media forms, of the myth of Lin Zexu will allow me to show the modalities 
through which the process of nation-building in China (and not limited to it), is 
dependent on the arrangement and display of a set of familiar symbolic expressions 
(signs) able to make up and convey distinctive ideas and conceptualization of the 
Chinese nation, of its appropriate role in the world of nations, of the kind of 
relationship that the people should have, and the association they have with the 
territory of China and the authority that govern it.  
Xie Jin began shooting his historical film “The Opium War” on May 8, 1996 at 
Humen, a town in Guangdong province, located on the east bank of Pearl River 
Delta, a strategic gateway that allows ships to reach the eastern, northern and 
western regions of Guangdong. Besides its first-class port, which has represented a 
decisive factor in the development of domestic and international trade route, 
Humen is also famous as it was the venue where Lin Zexu, in 1839, supervised the 
destruction of about 20.000 boxes of seized opium, weighing over 118.5 million 
kilograms altogether, provoking the anger of the foreign merchants, which 
eventually led to the Opium war.  
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At the time of Xie Jin’s first shooting of “The Opium War”, in 1996, Guangdong 
province was already known as the nation’s “Gold Coast”. Since 1981, its economy 
had boomed unbelievably, with an annual economic growth that averaged 20 
percent. Since its opening to the international market, foreigners have poured 
billions of dollars into the province, becoming China’s promised land for many 
people, foreign investors and Chinese unemployed rural laborers, that every year 
flooded into the province, seeking success or better chances. Even though 
Guangdong province, since the beginning of the reform in 1978, has been more 
open, independent and enterpreneurial than other Chinese regions, it is not an 
isolated case of economic development.  
The relevance of a brief introductory political economy of the 1990’s in China, is 
motivated by the China’s rulers efforts to develop and modernize the country in 
order to become a prominent actor active in the international arena, and thus 
qualified to compete with the other powerful countries, a message accurately 
inscribed in the whole text of “The Opium War” as well as through the 
mythological construction of the figure of Lin Zexu. In fact, China’s military defeat 
during the Opium War (1842) by the hand of the British, and the contemporary (in 
the 1990’s) urgency for a military modernization – part of the actual message 
connoted by the movie – is an example of the role popular culture had since the 
1990’s on Chinese politics and economic, as well as on society and culture in 
general, in the attempt to gain support toward the official trajectory of economic 
Reform and Opening up, which in turn was strictly related to the social 
transformation occured in that period, and of which I will try to provide a general 
understanding in this preliminary account. 
The 1990’s in China have been characterized by an extraordinary impulse of the 
economy in urban and rural areas, rapid in the former and more ambiguous in the 
latter. After the slowdown caused by the troubled events of 1989 – partially 
sustained by the authorities – the relaunch of the economy has been, since then, the 
main concern of the ruling class. Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour (南巡), at the 
beginning of 1992, had a strong symbolic meaning in regard to the new economic 
trajectory that China undertook, a trajectory that actually had been drawn since 
1978, but that due to obstacles of different nature, had to be straightened out in a 
period (the 1990’s) whose political conditions allowed the ruling elite to better 
manage the economic opening. This new path was made official in the XIV 
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Congress of the CPC12 , with the adoption of the concept “socialist market 
economy” (社会主义市场经济). A concept strongly promoted by Deng Xiaoping, 
and justified with his own words in this way: “Practice of a planned economy is not 
equivalent to socialism because there is planning under capitalism too; Practice of 
a market economy is not equivalent to capitalism because there are markets under 
socialism too”. This has been a formula used by Deng Xiaoping that, on the one 
hand had the power to reassure the conservative faction of the party, which until 
then had obstructed the economic opening, and on the other hand had restored trust 
on the eyes of chinese enterpreneurs and foreign investors. The cinematic message 
encoded in the film can be best understood through an effort which attempts to 
reattach the text of “The Opium War” to the ideology that it sustains and utters, 
namely fervent patriotic nationalism, which in turn served (and still does) 
diversified interests that the movie is called to naturalize and normalize, in order to 
make then-present conditions, the 1990’s, to be seen as the natural convergence of 
social and economic circumstances, which are now backed by the intervention of a 
specific way of producing historical narrative that expresses itself through a precise 
media form, the movie.  
For this reason, If I were to assign a theoretical designation to the nature of this 
study, I would probably affirm that its main feature is represented by its hybridism. 
A necessity that cannot be escaped by reason of the diversified contexts in which 
the present study whishes to collocate itself. Indeed, a field of investigation as it is 
Chinese media studies, demand for a transcultural and multidisciplinary mode of 
inquiry, which takes into account heterogeneity and asymmetries, and that 
considers the hybrid nature of discourse and practice formation, which must 
therefore be reattached to the direct, indirect, and even oblique motivations that lie 
behind any production of texts13. A text, as I intend it, is a structure of meaning. It 
could contain images or words or sounds, both alone or together; those are related 
to each other within a context, and all the part of a text cohere and tell us something 
(R. P. Kolker, 2000). “Any event”, says Robert P. Kolker, “that makes meaning can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Communist Party of China (中国共产党). 
13 Natascha Gentz and Stefan Kramer, Globalization, Cultural Identity, and Media Representations, SUNY Press, 2006.  
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be called a text if we can isolate and define its outside boundaries and its internal 
structure – and our response to it.”14  
Applied to the specificity of the Chinese movie “The Opium War”, a text can be 
read only in relation to its narrative, its economy, its culture, its politics and yet, as 
suggested by Kolker, its production, distribution, exhibition and viewing. In this 
sense, by outlining pertinent features of the reformation proccess, and of the 
consequences it produced, I might be able to reattach them to the considerations 
that will originate from the  perusal of “The Opium War”. 
The economic reform launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 gradually integrated 
Chinese economy with the global capital and culture, and it had diverse effects on 
Chinese social life and on the system of signs circulating within society. Xudong 
Zhang explains these effets in this way:  
 
“On the one hand, it had exposed the Chinese market and the realm of daily life to 
global capital and to international fashions and ideologies…On the other hand, 
Chinese massive entry to, and penetration by, the world market also has enabled 
Chinese consumers to encounter a world of difference, often delineated in term of 
nation-state border.”15 
 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to better examine and understand the range and 
dimension of these changes occurring in China in the 1990’s, and see how media 
popular culture has been transformed and has transformed itself into a product, as 
well as an instrument of production of mass consumption. 
“The Opium War” as a media form of popular culture that “partakes of the 
communist/capitalist pacification project” (Sheldon H. Lu, 2001: 211), is the result 
of, and simultaneously expresses an uncertain process of cultural (re-)construction, 
which was part of a wider state-imposed reorganization of the materials and the 
principles for the production of (cultural) capital. In the 1990’s, industrial, 
technological and economic development have been the priorities of the Reform 
and Opening up (改革开放), and after 1989 it was clear that the political survival 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Robert P. Kolker, The Film Text and Film Form, in Film Studies: Critical approaches. Ed. by John Hill and Pamela 
C. Gibs, Oxford University Press, 2000, p – 10.  
15 Xudong Zhang, Nationalism, Mass Culture, and Intellectual Strategies in Post-Tiananmen China, in Social Text, No. 
55. Intellectual Politics in Post-Tiananmen China (Summer, 1998). Duke University Press. 
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of the ruling class and of the CPC fell into the agenda, too. Xie Jin’s movie may be 
seen under two major lens, which might highlight the ideological commitment of 
the movie and of the political era: nationalism and development. If in fact, we 
recognize that one central thematic concern accompanying the disocurse of national 
development in China has been the “humiliation for the atrocities inflicted upon the 
nation since the Opium War” (J. L. Qiu, 2003: 3), the framing and staging of the 
myth of Lin Zexu in the movie, though not limited to it, reveals how much 
important was for the Chinese political actors in the 1990’s, the necessity of 
providing a general ideological discourse that upholded China’s need of restoring 
its technical supremacy, and to put forward economic principles that were clearly in 
contrast with the traditional communist ideals. On the other side, China as a nation-
state soon found itself embedded within a global network of capital and culture 
whose signs, values and meanings strongly challenged the Party’s authority and 
capacity of providing social stability and legitimation to its policy and institutions, 
thus facing a significant confrontation with a series of problematics that have been 
dealt with through the production of a specific form of nationalism. “The Opium 
War” movie can thence be seen as a temporary answer to such difficulties, which 
were not only theoretic but became practical when applied to the socio-economic 
changes that many people went through. The public industries for example, 
represented a great concern over the years 1992-1998 in China. In fact in 1998, 
36% of public enterprises were in loss, and they employed something like 108 
million urban workers (Bergère, 2000). Traditionally, the public industries had 
represented a firm standpoint both in the organization of Chinese economy, and in 
the control of mass employement, and the authorities were well aware of the fact 
that any decision toward a decisive liberalization would have resulted, in the eyes 
of the million of laboures employed, as an aggression to one of the founding 
principle of socialism.  
“The Opium War” represents many different things that somehow are linked to each 
other. It represents the state’s effort at self-legitimation; it represents an agency for 
the implementation of a nation-building process; it represents a new step towards 
the successfull use of a media technology to produce popular content serving 
multifarious interests; it represents China’s re-territorialization under the guise of 
its alleged spontaneous form of social and political organization – a point  
constantly stressed in the narrative of the movie; it represents a special combination 
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between sovereignty, territory, and culture which gave rise to an imagined 
configuration of the Chinese state’s power asserting itself as a an eternal, legitimate 
political and spatial entity; it represents the inspiration and incentive to sustain the 
social and economic forces that were supposed to drive and boost the industrial-
technological development of/in China; it represents the commercial interests of the 
indigenous cultural industry (Emei Film Studio and Xie Jin’s Heng Tong Film & 
TV Company Ltd.), with its 15 million dollars production; it represents part of the 
ideological apparatus that was necessary to the political leaders, to the major 
economic actors, as well as to the foreign investors who started to pour billions of 
dollars into the middle king, and of which China had absolute need, in order to 
maintain its development credible both at home and outside. Therefore, “The Opium 
War” as a media popular form, through its format, genre and narrative provides – or 
at least tries to do so – political legitimation to the new path that China had 
undertook, and to the gradual dismissal of the previous Maoist ideology. 
Economically, the movie’s complex arrangement of encoded meanings aim at 
justifying the acceleration of the Reform and the consequent transformations 
brought about, through a system of signs epitomized and simultaneously deployed 
by the new media and information technology associated with global capital and 
culture, which meant new cultural forms that had a strong impact on the life of 
Chinese people, in terms of communication, of identity formation, and of general 
understanding of the self and the other, for the new relantionship with Western 
foreign countries (as a result of the Reform), exemplified also in the transnational 
flow of capital, images and people, engendered as well as imposed to find new 
ways of conceiving the relation between the territory (China), and the people 
(Chinese), namely nationhood and self-understanding. This was only a tiny part of 
the peculiar and precarious situation in which China stood. The social alteration 
caused by the economic development and the attempt to modernize China, have 
been ambiguous and not without negative consequences, and the major role of “The 
Opium War” has been exactly to smooth the negative alteration caused by the shift 
that China decided to undertake. The way the myth of Lin Zexu has been framed in 
the course of the movie – a subject matter discussed in the section below where a 
semiotic analysis is provided – designates at the same time the ideological, if not 
mythological, legacy of the Maoist past, which although needed to be corrected and 
appropriately addressed to fit the new course foreseen by Deng Xiaoping. In the 
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1980’s the politics of the “Four Modernization” (四个现代化) had already opened 
the way for a social renovation, but it is only in the 1990’s that we see part of the 
Chinese people joining the universal popular culture of industrialization. 
At a superficial level, the Chinese reform started in 1978 and accelerated in the 
1990’s, is seen as an attempt to modernize China in line with the already advanced 
countries, and to develop its economy by allowing foreign capital/technology and 
tourists to enter its territory. But if we look deeper at the implications of the process 
of opening to the international market and global capitalism, we see that it also 
gave rise to what we call global populare culture which, as de Oliveira Jesus says, 
is “based on the reification of the image, a celebration of diversity and 
individuality, and the exaltation of everyday life”.16 The transformations in the 
everyday life caused by the opening to global capital, and by the devolopment of 
the media and information technologies, along with the overwhelming use of TV, 
computer technologies, videorecorders, digital photocameras, the increasing use of 
the Internet, and the consequent growth in the communication of informations, 
capital and people, and yet the globalization of labor, the decentralization of the 
market and the growing competition-mentality, all these factors and many others, 
strongly contributed to a decisive and rapid social transformation which brought to 
a world of confusion, tensions and contradictions.17 As a form of media popular 
culture, “The Opium War” can then be seen as a successful conveyor of a 
contemporary (media) mythology that strived against the social imbalances caused, 
also, by the same (media) technology – if we consider it as a part of the whole 
process of Reform and Opening up.  
This mythology, detailed illustrated below, expresses itself as a media aesthetics 
that results from criterions dictated by principles of a market and consumer-driven 
society, by the movie’s commitment at conveying national feelings, by the need to 
accelerate the economic growth without delegitimizing the political authority of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Marco A. de Oliveira Jesus, Postmodernism with Chinese Characteristic: Media and Politics in the Cinematic 
Images of the Post New-Era, Master’s degree thesis, 2005, p-36.	  
17 Issued in 1995 by the Chinese government, “The Provisional Guidlines for Foreign Investment Projects” (外商投资
项目的临时文件), aimed at guiding the orientation of foreign investment so to keep them in line with the national 
economy and social development planning of China. A narrow focus on the document, unravel that the most important 
objectives of the guideline sought to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI), which would introduce advanced 
technology into designated industries; the information technology and communication, and the electronic sector were, at 
the end of the 1990’s, the major targets of FDI. 
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country, and above all by the visuality that it encourages, if not imposes, that is the 
cinematic codes and conventions utilized to allow a precise imagining of China 
within a broad, transnational visual culture. Consumerism, individuality, 
differentiation, are all definitions of the ideals and beliefs that the movie cunningly 
uttered, although their apparently opposite principles (nationalism, patriotic 
feelings, homogenization of forms) are connoted inasmuch to rise as the main 
meanings. When I say that the trajectory undertook by China, since the Reform Era, 
gave birth to a world of confusion, of contradictions and inequalities, I attempt to 
underline the growing importance and impact that a new system of values and of 
forms, clearly illustrated by Xie Jin’s movie, had on what too much generically we 
call China. These values and forms were not pertinent to, and a result of, a single 
specific category, which would be that of the society, of the state or of the market. 
It is rather a result of an intertwined relationship between them. Political ideology 
has been tremendously affected by economic considerations. Economic decisions 
have been deeply influenced by political reflections and struggle. Many different 
form of social configurations and practices have been determined by, and drawn the 
attention of political and economic actors and institutions, while at the same time 
had them inspired and stimulated by the society itself.  
The movie “The Opium War” conveys the myth of Lin Zexu to utter a precise 
thinking, a specific way of consuming knowledge produced to generate a distinct 
idea of the world, but also of the self, both individually and collectively – the myth 
of Lin Zexu connotes at the same time shared national feelings that lead toward the 
idea of a national community whithin which the people as a collectivity think and 
act; and individual aspirations promoted by the peculiar framing of the media figure 
of Lin Zexu, which through its constant righteousness, focus, and desire to know, is 
able to accomplish (by means of its individual ambition to serve the great good) any 
task it is presented with. However, as Barthes says in “Mythologies”, the 
decipherment of a myth requires the identification of its motivations, whithout 
which the myth cannot be justified. A specific form of nationalism could be 
considered in general terms as the foundations of the myth of Lin Zexu in Xie Jin’s 
movie. The complex dismissal of the Maoist ideology undertaken since the 1980’s 
by Deng Xiaoping, hadn’t been replaced by a coherent ensemble of guiding 
principles; rather concepts such as “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济
) or “seeking the truth from facts” (实事求是), became the redundant lullabies 
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which served to remind that a new path but with socialist characteristic had been 
undertaken, or better, that the old same path (the socialist way) now displays some 
new features (marketisation, mixed ownership)18. The new conditions imposed by 
the Reform and Opening up policy, had profound repercussions in the everyday life 
of people at all levels. Political and ideological discourses (in the Maoist guise of 
mass mobilization and class struggle) were gradually substituted by mass 
consumption. New alliances between bureaucracy and local enterprises have led off 
to different form of nepotism, and corruption grew esponentially, to a certain extent 
money became the supreme good (Bergère, 2000).  
It was in this very state of things, namely the decline of traditional ideology, and 
consequently the need for legitimacy, that nationalism - in the form of a new 
nationalistic consciousness, and rendered possible through the media production 
and deployment of nationalistic features – could arise to the rank of main ideology 
in China in the 1990’s. The necessity for this form of legitimation is primarily 
motivated by the longing to support the neoliberal principles of the new market, and 
to rationalize the state apparatus to the global economy; a process that couldn’t 
have been sustained by the socialist doctrine as conceived by Mao’s China. Far 
from being that form of nationalism traceable in pre-reform China, which 
highlighted patriotic sentiments vs imperialism, or class struggle vs bourgeoisie, all 
directed toward an unconditional affirmation of the party; China’s nationalism of 
the 1990’s, possesses a different structure, deployment and objective, and more 
important is the result of an extremely confused and intricate pragmatic ambiguity, 
not in regard to the message displayed, but rather in respect to the forces that it 
sustained (political, economic, intellectual). As a cinematic narrative, the myth of 
Lin Zexu in the movie displays a complex cultural network to which it provides 
legitimacy and validation, and somewhat concealing and obscuring the 
unwillingness, rather than the inability, of Chinese politics to face responsabilities 
for the social inequalities and uncertainty that the Reform brought about. The 
Communist Party extended its internal modality of confrontation – that is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping enunciated the “Four Cardinal Principle” (四项基本原则): upholding the Socialist 
Path; upholding the People’s Democratic Dictatorship; upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China; 
upholding Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism. In september 1997, those four principles were written into the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, albeit concepts such as class struggle and constant revolution were not 
mentioned.  	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compromise, bargain, negotiate and even struggle between party members – to the 
entire Chinese politics. The ruling and technocratic elite, lacking long-term social 
planning, as well as work to “critically analyze contemporary Chinese society and 
culture” (Zhang, 2001: 5), was instead inclined toward an approach based on 
constant compromise and negotiation with the multiple social actors19. A condition 
that relentlessly affected the State, which resulted impoverished and undermined, as 
Xudong Zhang suggests: 
“The State must be considered a remaining or reinvented ideological sham 
necessary for real power operations on both subnational and supranational levels. 
In other words, the uniformity of the Chinese State must now be regarded as a 
function or agency of the economic, social, and ideological reconfigurations driven 
by global and local forces and interests.”20 
With such a foundation, Chinese nationalism attempted to grant an ideological 
fulfillment that overshadowed the State’s desorientation vis-à-vis disparity and 
social fragmentation (Xudong Zhang, 2001). 
Therefore, Chinese nationalism of the 1990’s served the need for definition and 
identification of the self against new spaces of interaction (Lin Zexu’s 
confrontation with the British connotes dichotomies such as East vs West, China vs 
the world, the self vs the other, development vs tradition, private vs public and so 
on), both domestic and international, which challenged the everyday life through 
rampant flows of informations, images, fashions, and even what I call 
‘commercials’ ideologies’ (the increase of advertisements as complex set of 
meanings associated with various aspect of social life, and thus able to cognitively 
transcend the objects or services offered in the advertisements). The rise of a global 
culture within Chinese society, becoming in the meanwhile more and more 
consumeristic and diversified, had precipitated the need for individual and 
collective repositioning within a frame of reference in which, identity and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In my opinion, the political sphere of the 1990’s has been, among other things, characterized by an approach that has 
determined the measures and operations to be taken, depending on the needs that the moment and the situation required. 
It seems to me that in some ways, that typical mode of negotiating power and decisions peculiar of the diverse factions 
within a political party, namely to bargain, treat and retreat inorder to reach compromise – and which has distinguished 
the extraordinary effort put by Deng Xiaoping in riding the rushing and sudden waves provoked by the strong political 
factions within the CCP – it seems that this attitude or manner had been expanded to all areas of the public domain.  	  
20 Xudong Zhang, The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview, in Whiter China, 
Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China, Ed. by Xudong Zhang, Duke University Press, 2001. 
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subjectivity were re-defined in opposition to an outside (not to be intended only as a 
foreign outside) that aroused curiosity, as well as bewilderment. “Nationalism must 
of necessity reconstruct a national culture as both a means of ideological 
legitimation and a goal of social reconstruction” (Liu Kang, 2004: 41). “The 
Opium War” thus contemporarily stages nationalism as a form of cultural 
hegemony preserving the ruling class from political unrest (something perhaps 
learned in 1989), supposedly caused by a course of action (the effects of the 
Reform) that wouldn’t bestow a firm grasp of then-present conditions; while on the 
other side the kind of nationalism encouraged by the movie and by the figure of Lin 
Zexu served to stage the triumph of economic success. The myth of Lin Zexu in 
this sense is central for it is produced to provide a sense of belonging and of ardent 
patriotism employed to create an extensive and popular support to the new 
economic path. The lack of vision sprang from, and caused by the new economic 
path, eroded the ideological discourse – Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, 
class struggle and mass mobilization – that until then had represented the main 
source for the political course (or its appearances), and the main leading feature for 
identity formation among people, which undoubtedly relied on, more or less, fixed 
set of symbols and meanings. Many of the decisions taken by the government and 
the party in the 1990’s, such as the granting of better tax conditions to the workers 
of the state-owned steel industries after the riots in 1994, or more in general the 
adjustment and retreat, the acceleration and slowing down of the Reform, indicate 
the absence of a firm referential standpoint that the media representation of the 
myth of Lin Zexu, and the “The Opium War” movie in general had to surrogate. 
Clearly enough, the ideology conveyed by the movie and by our hero’s mythology 
was not the only one in play at the time, nor carried alone all the weight of the 
ruler’s unwillingness to plan and conduct a much more equilibrated transformation 
of/in China.  
In fact, the 1990’s in China were a decade in which, various forms of nationalism 
can be identified – and among which that communicated by the movie is only one 
version – all of them representative of a broad effort aimed at the organization 
(perhaps poorely conceived) of a hegemonic ideological network. In this sense, it is 
possible to single out the “Patriotic Education Campaign” (爱国主义教育) that 
began in 1991, as one of these forms. Zheng Wang, in his study on Chinese national 
humiliation, explains that “this campaign is a nationwide mobilization effort 
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targeted mainly at Chinese youth. As a central part of the campaign, Beijing called 
upon the entire nation to study China’s humiliating modern history and how much 
the country has been changed by the Communist revolution”21. In order to do so the 
Party conducted a revisionism of school’s history textbooks, in which a new 
patriotic narrative took the place of Maoist’s class struggle narrative, and a new 
victimization discourse has been highlighted in this new narrative. Very 
generically, the aim of the campaign was that of shaping young generations in the 
form of patriotic citizens which would, on one side, recognize the political system 
of the CPC’s one party rule and its glorification, while blaming West for China’s 
suffering and humiliation on the other side. The campaign launched in 1991, hadn’t 
been carried out at full scale until 1994, and since then it has been politically 
sustained till today22. 
The myth of Lin Zexu in the movie seems to provide a consolation and a utopian 
appeal. Being Lin Zexu a historical, national hero, its mythical relevance is deeply 
rooted in that, culturally produced, ideal space that since the foundation of the 
People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国) in 1949, has been filled with 
nationalistic narratives and ideas with the purpose of creating a national historical 
tradition or mythology able to yield a sense of continuity with the past, and which 
still today, though differently, is a powerful and effective ideological instrument. In 
other words, the representation of Lin Zexu in the movie “The opium War”, 
although the clear shifts (changed the interests, changed the meanings) that its 
mythology has undergone since the Maoist era23, and the consequent attempts to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Zheng Wang, National Humiliation, History Education and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education 
Campaign in China, International Study Quarterly (2008) 52, p -784. 
22 Another form of nationalism that I wish to highlight, is that provided by what Michael Billig in his book “Banal 
Nationalism”. By this term the author stresses the attention to the countless situations in which, in the course of a day, 
the concept of nation is emphasized and accentuated in such a way, as to make it seems the most natural thing in this 
world. According to Billig, the idea of nation and of national identity is a background always present in the discourse of 
politicians, as well as in many other cultural products such as television, magazines, daily newspapers, the flags in the 
institutional buildings, emblemes, the national football team etc.. The aim of this omnipresent nationalism, has the 
power to naturalize the idea(l) of  nation and, in an underhand manner, it constantly reminds us of being part of that 
nation. Although the study of Billig tends toward an approach that wants to point out that a nationalistic discourse, 
despite what many people might thing, is still conducted in those Western and democratic countries that traditionally 
are not considered as such, this same analysis can be easily applied to China of the 1990’s, for in that period it had 
already entered, albeit at a different stage, the realm of everyday life, meaning that a universal popular culture had 
already started to stage its own features, and thus shaping new type of individuals within Chinese society, often using 
the same means as in in those Western countries recalled by Billig. 
23 During the Maoist era the myth of Lin Zexu served different political needs (anti-emperialistic ideas, anti-capitalistic 
principles, anti-bourgeoise behaviours, and so on).	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renew its functions within Chinese society, as a “process of formalization and 
ritualization, characterized by reference to the past” (Hobsbawm, 1983: 4), it is 
still attached to a specific Chinese old-fashioned mass culture of which a 
contemporary nostalgia, though mostly expressed in a consumeristic manner, is a 
recognizable form. The myth of Lin Zexu seems to belong to the olympus of the 
great fathers of modern China. Its figure, as expressed by Xie Jin’s media product, 
with its confucian fashion and nationalistic ardour, conveys a comfort and a utopian 
relief to disperse and dissolve the anxieties of daily life in the 1990’s, in China. 
As stated in the first pages of this chapter, “The Opium War” aims at rendering a 
historical account of the facts occured in China between 1838-1842, which led to 
the British military attack known as the ‘Opium War’. 
This is the very first aim of the movie; that of providing a “historical account” of 
the… But what does it really mean to provide a historical account? What processes 
does it really contemplate, and why it is so normal to ignore, as often happens, the 
idea that the past can be thought, represented and reproduced? 
The historical time, as we know it, is a singular time organized in a set of stages of 
development, or, to quote Timothy Mitchell, “is singular, moving from one stage of 
development to another” (Mitchell, 2000: 8). The concept of modern history is 
strictly bond to the idea of time, rendered as a progression on the axis of human 
development, which goes from an indefinite archaic stage, to a presumable endless 
one. For instance, if we look at China and England, we would almost certainly say 
that the present historical trajectory of England, places it at an advanced stage of 
development than that of China, and perhaps, we would say the same for China if 
compared with a country as, say Thailand. What associates them, is that they all 
have a place in modern history, they are all part of the same singular historical time, 
they are part of a single narrative. “The narrative”, affirms Mitchell, “is structured 
by the progression of a principle, whether it be the principle of human reason or 
enlightenment, technical rationality or power over nature”(Mitchell, 2000: 9).  
This understanding of time and of history, hasn’t always been present. It is rather 
the product of specific dynamics active in a distinct moment, and perhaps in 
different regions of the world. The dynamics I’m referring to, are those carried out 
by the development of global capital, whose forces – mode of production, 
organization of labour, accumulation of capital itself – deriving also from the 
exploitation of human labour and resources in the colonial projects, had a decisive 
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impact on social relations and on the organization of political spatialization, an 
impact that corresponded to the creation of the territorial state, as the more suitable 
way to produce and accumulate capital (Minca, Bialasiewicz, 2004), and of which 
the media framing and staging of the myth of Lin Zexu in the movie, though not 
limited to it, is the modern symbolic version in support to such conceptualization of 
time and history. 
“The dispersed geographies of modernity were reorganized into stages of Europe’s 
past, where discrepant developments outside Europe are translated into something 
else: expression of time itself”. This is how Timothy Mitchell (2000: 9) expresses 
the constitution of a singular historical time, and he continues by presenting 
histories as variations of a universal history, in relation to which they receive their 
meanings. “Singular does not mean uniform. In different countries, the historical 
process assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different 
orders of succession, and at a different periods. But these differences can only be 
thought of as different in relation to an underlying uniformity.” The figure of Lin 
Zexu produced cinematically in the 1997’s movie, emerges as the urgent need of 
recognizing this underlying uniformity, to recognize the historical time in contrast 
to the Qing Dynasty’s misrecognition24. 
Walter Benjamin speaks about a “homogeneous empty time”25, a time container 
marked by calendar and clockwork, which allows society, understood as a 
sociological organism, to move calendrically through a homogeneous empty time. 
Benedict Anderson, in his “Imagined Communities” uses Benjamin’s theory to 
explain the idea of nation, seen as a cohesive community moving steadly through 
history; a concept that opend up the way to the quantification and representation of 
historical time in modern societies, and which allowed the state and social groups 
not formally organized, as pointed out by Eric Hobsbawm, to invent traditions in 
order to provide a cultural and historical foundation, for the creation of a national 
identity, based on a shared historical origin, and common tradition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Rebecca Karl in her “The Burdens of History: Lin Zexu (1959) and “The Opium War” (1997), provides an important 
account on the contemporary understanding of China’s defeat in the Opium War, highlighting the concept of (the 
Qing’s) misrecognition of the (world) historical momentum. 
25 Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History, Gesammelten Schriften I:2. Suhrkamp Verlag. Frankfurt am Main, 
1974. 
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In the reading of the movie “The Opium War”, I believe it is useful and necessary 
to explore the complex ways through which social practices, narrative, images, 
myths, and sounds are bound together in the production of meaning, and/or  
ideology, as Douglas Kellner would probably say. Nevertheless, a thorough 
investigation, also requires to take into account, and unravel, those dimensions that 
we often ignore, and never question. A normal activity such as watching Xie Jin’s 
“The Opium War” - a movie that, before deploying its vast array of constructs, 
pretends to provide a historical account – actually conceals the basic principle that 
lies behind the constitution of nationalism and nation, hence rendering possible the 
shaping of a national identity. Consequently, modern historical time is the departure 
point upon which “The Opium War” has been conceived and realized.  
What is more remarkable, is the intrinsic coherence that has been given, since then 
(since the production of historical time), to human experience and to all human 
products; a coherence that has allowed the production and representation of a 
specific idea of reality. A reality that required and still requires to be perpetually re-
produced and represented, which in turn is a commitment almost integrally 
accomplished by the media. Media culture, in fact, is not an innocent cultural 
product, as it isn’t innocent its message. Xie Jin’s work is no exception. Douglas 
Kellner argues that “media culture is a contested terrain across which key social 
groups and competing political ideologies struggle for dominance and that 
individuals live these struggles through the images, discourses, myths, and 
spectacles of media culture” (Kellner, 1995: 2). 
Providing materials out of which creating and shaping a wide system of reference 
within which people draw their sense of identity, of nationality, of good and bad, of 
sexuality, of otherness and sameness, of homogeneity and heterogeneity, is the 
everyday task of media culture. It is also one of the most prominent sectors of the 
global economy, which also justify why it is a terrain of competing forces. In 
1990’s China, many of the traditional social institutions still present in the 1980’s 
were gone. The people’s commune (人民公社 ) introduced in 1958, had 
disappeared in 1984; the division of the population into political categories had 
vanished; the system of registration which differentiated rural and urban residents 
had lost part of its efficacy; the work units (单位), which had expressed the 
attachment of the traditional working elite to the public sector, and which had 
represented the fundamental social and spatial unit of urban China under socialism, 
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appeared in the 1990’s as a corporativistic practice that fought in order to defend 
the old privileges. The active26 participation of the population to the development 
brought about a world of differences and of inequalities. 
Now, in order to highlight in the movie those peculiar components displaying 
nationalistic features, whose aim is to sustain the shaping of a national identity in 
the process of nation-building – a process characterized by the dismissal of Maoist 
radical ideology (i.e., class struggle and mobilization, anti-imperialism, anti-
capitalism, constant revolution), in favour of a market-oriented ideology, which 
would justify then-present party policy of openess to global capital and 
international market, as well as the ongoing modernization of the country and of the 
institutions of the state, and last but not least, to encourage people’s trust and 
devotion to the party and its members, with the clear intent to avoid social 
opposition and politicization – I have decided to distinct the analysis of “The 
Opium War” in two different approaches. In the attempt to realize this purpose, the 
first approach will provide a semiotic analysis of the figure of Lin Zexu intended as 
a vehicle – in the form of myth – whereby “the national” (devotion, belonging, 
common origin and culture and, in the specificity of the figure of Lin Zexu, high 
moral values) becomes the inevitable and natural background by which it is 
possible to develop and further – this being part of the second approach – other 
argumentations on specific meanings cunningly encoded in the narrative of the 
movie. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The term active refers to the use of the new means provided by the process of opening and of the reform. 
	   36	  
1.  A semiotic analysis 
 
As I affirmed in the introduction to this research, understanding the myth of Lin 
Zexu means to get hold of the motivations that have engendered its production and 
communication, which in turn means to acknowledge the discourse by way of the 
signification uttered (Barthes, 1957). As an agency to mainstreaming national 
feelings, the representation of Lin Zexu is to be semiotically explored in order to 
recognize and decipher the semiological systems that produce its myth and allow 
the signification process to successfully occur.	   	  The need for a semiotic analysis 
also lies in the urgence to unfold meaning encoded into “all kinds of human 
products, from words, symbols, narratives, paintings, and comic books to scientific 
theories and mathematical theorems”27. The urgency to unfold encoded meanings 
lies in the demand for de-naturalization and  re-politicization of all those aspects 
and things that express meaning.  
As said above, the aim of this study is to examine the motivations behind the 
representation of the myth of Lin Zexu in Xie Jin’s “The opium War”. Quoting 
Roland Barthes, I could say that Lin Zexu – as represented in the movie – is a 
depoliticized speech, history that becomes nature, contingency that becomes 
eternal, politics that becomes the very state of reality, an innocent essence, a myth. 
Barthes in his “Mythologies”28 tells us that a myth has the task of giving a historical 
intention a natural justification (Barthes, 1956), and adds that a myth is a type of 
speech. 
What does it mean to say that Lin zexu is a myth? When Barthes sais that the myth 
is a type of speech, he means that the myth is a system of communication which 
carries a message, and “the myth is the specific way to utter this message”29.  
Hence in our case, Lin Zexu is the particular way through which a specific message 
is expressed. 
Lin Zexu’s representation throughout the movie, is encoded in such a way, as to 
infuse its figure with features tending toward a reading which mythically portrays 
Lin Zexu as a hero. Camera positioning and lighting, as well as music, frame Lin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Marcel Danesi, The Quest for Meaning: A guide to Semiotic Theory and Practice, University of Toronto Press, 2007 
28 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, The Noonday Press, 1991 
29 Ibidem 
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Zexu by glorifying its image, and infusing him with positivity, promoting full 
devotion and unassailable loyalty to the nation and to the Chinese long standing 
culture and civilization.  
In its first appearance in the movie, Lin Zexu wears a Chinese scholar dress, his 
head is half shaved in compliance with the typical Qing Dynasty’s use of pigtail, he 
also has long mustache, and the traditional thin long beard. Lin Zexu is seated at a 
desk (presumably at home), and holds a writing brush, with which he is writing a 
personal account on opium that will be dispatched to Emperor Daoguang (visible in 
the next scene). 
While Lin Zexu is writing, behind him we clearly see a bookshelf filled with books, 
and a series of traditional Chinese paintings hanged on the wall. 
At a level of denotation, this scene shows Lin Zexu – a scholar official -  seated at a 
desk, writing an account on opium, with the voice-over providing the content of his 
writing. Nonetheless, its connotations are multiple, and are a result of the 
arrangement of the figure of Lin Zexu along with the objects he is surrounded by, 
the voice-over, and the music. In this regard, we can observe that Lin Zexu’s dress, 
the writing brush he is holding, and the books on sight, are all symbols which 
connote him as a well educated figure, and above all, ascribe Chinese traditional 
features of advancement and progress in the various art to Lin Zexu itself. The 
scholar dress and the books leave no doubt about Lin Zexu’s belonging to the group 
of Chinese intellectuals, whose role, according to Chinese tradition, was one of 
defending, however unsuccessfully, moral values rather than performing great 
tasks. In this scene Lin Zexu is positioned at the center of the camera shot, and the 
objects above mentioned (the books on the bookshelf, the paintings, the various 
tools and handicrafts on the desk), all surround him, connoting that he is a 
representative of Chinese culture; not just of contemporary culture (that of Lin 
Zexu), but of the long-standing culture, which made China to be known as a great 
civilization. Indeed, the paintings hanged behind Lin Zexu, reminds us of this 
ancient Chinese fine art, which requires the skill of using strokes and ink; the books 
are there to connote the great contribution given to human knowledge provided by 
the Chinese Classics; the objects on the desk, such as the brush leaned against the 
proper base, the ink pot, and the small jar in porcelain, are all features of the high 
level reached by Chinese manufacturing. 
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Hence, the entire scene presents Lin Zexu overwhelmed by Chinese traditional art 
features, which require absolute affection, passion, and rigorousness in their 
apprehension and command, as we see in the moment in which Lin Zexu holding 
the writing brush, brushes it against the ink with a touch of stroke typical of 
someone absolutely confident with the art of calligraphy. He therefore embodies 
China’s cultural tradition, not only that of his time, but Chinese culture as a whole. 
The use of the voice-over allows us to aknowledge the content of the letter that Lin 
Zexu is writing to Emperor Daoguang, adding an important signifying to the figure 
of Lin Zexu which will be constant during the entire movie: 
 
“Rampant opium use has become a serious threat to the Celestial Empire. In my 
opinion, if we do nothing, within ten years, the Qing Dynasty’s treasury will be 
drained and the country will be defenseless. Foreign could conquer our nation 
without using force”. 
 
According to the voice-over, in Lin Zexu’s regard, the main concern is the use of 
opium as a main threat to the Celestial Empire, to the Qing Dynasty, to the country, 
and ultimately to the nation. The focus is thus on opium as devil, as a menace to the 
treasury of the dynasty, and consequently to the security of the entire country. 
Foreigners are mentioned only in the last sentence, for they are not the primary 
mattern of concern. Indeed, the focus on opium reveal that Lin Zexu’s attention is 
aimed to save the country from the corruption and moral deviation caused by the 
rampant opium use. At a level of denotation, the content of the voice-over 
cristallize the figure of Lin Zexu as a scholar-official whose preoccupation are 
social and political, inasmuch as he is worried for the sort of the celestial empire 
and for the political survival of the Qing Dynasty. The connotation of the voice-
over tell the viewer that the nation is the only thing that matters, that there is no 
future without a healthy country, and that only through an absolute devotion and 
sheer patriotic behaviour is possible to save the nation, without which everything 
that exist (the Great Chinese Culture already embodied in Lin Zexu) would be 
wiped out. 
Therefore, the first scene in which Lin Zexu appears, is constructed in such a way 
as to deploy its image in the form of a myth (as shown in the rest of the movie), a 
national hero whose attachment to the nation, whose patriotic behaviour and moral 
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integrity, all converge together to invite the audience to identify with him. Thence  
the lengthy takes and close-ups present in this first scene, all overlaid by soft flutes 
melody which add positivity to the character, should thus be read in this sense. 
In an other sequence of the film, Lin Zexu visits Emperor Daoguang in the 
Emperial Palace. This scene is particularly significant, for it provides relevant and 
central features to the image of Lin Zexu. In their meeting Lin Zexu appears to the 
viewer bent on his knees (kowtow, 磕头) in front of the Emperor, as a sign of 
respect to the authority and to the emperial protocol. The low camera angle behind 
Lin Zexu is positioned so to make the audience identify with him while being 
bowed down, whereas the emperor/authority, on his desk, asks him whether he has 
a solution to the opium problem or not. Only when asked to talk Lin Zexu raises his 
head, adding in this way solemnity to the moment. In this scene Lin Zexu wears the 
proper Qing Dynasty’s dress. Indeed, during the Qing Dynasty (and not only), there 
were regulations that codified dress for the imperial family, the Qing court and 
court officials, distinguishing the ruling elité and government from the population. 
Those like Lin Zexu who passed the civil service examination and attained the 
status of a government official were granted the privilege of wearing court robes. 
The rank was further distinguished by a hierarchy of colour and ornamentation. 
Rank was therefore a sign of accomplishment and status. There were nine grades of 
civil officials, represented by birds motifs. Lin Zexu’s depiction in “The Opium 
War”, presents him with a “manchurian crane” motif (actually the camera never 
allows the viewer to see entirely and in detail the picture on the badge, nevertheless, 
after having compared the different bird images of the Qing Dynasty along with the 
one displayed in the movie, I’ve come to the conclusion that the bird in Lin Zexu’s 
badge is the crane, despite its resemblance to the “wild goose”), embedded on his 
badge, and shown in the front and back, which corresponds to the first rank in the 
civil official hierarchy, which in turn has a symbolic meaning of “longevity and 
wisdom”. As for the trumpet-shaped hat wore by our hero, it constists of a black 
velvet cap with a finial on the top, whose colour and shape depended on the 
wearer’s grade. Lin Zexu’s finial on the top of the hat seems to be a solid red ball, 
corresponding to a first or second grade, depending on whether it is a ruby 
(chaoguan) or a coral. During the Qing Dynasty, those who achieved special 
distinction at court, were granted the right to wear peacock feather plume in their 
hat, showing one, two or three eyes, depending on the recipient’s rank. The peacock 
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feather plume was thus attached to the hat by a jade tube or a glass imitation. Lin 
Zexu’s depiction shows him wearing a hat with a knob (red ruby or coral?) and 
with the plume, a distinction which positions him, as a scholar-official, at the 
highest levels of the emperial civil hierarchy. In the scene Lin Zexu also wears a 
long necklace, which was another indicator of status, and whose materials were 
carefully regulated. It is said that the court necklace was patterned after a mala (a 
string of Tibetan prayers beads) that was given to the Emperor Shunzhi (順治帝,	  
1644 – 1661) as a gift from the Dalai Lama, and since then, the court necklace has 
been a constant throughout all the reigns of the twelve Qing Emperors. In the entire 
scene, Lin Zexu’s appropriate dress, hat and necklace - which I might call Lin 
Zexu’s fashion -  suggests not only that he is unquestionably a member of the ruling 
elité, a devoted servant of the Qing Dynasty/government, but also that he embodies 
the very essence of both politics and Chinese culture. He speaks even when he is 
silent; its character is conceived and staged to produce meaning every instant.  
However, Lin Zexu doesn’t express only devotion. He shows trust and has 
confidence in the capacity of the Emperor/authority to defeat the plague of opium: 
 
“It is my opinion that if your Majesty issues an order… 
 
The “If” he uses is so important inasmuch as let’s the audience assume that it is 
only a matter of doing something, in order to eradicate the use of opium, and thus 
suggesting the idea that the authority, has the right, and above all the strength and 
power to do it, which in turn, legitimate its right to act. Lin Zexu as a myth, staged 
to be a national hero, puts himself in the hands of the emperor/authority, to whom 
he is devoted to, through a natural/political/moral bond as expressed in the 
continuation of the dialogue: 
 
“It is my opinion that if your Majesty issues an order, the cabinet enacts 
prohibitions and customs rigorously enforces them, I’m certain that opium can be 
wiped out. Your Majesty’s power can destroy any monster”. 
 
Politics is possible only if there is a unity of purposes and everybody operates and 
behave for the good of the Empire/Nation/Qing Dynasty/Party-government. 
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The identification with Lin Zexu is equal to an identification with the attachment to 
the authority, and his affection to the Celestial Empire, is a kind of affection that all 
the people/citizens should have toward the nation and the government. 
Lin Zexu is duty bound and ready to sacrifice himself for the Celestial Empire, as 
he says; although, as displayed in the film, the sacrifice will be that of sadly leaving 
his former teacher, Lu Zifang (himself addicted to opium), being prosecuted by the 
Emperor, in order to prove Lin Zexu’s loyalty to the cause and to the country. Lin 
Zexu is on his knees almost for the entire scene in front of the Emperor. The only 
moment when he stands on his feet is when the doors behind him opens revealing 
Lu Zifang (being also Emperor Daoguang’s former teacher) in chain, waiting for 
capital punishment. Here Lin Zexu finds himself confronted with a choice: 
imploring Daoguang in the attempt to save his teacher, or sacrifice him for the 
Empire’s sake.  
As Rebecca Karl has pointed out, Lin zexu is bound to Lu Zifang “out of a 
traditional teacher-student loyalty”, but on the other hand he is also bond to the 
emperor-official relationship. The scene thus presents Lin Zexu apparently trapped 
between two confucian obbligation, toward his teacher and his emperor. Even 
though Lin Zexu suffers in seeing his own teacher prosecuted – his attachment to 
him is shown through the changing of his posture, from on his knees to on his feet – 
his expression never hesitates; rather, after Lu Zifang is escorted to his destiny, and 
Lin Zexu returns in the dim room in front of Daoguang, his gaze shows 
determination and no trace of hesitation; the door closes behind Lin Zexu, 
connoting that he is leaving personal feelings behind, and that he is ready to 
undertake the task at all costs. Then he prostrates. 
Music is alway solemn and it adapts itself easily with the austerity atmosphere and 
dim light present in the scene. The choice of the indoor location for the 
confrontation of political issues is another signfier, which again suggests that any 
matters of a certain importance, such as the social disruption caused by the opium, 
or the later territorial issue, are to be discussed within the only possible avenue, the 
Emperial palace. We assist at a naturalization of the fact that politics has a proper 
place (the state’s institutions), and that only those (party members) who are 
empowered to move within these places, have legitimacy to discuss and take 
adequate measures in order to solve political matters. It is thus represented the 
mechanism of a modern nation-state, where political representatives meet and 
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discuss daily issues within building that embody the very essence of power. In this 
case the naturalization that occurs, aims to create the impression that what we see 
on the screen is as normal as in the reality/present.  
In another scene Lin Zexu questions some Chinese rich merchants, accused of 
being guarantors for all foreign ships that carry opium, and of bribing officials in 
order to sell opium freely. Again the location is indoor, and the light is dim, as in 
most of the indoor sequences. The indicteds are genuflected in front of Lin Zexu, 
which is seated behind a desk on a dais. He is positioned at the center of the camera 
shot, and the set of the stage in this scene clearly reminds of a court room. The 
focus of the discussion between Lin Zexu and the accused, is on opium and 
corruption: 
 
“Now there is opium everywhere, breaking up millions of families, killing millions 
of people, and robbing the Great Qing of million of silver”. 
 
Lin Zexu says something significant for the understanding of the film’s message. 
As we see, trade and foreigners are not even mentioned; in Xie Jin’s work all the 
sequences and statements are structured and staged in conformity to the political 
course of the 1990’s. Hence opium becomes the very devil, a disruptor of families, 
an illegal drug which breaks up the Chinese society.  Furthermore, the accused are 
all Chinese people, suggesting that moral corruption is to be eradicated on the 
Chinese side, which is exactly the very core of the issue in Lin Zexu’s concern. By 
punishing the corrupted and deviated immorals, the country can be saved. The 
actual debate is within China; it is in fact, because of its weakness that the British 
Empire will humiliate China.  At the beginning of this scene, the lengthy take and 
close up, which center on Lin Zexu, tend to deify the character, suggesting his 
mythic patriotism.  
The Chinese merchants in front of Lin Zexu not only represent China’s guilt in 
front of the audience, but they also provide a resolution of the historical trauma 
caused by the opium war. Indeed, by an identification with Lin Zexu, the audience 
attain the pleasure of the sadistic position, as when Lin Zexu refuses He Jinrong 
proposal to share all his assets, and Lin Zexu quite adamatically says “I don’t want 
only your money, I want your life too”.  
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In addition to this, the Chinese merchants, gathered in front of Lin Zexu/authority, 
are the equivalent of actual spontaneous social aggregations of merchants, or of 
other social categories typical of the 1990’s.  
At the end of that decade (the 1990’s), there were in China almost 200.000 
registered social organization (shehui tuanti), and many other not officially 
recognised. In 1998 was issued a new regulation for the the establishment of social 
organization. According to article 2 of the “Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Social Organizations of the People’s Republic of China”, “social 
organizations are non-profit-making organizations composed of citizens (individual 
members) or organizations (unit members) who volunteer to perform activities in 
accordance with its articles of organization for the realization of their common 
desires.” 30  Many of this organizations received public financing, and were 
dependent on a political patronage: governmental authority/office, or party control. 
Nevertheless, in those years, many of these organizations were born so as to solve 
actual problems linked to the process of opening of the reform, and pertaining to 
their own category. However, Beijing government very seldom took into 
consideration the idea of negotiating with them. Their institutionalization, albeit 
professed, was anyhow obstructed by the many bureaucratic passages, and by the 
financial asset that each organization should have possessed, as requested in the 
article 10 of the Regulation of 1998:  
“Possession of lawful assets and sources of funding: a national social organization 
shall have a business fund of more than 100,000 yuan, while a local social 
organization and a trans-administrative-district social organization shall have a 
business fund of more than 30,000 yuan”. 
Their politicization is impeded and prevented. Lin Zexu in front of the merchants 
shows how politics is able of monitoring those associations, which are (allegedly) 
free of conducting their business if they abide by the law; otherwise, they might end 
as He Jinrong did in Xie Jin’s work, prosecuted and then punished to death. 
In another scene we see Lin Zexu, probably in his residence in Guangzhou, 
supervising his interpreter He Shangzhi, who is wearing Western clothing, and eats 
using fork and knife. Lin Zexu is depicted in non-formal dresses and, as always, his 
figure is surrounded by many Chinese traditional abjects and features, such as 	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  http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol2iss3/art_2.htm.	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porcelaine vases, paintings, ornamental carved stones, and different kind of 
engraved wooden furniture set in the room. Lin Zexu seems particularly jovial, and 
dispenses smiles as we never find in the rest of the film. He is amused by the 
performance of He Shangzhi in Western clothing; and when Lin Zexu sees how to 
use Western tableware he says:  
 
“The foreign tableware requires the use of both hands, our chopsticks require one 
hand only, and have greater adptability”. 
 
Even though Lin Zexu dismisses too easily the foreign habit of eating with two 
hands, instead of using one hand only as Chinese people do, and thus suggesting 
that he is not yet fully aware of the real technological advancement of England (this 
is perhaps the way Xie Jin decided to show that patriotism alone is not enough); the 
entire scene provides positive images of the confrontation between two different 
country, two different way of being. The quick views of the garden overcome by 
sunlight, the audible bird-song along with Lin Zexu’s informal behaviour, all 
contribute to create a good effect on the audience, and our hero appears as invested 
with positive energy. Here the connotations are the following; to confront with 
other civilazations is not wrong, and it is also possible to be positively intrigued by 
other’s people habits, albeit Chinese culture and tradition has nothing to learn. 
Nonetheless, the scene also tells us that the confrontation between China and the 
Western cannot be postponed anymore. Lin Zexu is the only character in Xie Jin’s 
“The Opium War” that has understood the importance of joining the rest of the 
world, though he is not yet well aware of the other countries’ power. The 
confrontation with the British, actually masks the confrontation within the Chinese 
political government, within the Qing Dynasty. Indeed, on one side there is Lin 
Zexu who throughout the movie utters this message: I’m a citizen of the Chinese 
Nation, and as such I serve my country with full devotion and loyalty, and I’m 
ready to sacrifice my personal feelings as well as my life for my country. On the 
other side there is the Qing Dynasty and his corrupted officials, which didn’t get the 
sense of the historical moment, misrecognizing the historical trajectory. Presenting 
the Chinese characters in this way, Xie Jin could advance the idea that the actual 
trajectory undertaken by the government, is the ruling class’s “right recognition”, 
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which have an awareness of what the country needs in order to compete with other 
powerful nations. 
In the next scene, Lin Zexu meets up with a priest belonging to the British 
community present in Guangzhou. Lin Zexu in this sequence wears official dress, 
hat and necklace. The camera shot frames him on the bright side of the room, while 
the priest is on the dark side of it; therefore connoting positivity for Lin Zexu and 
negativity for the priest. In the scene, again, the theme of the confrontation is  
central, and shows Lin Zexu’s readiness to approach the foreigners, like when he 
says: “Whether you come alone or with all your people, I’m ready to meet you 
here”. This statement reiforces Lin Zexu awareness of the inevitability of China’s 
encounter with foreign powers, thus suggesting his better comprehension of the 
historical situation. This is particularly clear when, after the priest’s accusation 
“cutting off food and water is not human bahaviour”, Lin Zexu focuses again on 
the disruptive power of opium, never accusing trade (which is the very 
inevitability) or the presence of foreigners in Chinese territory. Hence, the Emperial 
Commissioner cites some English newspapers which report the Queen’s strict ban 
on opium in British territory. The scene provides important connotations. In the 
conversation with the priest Lin Zexu uses many words such as “Chinese people”, 
“English newspaper” (), “your own country”, “your Queen”, “our tolerance”, “we”, 
“all your people”. These words even if innocent at first sight, actually have the 
power to strengthen and naturalize the idea of belonging to a community, better 
understood as a nation. To mention English newspaper, suggest the existence of 
Chinese newspaper, as well as every other country’s newspaper; such words and 
expression – Chinese people, your Queen – mentally create, and make it seems 
natural and eternal the conception of a world divided into several nations, the 
unique, unrivaled vision allowed. Furthermore, Lin Zexu expressess his intolerance 
toward the selling of opium in Chinese territory, and makes clear that Chinese laws 
must be respected as it happens in England. Lin Zexu’s determination is aimed to 
induce the foreigners (or the Chinese audience?) to understand that China as 
England is a nation, and everybody within its territory must abide by the law.“What 
about a country that has been broken apart for the last hundreds years and the 
millions of people that died or whose families have been ruined because of opium? 
These English newspapers have reported clearly strict bans on opium smoking in 
your country by your Queen”.  
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As the priest is invited outside, the camera closes-up on Lin Zexu in order to 
dramatize what he is going to say:  
 
“I’m not afraid of these foreigners, but what I really fear is that if the traitors are 
not eliminated, they will bring opium back to this country”. 
 
For the first time Lin Zexu clearly reveals of underestimating the foreigners, 
showing too much confidence in China’s own capacity of overcoming the problem. 
This is perhaps the only historical burden on Lin Zexu’s conscience, that of having 
understood too late (the last three scenes in which he appears) that the world is full 
of powerful nations, and that China must enter this international arena by enhancing 
its own status to that of the other developed countries (as the military technology of 
the British will show). In addition to this, he also points out the finger against the 
traitors, the immoral emperial officials and the Chinese opium dealers, which 
through their behaviour had let China down, ruining their own people and society,  
and causing, for their own interest, this shameful situation. Thence, the Chinese 
incapacity of interpreting and rationalize the significance of the world trajectory, is 
embodied in the figures of the officials and of the Emperor, the Qing Dynasty. 
In a further scene, we see Lin Zexu and his collaborators together with Qishan, 
newly appointed  as Emperial Commisioner. Lin Zexu has been just dismissed from 
his position, he wears unformal dressess like the other in the scene. Qishan is seated 
at the center of the room, and Lin Zexu is on the right side, as seen from Qishan’s 
point of view. The depiction of our former commissioner Lin, shows him deep in 
thought, silent. The scene shows two different approaches to the British attack 
(British navy is meanwhile sailing toward north); on the one hand we see Qishan 
that is aware of the military superiority of the enemies, and thus wishes not to go to 
war against the foreigners, he is instead inclined toward a negotiating approach, 
which is more rational, but at the same time shameful for China. On the other side, 
there is Lin Zexu that is conscious, as Qishan is, of China’s military weakness in 
comparison with British power, nevertheless, having also understood that Qing 
China is at the beginning of its decline, he opts for fighting till death, defining once 
and for all his role as a hero, who prefers to die for the country than see it 
conquered by foreign people; an approach dictated more by his feelings, and thus 
resulting less rational than Qishan’s, though inevitably more glorious. Semiotically 
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this scene can be interpreted as the acknowledgement of China’s (military) 
subordination, a rational self-understanding which is a step necessary to plan the 
new rise of China; on the other end, Lin Zexu’s apparent illogical will to fight 
connote China’s pride and upstanding attitude of a country that is not afraid of 
facing the other (actually wishing to be somehow otherized as the only way to 
recognize the true self), and the responsibilities of its self-aware actions.  
This scene represents the delineation of China’s military defeat, and the missed 
opportunity of being part of a world that writes its history, instead of suffering it. 
The constant comparison with the military advancement of England, and necessity 
for technological development, has a clear correlation with the will of present 
China (1990’s), to develop and modernize the country, in an effort to place China 
back to a position of prominence, which by the way is its natural destiny. 
 
“I like a frog in a well didn’t know much about the world affairs. Not until today 
did I understand that there are many powerful countries in the world….I’m aware 
of the approaching calamity.” 
 
In the consecutive scene, Lin Zexu walks in what seems to be an enclosure of 
institutional buildings, among which he stops in front of a class, whereby young 
students diligently apply theirself in studying. Outside the class, where Lin Zexu 
stands, is raining. The music is a soft delicate flow of flute sound, which connote a 
sense of melancholy, reinforced by the incessant rain. While the camera shows the 
students in the class, Lin Zexu is framed in a long shot, dark shadowed. This kind 
of set of the camera frame suggests that we are soon going to leave Lin Zexu to his 
destiny (the exile in Xinjiang), and therefore adding more intensity to these last 
moments with our national hero; and then the voice-over starts: 
 
“The Chinese could tower like a giant in the east for 5,000years…” 
 
here, the camera closes-up on Lin Zexu, to let the audience assume that the voice-
over is none other than Lin Zexu’s thoughts. 
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“…by relaying on these younger generations of scholars. No matter how powerful 
the enemy outside is and how frightening and earthshaking the changes are, the 
training of scholars should not be neglected.” 
 
Through the voice-over, the message we receive is that China’s culture and 
tradition is redempted. The outstanding 5,000 years of Chinese civilization were not 
vain, they instead have assured Chinese people to reach the thresold of modernity, 
and should be regarded with respect and deference forever. Even more, if we want 
to rebuild a ‘new China’ (新华), ready to face the new modern challenges and 
opportunity (social changes and trade), we must look back to our tradition and 
culture and learn from it. At the same time, the present, the Qing China, is regarded 
as the cause from which originated the Chinese illness, that is, corruption, 
ignorance, and lack of national devotion. 
In the third from last scene in which Lin Zexu appears, he pays a visit to the 
soldiers killed in the battle against the British army. The wind strongly blows, 
connoting that the battle, however finished, it is still there, embodied in the corps of 
the fallen soldiers, still causing sorrow. The music is solemn and sadly ceremonial. 
Lin Zexu wears informal dress, indicating that he is there not officially but only for 
a sense of human participation to the regrettable loss. He pays his respect, by 
conforming to the Chinese tradition of burning figures made of joss paper, thus 
connoting him, for the unpteenth time, as a citizen whose bond with his culture, 
history and tradition – which all together create a sense of nationality – is staunch 
and inescapable. In this scene we see Lin Zexu outdoor, he is there to extend the 
respect to the dead, and to see in person the dread of the war, the sorrow caused by 
the misrecognition of the Qing Dynasty. The scene presents certain aspects that 
make it look as a proper ceremony (the burning joss paper, the white colour for 
funerals that covers the dead bodies and the horses, the solemn music), and 
therefore connoting that the dead are not just dead, but that they are national 
citizens that have been sacrificed for a national cause, for the country. As such it 
becomes a public event (outdoor) , which must be seen by the general public, by the 
people.  
In his last appearance Lin Zexu, in his way to Xinjiang, runs into Qi Shan who is 
going to Beijing for capital punishment. From the the audience point of view, Lin 
Zexu appears to the right of the screen, while Qi Shan appears to the left. Ma Ning 
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in his “Xie Jin’s film melodrama”, citing Chris Berry says that “by spatial 
positioning I mean the use of the techniques of mis-en-scène to designate the spatial 
relationships among different characters, a device important to the construction of 
character identity and audience identification in Classical Chinese Cinema.”31 
Ma Ning affirms that the layout of the traditional Chinese stage is influenced by the 
ancient Chinese cosmology of yin-yang. This means that the character’s position on 
a movie can designate the personal characteristic that the author wants to convey on 
them. According to Ma Ning’s theory “the spatial code of the right designates 
yang, which means masculinity/positivity/law/order, while that of the left denotes 
yin, which means femininity/nagativity/lawessness/disorder”.  
Consequently, the set of the stage that frames Lin Zexu and Qi Shan, might signify 
the images portrayed. Lin Zexu being on the right side of the screen (as seen by the 
viewer) designates “yang” (阳), and thus represents positivity, respect for the law, 
and commitment to establish order. Qi Shan, on the other hand, being staged on the 
left side of the screen, is “yin” (阴), representing negativity, disorder, lack of 
morality and of devotion to the Celestial Empire/Nation. Furthermore, the angle 
camera shot frames Lin Zexu followed by a numerous group of devoted friends and 
faithful colleagues; while Qi Shan is backed only by two guards that stand near a 
cage, to escort him to Beijing, connoting two different destiny, appropriate to their 
behaviour and conduct. 
This last scene, is the only one set in a natural location, besides the one in which a 
courier rides a horse in a wide landscape to dispatch a message to Beijing. Here, the 
stage is an indistinct seashore, presumably in Guangdong province. The scene 
presents no trace of human constructions such as buildings or roads; the sea is 
nearly always at sight. The sea-sound is ever present, perhaps to add incisiveness to 
the natural set. Music is calm and provides intensity to the words of Lin Zexu, so to 
positively dramatize what he says:  
 
“Since I came to Guangzhou, I have never though of myself. I fear that the Chinese 
are being thrown into a long dark night, and have nowhere to turn for help” 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ma Ning, Spatiality and subjectivity in Xie Jin’s Film Melodrama of the New Period, in New Chinese Cinemas, 
Forms, Identities and Politics. Edited by N. Browne, P.G. Pickowicz, V. Sochack, E. Yau. 
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The first words of Lin Zexu permanently connote him as an heroic patriot, who has 
renounced to himself to serve the country, in a complete and intense identification 
with the nation and its principles; an identification that asks each one to let 
individual interests and feelings to vanish, in lieu of a new renaissance between the 
arms of the motherland, whereby every new subject can be fed and protected, until 
the strength and will-power of each one, will be put at work to indiscriminately 
serve the common cause, the imagined community everybody belong to, the nation. 
However, in the very last moment of the scene, Lin Zexu holding a globe that he 
soon after will consign to Qi Shan says: 
 
“There are so many powerful nations in the world. Our Qing Dynasty could no 
longer be out of touch with reality.” 
 
The fact that Lin Zexu, in order to show the existance of a world made of nations – 
which in his words represents reality – uses a globe, a map of the world, is very 
significant. 
Indeed its connotations express a total confidence in the power of representation, as 
an exemplary way to depict the actual features of reality. A confidence that is 
exquisitely modern, and which is one of the pillars of the modern nation-state. 
The production of modern geographical maps since the enlightenment period, 
inaugurated an era whereby the spatialization of politics, strongly contributed to the 
creation and acceptance of a world made of nations; thus naturalizing a historical 
contingency, and providing a specific vision of the world; a world that since the so 
called scientific revolution, has been denominated and measured according to 
allegged objective and immutable characteristics that undoubtly identify it. Thence 
in this last scene, the figure of Lin Zexu, our patriotic and devoted hero, takes 
possession of this powerful instrument of representation to convey the message that 
if we, China, do not enter history in the form of a nation, we won’t be able to enter 
it at all, and in order to be a nation, everybody’s behaviour must adapt to the new 
circumstances (social inequalities or economic opportunties of the 90’s?) that the 
situation requires; accept trade as a positive event, and conform to our Chinese 
tradition as part of our Chinese history; serve the national cause as well as the 
authority, and consequently behave and think of yourself as an essential part of the 
national body, the Chinese Nation. 
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2. The Opium War 
 
 
In the previous pages, I indicated how the myth of Lin Zexu as a cinematic popular 
form is able of inducing consent	   to	   specific	   political	   issues	   and	   imaginings,	  enabling	   the	   audiences	   to	   participate	   to	   the	   media(ted)	   celebration	   of	   a	  historical	   moment,	   by	   virtue	   of	   which	   both	   economic	   development,	  nationalism,	   and	  people’s	   experientiality,	   are	   strictly	   connected	  and	   crucially	  dependent	   on	   to	   the	   use	   of	   a	   system	   of	   signs	   that,	   adequately	   arranged	   and	  displayed,	   constitute	  a	  narrative,	   a	   text	   in	  which	   the	   figure	  of	  Lin	  Zexu	  plays	  the	  part	  of	  the	  major	  conveyor	  of	  meanings	  and	  ideology,	  although	  its	  myth	  is	  constantly	  sustained	  by	   the	  networking	   functionality	   (that	   is	   the	   interaction)	  of	  the	  set	  of	  signs	  participating	  to	  the	  production	  of	  the	  movie.	  I also pointed out 
the relevance a modern concept of history has in the making of the film “The 
Opium War”. I said before that a new (modern) concept of time, had allowed 
Benedict Anderson to conceive the nation as a cohere community, moving steadly 
into history, through different stages of development. Here, the discourse conducted 
by Anderson on the importance of a specific idea of time in the process of 
constructing the nation, is particularly significant inasmuch as it allows me to focus 
on a peculiar aspect of nationalism, as well as on the major accomplishment of 
“The Opium War”; the reappropriation of history. 
In their analysis on Xie’s film, both Xiao Zhiwei32 and Rebecca Karl33 share the 
opinion that the “The Opium War” represents a main departure, a shift from the 
conventional predominant Party ideological narrative that, unitl then, had blamed 
the British for the war, denouncing Western imperialism as a devastating, immoral 
practice that humiliated China, reducing it to the status of semi-colon (fenhaò); a 
narrative which, by the way, is the main theme of another film on the opium war, 
directed by Zheng Junli, and released in 1959.  
Rebecca Karl in her account on “The Opium War”, uses the term “the burden of 
history” – being also the title of her essay – borrowed from Hayden White’s work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  Xiao Zhiwei, “Nationalism in Chinese Popular Culture: A Case Study of The Opium War”, in “Exploring 
Nationalism of China: Themes and Conflicts”, Edited by C. X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu.	   Greenwood	   Press,	  2000. 
33 Rebecca Karl, “The Burdens of History: Lin Zexu (1959) and “The Opium War” (1997), in Xudong Zhang Whiter 
China, 2001. 
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(“The Burden of History”, 1966), to explain the trend, in Xie’s film, of 
“abandonment of a conflictual notion of history in favour of an affirmation of 
contemporary benefit and experience.” 34  She proposes the idea of a 
“recolonization” of Chinese history, according to the current elité’s desire of 
promoting the new liberlal convergence between China and global capitalism, and 
thus affirming the new trajectory undertook by Chinese leader, which would place 
China, back into universal history. Moreover, Karl explains that the historical 
burden must be identified in the “state’s misrecognition” - the Qing Dynasty’s – of 
the historical moment: 
 
“The past is thus reconfigured as a missed opportunity, or a burden, that is erased 
in the present through the realization of a new state-sponsored global market 
inscription of power.”35 
 
At first glance, it is clear that the idea of the historical misrecognition is the main 
theme in Xie’s “The Opium War”, and that the historical revisionism presented in 
the film, aims to normalize China’s present trajectory (of the 1990’s). 
 Nevertheless, before I go on examining in details Xie’s work, I would like to pay 
specific attention to the term “recolonization” of Chinese history, and show how 
this should be intended not as a result of then-rulers’ elité initiative (it is, only in the 
form it takes), but rather as a “permanent” process intimately linked to the notion of 
nation and modernity, and their representation. 
Assuming that with the term modernity, I intend a certain kind of economic 
program (capitalism), a specific political realm (nation-state), and cultural course 
(science), and given the fact that they all join the ideology of development, it 
wouldn’t be irrational to say that, since time has been historicized, each stage of 
development required a precise process of production and representation of history 
(the past), which had favoured the political and economic objectives pertaining to 
that distinct stage of development. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibidem p. 234. 
35 Ibidem p. 235. 	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To see China of the 1990’s, as being in the process of recolonizing his history by 
dismissing the previous Maoist conception of China’s past is, in my opinion, as 
right as limited. I think that the abandonment of the Maoist revolutionary 
interpretation of history, shouldn’t be seen neither as a single revisionism of local 
history, nor as an attempt to put China back into universal history; rather the new 
production and representation of that historical narrative (the new interpretation of 
the events in “The Opium War”) results in a wider attempt to advance – to use the 
language of modernization – from a stage of backwardness (as many supporter of 
modernity would call the Maoist era), to a stage which would (and actually does) 
denominate China a “developing country”. Therefore, we see that it is not a matter 
of placing China back into history, but to give China an active role in the 
contemporary production of universal history itself. Consequently, what Rebecca 
Karl calls the burden of history, is none other than the economic, political and 
cultural process that China had to engage with – culminating in the Maoist 
socialism – which until then, might have been believed to be an alternative 
modernity. 
However, although I believe that China’s reconfiguration of the 1990’s is to be 
primarly seen in its global resonance, it is undeniable that locally it had to display 
pertinent features in order to provide a historical narrative which would have fit the 
imaginary national trajectory, and in this sense Karl’s identification of the burden 
of history, in the Qing Dynasty’s misrecognition of the historical opporutnity, is an 
effective lens to gain insight of the actual motivations behind the representation of 
Xie Jin’s “The Opium War”.  
After an attentive and meticulous viewing of the film, I have been convinced that 
the most striking characteristic of Xie’s work, is its constant and cumulative 
binarism, used as an efficient tool to construct the narrative of the film, and help its 
reception at a cognitive level, by displaying a vast array of opposites and/or 
complementaries, which introduce, at every step, the Chinese audience to a 
confrontation that fix and identify categories and sides. Since the beginning of the 
film, the audience is faced with one of the ever-present binarism, the inside/outside 
and indoor/outdoor conception. 
In the first scene of the film the camera shows a wide dark room, in which some 
scholars are editing official documents of the Celestial Empire that are sent to the 
most important viceroy of the empire, among which is Lin Zexu; in the next scene 
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Lin Zexu is writing an account on opium (supposedly at home) in a dim light; then 
again, the sequence frames Lin Zexu at his former teacher’s house, and immediatly 
after at Emperor Daoguang’s Court. Clearly, we see how the political debate and 
confrontation is meant to be conducted within enclosed spaces, which in the movie 
are represented through the building of the emperial palace, thus suggesting an 
interpretation of politics as enclosed, as a practice that has its own place, the 
institutions of the state. However, this representation of politcs as an interior 
atmosphere, as something that pertains to a confined space and circle of people 
(politicians), seems to me to be in line with the Dengist (but also Jiang Zemin’s) 
endeavour to depoliticise the Chinese society in order to separate the political life 
of the PCC from the everyday sphere of the people, not erasing the presence of the 
Party form people’s conscience, not nearly, rather by naturalizing the role of the 
state as guarantor of a multi-centered open market-economy and culture, whereby 
the state-party-government is a firm reference system. 
In this light, must also be seen the role that global culture plays, a culture much 
more politicised than ever, which normalize politics and, paradoxically, 
depoliticises society, putting an end to the Maoist policy that attempted to mobilize 
the masses in order to build people’s support to the party. 
Evidently, for the state to be the supreme arbiter of the new convergence between 
Chinese economy and global capital, it has to be also the promoter of economic 
development, and in order to do so, trade should be seen positively and inevitable. 
This is the reason why the main concern of the political apparatus in Xie’s work is 
opium as drug, as a disruptive social addiction, which not only erodes people’s 
daily life and familiar unity, but also acts as a destructive force that undercuts the 
morality and devotion of the officials toward the emperor/rulers and the 
empire/nation. 
In this sense Lu Zifang, the former teacher of both Lin Zexu and Emperor 
Daoguang, is guilty of having irreparably damaged (through opium consumption) 
the traditional teacher-student loyalty, and therefore the traditional Chinese 
hierarchical relationship expressed by the Confucian “filial piety”. Indicative of the 
role of opium as a main threat for Chinese society, is also the corruption of the 
Qing officials which receive bribes from British merchants; while the former are 
accused of having betrayed the bond between them and the celestial empire, the 
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British are only accused of unfair trade, and we never assist to the rejection of trade 
as an immoral practice. 
Here the binary construction is displayed in the dual confrontation 
morality/corruption, and fair trade vs unfair trade, where Lin Zexu stands as a 
supporter of morality and fair trade, while the Qing officials and foreigners stand on 
the side of corruption and unfair trade. Nevertheless, the movie presents an 
interesting and fundamental shift from the traditional depiction of the foreigners as 
immoral emperialists, depraved invaders and bearer of immoral corruption and 
deviation. 
Indeed Xiao Zhiwei in his account of “The Opium War” affirms that: 
 
“Xie’s film does not purport to fan anti-west emotions but presents the conflict as a 
historical inevitability. In so doing it reduces the moral indignation over Western 
imperialism and offers its audience a history lesson: patriotic feelings alone did not 
and will not save China. In order to avoid repeating the humiliating experience of 
the Opium War, China must focus on domestic reforms, strengthening itself, and 
remain open to the outside world.”36  
 
It is clear that the figure of Lin Zexu has the task to highlight those patriotic 
feelings and devotion to which Xiao Zhiwei refers to, as it is been shown in the 
previous semiotic analysis; on the contrary it is through the depiction of the 
foreigners and the use of multiple binary conceptions that the need for reforms and 
openess is displayed. 
In this context, the foreigners are portrayed by constantly contrasting the mode of 
representation of their omonyms in Qing China. First of all, the Westerners always 
appear in sequences, which show a different use of light if compared to those 
scenes depicting the Chinese. While the light is bright for Danton’s people, and in 
the shots framed in England, a light that often is presented as natural, indicating that 
Westerners are more than occasionally portrayed en plein air, the Chinese 
characters are almost always shown indoor, with a dim, dusky light which connotes 
a negative and passive historical position. Even though the foreigners are depicted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Xiao Zhiwei, Nationalism in Chinese Popular Culture: A Case Study of The Opium War, in Exploring Nationalism of 
China: Themes and conflicts, p. 42, 2000. 
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as arrogant and brutal (see the scene in which Danton shots a seagull), they also 
present a sense of humanity (Danton’s love for his daughter), initiative (some of 
them write and speak chinese), and positive ambition (their determination to defend 
and further trade).  
Furthermore, they show a better knowledge of China and of Chinese habits, than 
the knowledge their Chinese counterparts have of England and of English people.  
Emperor Daoguang ignorantly dismiss the English nation as a small country, and he 
is offended by their diplomatic note. The triviality with which Lin Zexu’s assistant 
– and to a certain extent Lin Zexu himself – judge the current English fashion and 
habits (dress and tableware), is another attestation of their ignorance of the outside 
world. On the other hand, during one of the scenes shoot in England, some English 
politicians look carefully at a detailed map of China (to be noticed the bright light 
in the room), and Xie Jin make them say: 
 
“Here, on the table we have a map which shows all rivers, all harbours, all the 
fortifications. A map much more accurate than anything they have in their 
Emperial Palace.” 
 
There are two important connotations here. Without any adequate knowledge of the 
outside world, it is impossible to compete in the inevitable confrontation with other 
countries, suggesting that openess is essential to development, and that ignorance 
means subjugation. The other message is that an ordinary, but powerful instrument 
as a map is, has its place (when produced) in the “Emperial Palace”, in the 
institutions. The English official doesn’t finish the sentence with a more general “in 
China”; rather, he assumes that if a map exist (and he doesn’t believe it), it is in the 
hands of the Emperor, the only place where it could be. Hence, a banal map of 
China is not only treated as a sign of progress, but also as a powerful weapon which 
consents a theoretical and then territorial (by force of arms) conquering. 
In this manner Xie Jin decided to show the British enlightenment as opposed to 
Chinese ignorance. The only exception in this sense, is given by He Shangzi, a 
fictional character, son of the opium smuggler He Jingrong (eventually sentenced to 
death). He Shangzhi has been part of Danton’s crew overseas, and upon his arrival 
in Guangzhou, he is favoured by Lin Zexu only because he has a better knowledge 
of the world, of the British people and habits, and more important he is the only 
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Chinese in the film that speaks and understands english. The fact that despite his 
collaboration with the opium traders, he is forgiven by Lin Zexu – and we know 
how much incorruptible he is – connotes that a specialized education in foreign 
affairs, and more in general in matters which look beyond the traditional sino-
centric education, is as positive as productive, for both personal ambition and 
national development. The staging of the character of He Shangzhi in Xie’s film, is 
indeed in line with the mid-1990’s Chinese process, promoted by the state, to 
strengthen its control over the entire Chinese educational system; in fact the 
Ministry of Education, with a larger budget, had gained since then a stronger 
finance-based policy instrument. On the one hand, it allowed the Ministry of 
Education to introduce all kinds of national level research projects, schemes, 
programmes and awards, consolidating its authority in ranking Chinese 
universities37; on the other hand, it promoted the introduction of specialized studies, 
in the effort to provide better prepared expert, whose contribution to the 
differentiated and export-oriented economy, was becoming essential. In addition to 
this, the character of He Shangzhi, has also the task to utter at least two other 
messages. In the course of the film we see him struggling many time to save  his 
father. He is shown as a devoted son whose main preoccupation is to take care of 
his old father. Undoubtedly, the one-child policy here is recalled; in fact by 
showing the many task He Shangzhi is able to accomplish (mediating with Danton, 
serving Lin Zexu, helping his own father) and the skills he has developed (as an 
english interpreter), he becomes the perfect example of how useful a son can be. 
Since the 80’s indeed, the Chinese government introduced the one-child policy to 
alleviate, and slow down the demographic growth in order to maintain it within a 
proper range. It also introduced a sophisticated system that would reward those who 
had observed the policy; the reward system was precisely conceived because of the 
unpopular effect that the new policy had on the population. The figure of He 
Shangzhi in Xie’s film, doesn’t leave any doubt in regard to its intent of promoting 
the above mentioned policy; and the comparison with Rong’er, the only Chinese 
woman portrayed in the film, confirm what just said. Rong’er is depicted in such a 
way as to constantly contrast the image of He Shangzhi; she is in fact an opium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Zhao Litao and Zhu Jinjing, China’s Higher Education Reform – What has not been changed? East Asian Policy. 
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addict, a prostitute, and at the end of the film, albeit not guilty, she is sentenced to 
death for having betrayed the Celestial Empire. 
The other message uttered by He Shangzhi pertain to the condition of the welfare 
system in China in the 1990’s. As stated above, He Shangzhi shows what in China 
is called “filial piety”, a fundamental Confucian principle which establishes the 
general obedience and respect to be used in society, according to the social 
hierarchy. In this regard He Shangzhi provides support to all his father’s needs (or 
at least tries to); even though he finds himself unable to save him from Lin Zexu’s 
resoluteness, he never loses hope. Throughout the 1990’s, the Chinese welfare 
system has been reformed three times – in 1991, 1993 and 1997 – in the attempt to 
alleviate the burden of million of elders, which were supposed to receive a pension 
from the state38. The new economic development had changed the quality of life 
and its expectations; the new intense flows of human migrations from the 
countryside to the coast, along with the steady demographic growth, had 
exacerbated the situation, and though different reforms tried to compensate the 
delay of pubblic intervention, the condition of many elders retiree deteriorated. 
Only through familiar intervention (encouraged by the state) most of the elders 
without any public aid, could get along. In this regard, the role of the family 
became indispensable, and He Shangzhi, through its character utters the message of 
the son who takes care of his own father in his elderly, a message which whishes to 
normalize the idea of helping the parents by providing them a full economical 
support, and thus save the state from a social disaster, which to some extent occured 
even so. 
The sequence representing Queen Victoria, is another indicative way of the 
complex and diverse fashion in which the British are depicted in Xie Jin point of 
view. In her first appearance, the audience encounter the Queen outdoor, nimbly 
riding a horse on a vast green field, nearby a castle (her castle), which is shown 
through a long shot in its totality. As she gets off the horse, going toward Lord 
Palmerston who is waiting for her in the grassy plain, we see Queen Victoria in full 
frontal portrait, young, confident, perceptive, in a white dress which gives her a 
sense of fresh innovative approach to life. It is impossible for the viewer not to 
think at Emperor Daoguang, and how contrasting those two monarchs are in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Xiaona Tao, Prospettive del Sistema Pensionistico Cinese, Tesi di Laurea, Università di Padova, 2011-12. 
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representation that Xie Jin provided. Daoguang is always represented indoor, the 
audiovisual effects frame him in dark rooms and with solemn music, transmitting 
an idea of an Emperor trapped into a rigid bureaucracy, into infinite rituals and 
protocols, and what’s more, he is always deeply concerned and hesitant, he lacks 
vision, knowledge and initiative; thus his character appears to be in the dark side of 
history. Queen Victoria, on the contrary, with her femininity, directly confronts the 
Chinese audience, showing them an easy manner with her subordinates, like when 
she says: “So, what have you brought me, my dear friends? Budget, deficit, or war 
in India?”; or soon after, when Lord Palmerstone, after having invited her at a 
ribbon-cutting ceremony to inaugurate a new railroad, says: “Lin Zexu has 
destroyed eight million pounds of our goods, and is driving all our British residents 
out of Guangzhou”, and with a sarcastic tone she answers: “But I hear that you are 
already assembling marine forces”, and then she goes toward the castle. In this 
sequence where the audience is delighted with the figure of Queen Victoria, it still 
is the difference in the portraying of the two regnants that strikes at once. 
In the scene depicting the British Queen, the sky is blu, the grassy plain is 
obviously green, but intensely so, and her beautiful figure in white, let the viewer 
have no doubt where the simpathies lie. Furthermore, she is also capable of decisive 
political considerations, she is never hesitant, and knows what she wants for herself 
(a wax copy of Lin Zexu in Mme. Tussaud’s museum) and for England: “If I were 
in Lin Zexu’s position, I would also burn all the opium”, with this statement she 
gains respect from the Chinese audience inasmuch as she reveals to understand Lin 
Zexu’s motivation, and at the same time, she somehow redeems Lin Zexu for being 
guilty of having understood too late (however, before anyone else in China) the 
strength and power of England. And then she continues: 
 
“If all nations follow China’s example and reject free trade, the British empire will 
no longer exist within a year. This is the reason for us to use force. We must teach 
them a lesson on free trade…Whoever gets hold of China will have the entire East 
the Nineteenth Century.” 
 
This discourse, is the lesson China is invited to learn; free trade is the key for 
modernization, for a new brilliant future which will definetly reposition China 
	   60	  
among the most powerful nations, a place that China deserves, but that must be 
conquered with everybody’s (the people) support to national development. 
Finally, technology becomes an essential requirement to compete at an international 
level, and only with a proper technological enhancement can China avoid 
subjugation. Many scenes in the film point the finger on China’s lack of military 
and communication technology. The emphasis on the British navy, on its powerful 
cannons, on the British map of China, and on the new railroad inaugurated by 
Queen Victoria, shows that a powerful nation (as England is), distinguish itself 
from a weak country (China evidently), for its military superiority and its modern 
ways of communication, which allow trade to reach every territory of the empire as 
shortly as possible. In the sequence when the British navy sets out toward Beijing, 
and Lin Zexu sends 600 couriers to inform the Emperor of the approaching 
calamity, we see the big, strong and rapid English ships sailing fast toward north; 
while Xie Jin shows us one of Lin Zexu’s courier riding a horse on a desolated 
land, supposedly going to Beijing. The disparity is evident to everybody. 
It is curious to notice that, in parallel with the message of modernization of china, 
uttered by “The Opium War”, China’s policy toward Southeast Asia in the 1990’s, 
aimed to increase China’s preponderance in the area. In doing so, China not only 
boost its control over the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), but 
also in the South-Asian-Sea for the control of energy reserve, and of the maritime 
straits (it is aknowledged that many grain carrier full of petroleum, coming from the 
Persic Gulf, transit everyday from the Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, and 
Makassar Strait, representing strategic gateways for China). Indeed, since 1993 
China has become an important importer of petroleum; hence, to control the 
maritime traffic of ships and vessels in the South-East-Sea, means to control the 
provisions of all the countries of South-East Asia. Moreover, the strong debate with 
Japan for the control and exploitation of the allegged energetic resources over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, in the East China Sea, had rendered necessary for the 
ruling class to seek a military development that could consent China to confront 
with the other regional powers in the area. Clearly, however, China since the 90’s, 
is trying to regain – if we consider the old tributary system which saw many 
population of the South-East paying their tribute to the Emperial China – its 
predominance in Asia, in order to play a strategic role not only in the political 
balance of the South-East area, but also in the wider context of global geopolitics. 
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In this regard, at the end of the 1990’s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 
undergone trasformative adjustments which led to a period of reform that, since the 
end of the ninth FiveYear Plan in 2000, has seen a modernization effort aimed to: 
the development of procurement and acquisition of new weapons systems and 
technology, the production of Chinese-made submarines and surface vessels, as 
well as conventional missiles; basic research and development in which the PLA is 
engaged domestically to produce information age military technologies; a reform of 
the insitutions within the PLA itself, as well as a major focus on raising the levels 
of professionalism of the officer corps and enlisted force39.  
This and many other reforms, must therefore be seen as a general attempt to play a 
global role, not only in the economic and finance fields, but also in order to render 
China a global actor able to impose its own vision on current global affairs. 
In this way Xie Jin’s “The Opium War”, despite its designation of independent and 
market-oriented production, remains a popular product that reflects, normalize and, 
more important, justifies the current (the 1990’s) political, economic and social 
trend that China, through its rulers (far from being only political), had undertook. 
We also see how nationalism – a specific form of nationalism – has became an 
essential background which serves to provide legitimation to the PCC; we see how 
concepts such as nationalism and modernization, are strictly intertwined;  
nationalism is thus used to enhance Chinese modernization, while modernization 
allows displaying different form of nationalism. 
If Television exclude the tragic and seamy side of life, as suggested by Kellner, 
than it is possible to say that although “The Opium War” tend to rend manifest that 
it was due to misrecognition and corruption at all levels of Chinese society 
(especially at political and commercial level) that China missed its first encounter 
with history, it is also true that no explanation is provided in the movie to explain 
what caused the moral corruption of Chinese people. This happens because 
Television too often stays on the surface of social appearance. 
In conclusion the myth of Lin Zexu is the bearer of an open nationalism that rejects 
extreme forms of anti-Western feelings, while at the same time tries to contain them 
within a sphere in which they can be shaped in different manners, following  
current interests and necessities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 David Finkelstein, China’s National Military Strategy: An overview of the Military Strategic Guidlines. 
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Chapter two 
Images of the Myth 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to get an insight on the role played by Chinese 
media to address specific forms of national feelings and imaginings through the 
analysis of a collection of images conveying the myth of Lin Zexu that I have 
gathered up from different Internet’s websites. I aim at analysing the processes of 
symbolic production supporting the representation of the authoritative figure of Lin 
Zexu, necessary as Chu Godwin maintains to help people learn determined values 
and beliefs. The myth of Lin Zexu uttered in the images analysed in this chapter 
provides access to a conceptual world or imagined society within which the 
production of knowledge, and therefore the contingent symbolic environment that 
produces it are seen as natural, eternal, and above all Chinese. Trying to engage in 
an analysis of the images of Lin Zexu with the objective of actually adding some 
knowledge to them, means diverse things. It means trying to answer to a series of 
questions that haven’t been posed yet, questions such as: What objects, actors and 
agencies do Lin Zexu images mobilize? What kind of mobilization would that be?  
Do Lin Zexu’s representations correspond to one coherent and uniform mode of 
knowledge, or do they result from processes of construction varying in accordance 
to the purpose they are meant for? 
However, willing to answer to these questions alone, I believe won’t be sufficient 
to produce an account able to accomodate all the dimensions in play in Lin Zexu’s 
images. For this reason many other questions, some of which have already been 
posed by earlier and present studies, will be enquired: What is a representation? Is 
it even possible to define “representation” regardless to what is represented? Is 
representation a privileged means of constituting our vision of the world? Concept 
such as modernity, culture, nature, society, inform our cognitive perception of 
Chinese modern aesthetics, or should we rather begin looking at the object of our 
study, and to the network it activates to discover everytime what the social world is 
made of? How does a media image come to be produced by graphics, design, 
narrative and display? What does it mean for an image of Lin Zexu to be an 
expression of popular culture in the everyday life? 
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These series of questions, though resembling at first sight as not being able to 
provide answers that haven’t already been conceptualized, are approached with a 
sense that excludes those presuppositions and assumptions originating from 
traditional 40  accounts on “representation”, “modernity”, “visuality”, and on 
concepts such as “everyday life”, “culture”, “nature”, and “society”.  
Thus the subject of this study are Lin Zexu’s images as they are shown below. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge since the beginning of this enquiry, of 
the extremely different visualizing effect that the images present in this study will 
create on the reader, in comparison with the original digital images that I have 
visualized through a computer screen, while connected on the Internet, and while 
exploring Chinese websites populated, besides Lin Zexu’s images, of a dense layer 
of signs such as texts, logos, entertainment panels and advertisements, all being 
static or dinamic images and texts which appeared as suddenly as they disappeared, 
condition that rendered the experience of research and analysis much more 
enterprising and edulcorated. 
Indeed, it is not only our visualization practices that would be different, for the 
reader will see the images printed on paper or, in case of a digitalized copy of this 
work, on a screen, being it that of a computer, a tablet or smartphone; but in any 
case he or she will deal with an immobile and paralyzed thing which has already 
become something else, and which anyone would hardly consider a representation 
of what, in turn, I had experience of in its own ambience and dimension. In fact, it 
is also a matter concerning the specific “logic of visualization”41 – dependence on 
the written text and the process of spectacularization are both functions of this 
logic, whereas the other senses (taste, smell, touch) fade away, and the eye 
dominates – that a visual presentation of the images of Lin Zexu, on a sheet of 
paper or in a digital format (Jpeg, Pdf, Tiff), would be tied up to. Why is so 
important this attention toward the different modalities in which the reader of this 
work is going to visualize the images of Lin Zexu, compared to the way I visualized 
them? First of all because they combine different modes of representation. The 
images present in this work do not combine language, sounds and animation (this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The term tradition does not refer here to any temporal character of the accounts. It rather refers to those account 
which almost consensually result canonical in the way they unproblematically treat their object of study. 
41 Henry Lefebvre recalling Erwin Panofsky in Henry Lefebvre,“The Production of Space” (p.286), Blackwell 
Publishing, 1991 
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last one usually being used for commercial offers or for game advertisement) as 
they do in the websites where I found them, thus resulting in two different 
collectives that mobilize quite different objects that, in turn, draw different 
trajectories. 
The use of digital light in a website, for example, carries with it a number of 
general and specific meanings or forces that, as a matter of fact, determines the 
shape of the network which it is part of. It does so by spectacularising (in general) 
the quality of a website’s layout, such as those in which I found Lin Zexu’s images, 
and by highlighting (in specific) the graphic substance of the elements present in 
the webpages – advertisements, entertainment panels and so on. Furthermore, the 
co-presence of elements alongside the images of Lin Zexu, and their relation with 
them, cannot be ignored if I don’t want the social world that from them arises, to 
result restricted in advance. This means that the images of Lin Zexu present in this 
study will produce, or better, are able to produce texts that in any case won’t be the 
same of the ones resulting from the images as if they were visualized in their 
intended dimension, the websites. 
A copy of an image of lin Zexu such as the one below, taken from a website and 
copied on a doc/pdf document, can be said to have a diverse communicational 
landscape, meaning that it is thrust by forces (actors, mediators, intermediaries) 
significantly dissimilar from those that might have arose if the picture was analyzed 
in its own environment. The spatiality of the visual results in this way transformed 
by that same environment in which the image is set, and that it actually contributes 
to produce and constitute. 
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Lin Zexu, (http://bbs.zhongsou.com/3/20120530/5229242.html) 
 
 
 
Hence the communicational landscape of an image – which in the case of the image 
showed above is formed by the dynamic interrelationship between the 
zhongsou.com (中搜) website, the digital nature of the image, the overall meaning 
of the text-image conveyed by such representation, as well as its positionong in the 
hierarchical ordering that the web page expresses through the arrangements of the 
other elements within it – and the spatiality of the visual, that is the range of vision 
that both our eye and our cognitive process are able or pushed to cover, meaning 
also that the range of vision of the eye may extent to a greater or smaller area than 
that of the cognitive process; these two principles go hand in hand in mobilizing the 
social world of an image and in constituting the subjective dimension (or at least a 
part of it) of the individual, reader of the image (Manovich, 2001; Lefebvre, 1991).  
It is therefore reasonable to say that the collection of images of Lin Zexu 
participating to this study, in the explicited and partial format they have been given 
by the author of the study – and in order to provide an analysis which is self-aware 
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of the manipulation of the data presented here – result reduced to a single plan, 
confined to a surface, to a euclidean space. However, what I call here a reduction, is 
in all respects a real transformation of the object re-presented, for outside of its 
habitat (the website) the meanings, objectives, ideologies and all its social world 
vanishes to form a new social configuration, a new network. Those images of Lin 
Zexu thus become cut out from the normal flow of experience, from the networks 
to which the images formerly belonged, and within which they could be said to be 
actively involved in broad critical aspects regarding the relationship between 
Chinese society and nation, and the media. In fact the myth of Lin Zexu through the 
discourse from which it arises and the one that it necessarily produces, allows the 
formation of individual and collective identities by means of the identification with 
the values of the nation, and the values attached to it, namely commercialization, 
individualism and consumerism; the deployment of a banal nationalism manifest in 
the numerous signs that soundlessly carry out the function of naturalizing and 
normalizing the idea of nation and all the involved by-products; the 
commodification of styles and ideas within an everyday life conception of reality. 
Nevertheless, an attentive reader might argue that the images of Lin Zexu as any 
semiotic system, in the way they can be seen and visualized in the websites that 
host them, have undergone a reductionist process (this time during their production) 
since they too are as any image a re-presentation of somenthing else, the historical 
Lin Zexu. However, this kind of predication implies a precise perspective of what 
one considers a “representation” to be. But I would like to delay any reflection on 
this highly ephemeral concept a little more, and keep focusing a bit longer on a few 
personal concerns about the collection of Lin Zexu’s images disclosed in this study. 
The issue here is what kind of theoretical and methodological approach would 
provide the images of Lin Zexu with their dignity, their being historical actors? 
The intellectual debate within the academic disciplines of Chinese cultural studies 
and Chinese media studies over issues concerning the understanding of 
contemporary Chinese society and culture, and post-Maoist Chinese society – with 
regard to China’s media landscape – has been absorbed, since the 1980’s by an 
exhausting search for an epistemological model or theoretical framework able to 
explain the conditions under which Chinese society, this immense eternal, carries 
out its functions and reaches its objectives (Liu Kang, 2004; Jing Wang, 1996). 
Significantly enough, this search has produced a variety of analytical formulations 
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that have populated the academic terrain and have, more than often, functioned as 
actual standpoints from which one could approach his/her own topic. Chinse 
scholars and authors as Xiao Zhiwei, Liu Kang, Jing Wang, Xiaobing Tang, Zhang 
Yiwu, Ma Ning, Han Shaogong, Lin Yiping, Xudong Zhang, Sheldon H. Lu, Chen 
Xiaoming, Sun Wanning and others, represent the intellectual Chinese cultural 
space this study has been relying on, in order to acquire a sufficient, even though 
not always comfortable, knowledge of the ongoing ideological debate on Chinese 
culture. 
Marxist, post-Marxist, modernist and postmodernist – just to name a few – 
although struggling fiercely to affirm this or that status for China, this or that label 
for China’s path,  this or that model of development, this or that stage of history (be 
it modernism, postmodernism, New-Era, post New Era, post-revolutionary era, 
industrial or post-industrial era and so on), nevertheless they all share one 
indisputable key point: the idea that Chinese culture as a whole exist and, more 
important, that it can be represented. 
In such congested theoretical ensemble of conceptualizations, the paradigm of 
modernity (and of modernism), as well as that of postmodernity, are the most 
adopted sources of interpretations able, according to their advocates, to yield a 
reliable knowledge on Chinese culture and society. Movies, TV shows, magazines’ 
articles and pictures, Internet-based images, entertainment media products, music, 
advertisement signs, TV news, and many other media products are accounted as the 
recurring objects of study by the authors’works aforementioned; and in most cases 
these objects of enquiry end up by being almost entirely labeled under such 
paradigms as modern or postmodern. 
The chinese debate about modernity and postmodernity, similarly to the 
international academic debate, reflects primarily the concern over China’s stage in 
history; and more extensively in succeding to find a thorough conceptual 
framework adequate enough to explicate China’s present condition. The Chinese 
debate’s argumentations range from claiming the crisis of ideology to the collapse 
of modernity’s grandnarratives, passing through the imagination of alternative 
modernities, and the deconstruction of political/ethnic nationalism. All this 
intellectual enthusiasm gravitate around a distinctive ideal segment of the 
progressive time-line that coincide with modern history, and which includes the 
following stages of progression: modernity and postmodernity. 
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The first part of this chapter deals with the images of Lin Zexu in the attempt to 
unveil some modern conventions and social discourses present in the arrangement 
and functioning of the modern aesthetics in China. In fact by engaging directly the 
very notion of (modern) representation, and by analyzing the specifics of those 
representations exemplified in the images of Lin Zexu, I aim to address these 
images by inquiring the idea of representation itself, and by questioning its self-
evident character through which the acceptance of certain knowledge had depended 
upon. With this objective in mind, I shall employ Timothy Mitchell’s critics to the 
metaphysics of representation to show how a system of certainties, peculiar of an 
alleged modern constitution, to use Latour’s terminology, has been subordinated to 
an ideal and imagined “ordering, distributing and enframing”42 of the historical 
actor commonly known as representation. 
I will consequently approach the images of Lin Zexu as representations, with 
regard to the technology used to produce them as representations. I will thus 
endeavour to formulate a semiotic analysis able to reveal the mythical nature of the 
representative quality through which the images of Lin Zexu are aknowledged. It 
must be clear that in this first part of the account, in no case shall I treat the 
symbolic space that each image of Lin Zexu, each in its own way, constitutes. 
Indeed, considerations on the encoding and decoding processes, on narrative, 
meaning and ideology, will inform the second part of this analysis on Lin Zexu’s 
images.  
In this preliminary account on the mediated and media representation of Lin Zexu, 
it is my objective to provide an analysis of the production/conception of the images 
of Lin Zexu as they are shown below. I shall therefore begin by acknowledging 
specific qualities in each of the images displayed, and by so doing, revealing what 
modernity is, or seems to be, in the author’s mind. With regard to the images 
showed below, and in respect of the dualism inherent in Chinese modernity,9 (also 
commonly known as the “New Era”), I will assign a criterion of analysis which 
consist in the distinction of two set of qualities that concern the images object of 
this study and which refer, on one side to the concept of representation that, as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Timothy Mitchell, “Colonizing Egypt”, Cambridge University Press, 1988.	  
9	  The dualism I’m pointing out refers to the modern convention of considering representation and what it stands for as 
an “order of appearance” that creates a binary system, exemplified in the dualism observer/observed and 
representation/represented. A detailed explanation of the concept will be treated later in the chapter. 
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will soon understand, goes far beyond the fact of being just a concept, resembling 
much more a dispositif able to authorize a “hierarchy of truth”, and thus 
determining a specific social order; and since the engagement with T. Mitchell’s 
theory on representation is regarded by the author as efficient enough to explain 
certain conventions – as modernity itself – in play in China, I shall apply it 
indiscriminately to all Lin Zexu’s images present in this part of the chapter.10 
On the other side, each image, adequately isolated by the others, will be analysed 
considering the social discourse that through the grand narratives of enlightenment, 
rationality, and humanism stages and perform that official culture which, contrary 
to what the Chinese postmodernist believe, it is not so easely exposed and 
endangered by the revelation of its partial, subjective, and positioned character. 
Indeed, according to the major attitudes and theories on contemporary China and of 
China in the 1980’s and 1990’s, this collection of Lin Zexu’s images could be seen 
and regarded both as modern and post-modern, global and local, as part of a 
metanarrative of world history or as an indigenous traditional form. In fact, the 
modern and postmodern dispute in China, in its oscillating grounds, supports and 
provides the means of nourishment to the official culture, the Chinese culture.  
          
 
 
 
- Toward the understanding of the modern representation of Lin Zexu 
 
The ambiguous nature of being at the same time a form of, and a producer or 
facilitator of cultural practices, makes the myth of Lin Zexu a powerful “instrument 
of cultural policy” (Andrea Zlatar, 2003), constituent of narratives and discourses 
that produce meanings and ideologies, promoting precise way of conceiving the 
contexts of the social, of the economy, and of the political as the cardinal elements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  This choice is motivated by the digital nature of the images analyzed in this study. The reader is invited to refer to the 
part in which I explain the difference between graphics and design. 	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that make up the nation, the Chinese nation, which through Lin Zexu’s digital 
productions come to be peculiarly visualised. 
 Cordell D. K. Yee in the volume two, book two of “The History of Cartography”, 
in the chapter “Chinese Cartography Among the Arts: Objectivity, Subjectivity, 
Representation”, explaining Liu Xie’s11 comments on the importance of language 
in representing physical reality affirms: “language functions not just as a means of 
preserving utterances, but also as a way of seeing”12. Timothy Mitchell in his 
“Colononizing Egypt” maintains that “Orientalism illustrates not just the strange 
ways in which the West has treated the outside world; it illustrates how the Western 
experience of order and truth, epitomized in the exhibition, depended upon creating 
the very effect of an outside, of an external reality beyond representation”.13 
To say that the images of Lin Zexu are the result of a peculiar media technicality 
(the media also as a communicative tool and its digital specifics) serving the 
construction of a national myth means that the symbolic space that each image 
constitute is a media-originated symbolic space; which in turn means that, for a 
symbolic space such as an image, to be modern, must have modern characteristics, 
and thus posses and/or express, according to the general understanding, distinct 
qualities and features as a hegemonic narrative, a coherent ideology, a 
homogeneous meaning, a univocal message, a formal and rational resemblence, and 
so on. But as Liu Xie indicates, language – and Lin Zexu’s images are language – is 
also “a way of seeing”. Therefore, given the fact that the images of Lin Zexu as 
representations require a specific way of seeing, it is plausible to say that a modern 
representation of Lin Zexu demand for a modern way of seeing. 
The need to rely on T. Mitchell’s critics on the metaphysics of representation is 
dictated by the aspiration to deal with a specific procedure in the production of 
knowledge historically built-in in the mode through which a representation of Lin 
Zexu (see the images below) is granted the validity and the authority of defining 
and assigning a quality or a set of qualities to that social world that we call China. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   Liu Xie, “Wenxin diaolong” (The literary mind and the carving of dragons) in Cordell D. K. Yee “History of 
Cartography”, University Chicago Press, 1994 
 12	   Cordell D. K. Yee “History of Cartography”, (Chapter six) “Chinese Cartography Among the Arts: Objectivity, 
Subjectivity, Representation”, University Chicago Press, 1994	  
13	  Timothy Mitchell, “The World as Exhibition”, Cambridge University Press, p. 218	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It is a matter of determining the conditions and the terms that led to the constitution 
of a “certainty of representation”, of a distinct way of seeing. 
Timothy Mitchell in the late 1980’s in his “Colonizing Egypt”, advanced the idea of 
the world-as-exhibition, a logic that allows for displaying the representation of an 
object as an exhibit that stands in front of an observer, a model set up in order to 
resemble as much as possible an alleged original, a model which “however 
realistic, always remains distinguishable from the reality it claimes to represent”.14 
Recalling the Parisian World Exhibition of 1889, Mitchell describes the model of a 
street of Cairo set up and exhibited to the visitors present at the exhibition:  
“The remarkable realism of such displays made a strange civilization into an object 
the visitor could almost touch, yet, to the observing eye, surrounded by the display 
but excluded from it by the status of visitor, it remained a mere representation, the 
picture of some further reality.”15 
The first important point that needs to be grasped here in order to begin to 
understand the logic of the world-as-exhibition is that part of its power resides on 
the fact that a “certainty of representation” depends first of all on the separation 
between representation and reality. It is a matter of recognising that representation 
is not reality, but its legitimate, more or less accurate model; that a representation 
doesn’t pretend to simulate reality in order to substitute it, but that it can only 
approximate it. In fact, only by conceiving a model (read: image) as an 
approximation we are reassured of the existence of an original, of a real beyond 
representation. The visitors that found themselves in front of the model of the street 
of Cairo at the 1889 exhibition in Paris, however astonished and amazed by the 
meticulous re-production of the detailed model that formed the image they had 
before them, not even for a moment believed that that was the real street of Cairo; 
they knew they were looking at a representation which as such, evoked the real 
thing (a specific street of cairo), external to both the representation and the 
exhibition. 
The effect created by the apparent realism of a representation and its claim to be 
only an approximation of the original operates in such a way as to begin 
constructing a correspondence between representation and reality. Nevertheless, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Timothy Mitchell, “The World as Exhibition”, p.223.	  
15	  IBIDEM. 
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Mitchell believes that this correspondence – that when complete results in the 
certainty of representation – requires at least two more principle: the arrangement 
of the representation around a common center, and the positioning of the observer 
in this center. The representation of reality embodied in the exhibit, Mitchell 
explains, were arranged as to encircling a common central space, and thus 
“allowing for the isolation of a point of observation”.16 This privileged and 
positioned point of view was occupied, useless to say, by the visitor/observer: 
“The representation of reality was always an exhibit set up for an observer in its 
midst: an observing gaze surrounded by and yet excluded from the exhibition’s 
careful order. The more the exhibit drew in and encircled the visitor, the more the 
gaze was set apart from it as the mind (in our Cartesian imagery) is said to be set 
apart from the material world it observes.”43 
The detachment of the observer from the representation sustaines the awareness in 
the observer’s mind of looking not at the real thing, at the referent of the 
representation, which is supposed to be far and outside the exhibition, but just to a 
representation, to a model of reality. Therefore the center in which the observer 
stands is not a fortuitous one, it rather is a privileged space - as when we look at a 
computer screen or television - it is a point of observation that only the observer 
occupies, and which consequently is separated and set apart from the object 
observed. Nonetheless, as Douglas Kellner calls the attention to, “in TV space, the 
spectator is a King or a Queen from whom all the wonders are being produced, as 
they sit in their front-row center seats, creating the illusion that they are in the 
center of social space”44. In this way, affirms Mitchell, it is possible to recognize a 
double distinction: the distinction between the observer and the representation, and 
the distinction between the representation and the reality; a distinction that can also 
be read as a binary system: obeserver/observed and representation/represented. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Claudio Minca, “L’Esibizione del Mondo o il Mondo come Esibizione”, Riv. Geogr. Ital. 107 (2000), pp.47-81. 
43	  Timothy Mitchell, “The World as Exhibition”, p.223.	  
44	  Douglas Kellner, “Television, Images, Codes and Messages”, in Gayle Gibbons, Larry Kirkman (eds.), Television 
Magazine, Volume 7, Number 4, 2009. 
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At this point, despite the fact that the logic of the world-as-exhibition has not been 
fully illustrated, yet, I can begin to correlate – this time consciously – the images of 
Lin Zexu to a peculiar way of seeing which Liu Xie understood the relevance of.45 
The world-as-exhibition demonstrates that the way we accord a representation the 
ability to resemble something that somehow is present in what we call reality, 
cannot be regarded as self-evident, but rather designates a distinct, partial and 
mediated visualization. For reasons of simplicity, and given the fact that the 
symbolic content of an image doesn’t undermine the way we look at it – quite the 
opposite, I will argue that the symbolic content and the understanding of it in an 
image is dependent to the specific way of seeing it – I will employ for the moment 
only one image of Lin Zexu; and faithful, this time, to the modern classificatory 
attitude, I will call it image one. 
 
	  
 Lin Zexu, (http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_c4b0868b0101sung.html) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 With this I don’t mean that Liu Xie was thinking to anything similar or near to what I’ve been explaining so far. I just 
point out the necessity to account for a logic of visualization – when it comes to representations -  that influence or 
determine our vision of reality. 
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The first image of Lin Zexu obeys in my opinion to the logic of the world-as-
exhibition for various reasons. Primarily because its cross-reference to an external 
reality, whether a material referent or a conceptual one, and its general referential 
quality (the first three characters of the centred text undoubtely are referential), 
which encourage the observer to think at the external reality that such 
representation promises (be it the Opium war period, or China’s past, or history 
itself), is uttered and emphasized by the image deliberate triviality, that is having 
been produced as a cartoon-like design; an attribute that reinforces the sense of 
artificiality of the image, declaring its intentional approximation to what is believed 
to be the real Lin Zexu46, rather than the substitution of it, and thus setting out the 
correspondence between the representation of Lin Zexu and an alleged material or 
conceptual referent present in the material world, what in Western modernity is 
conventionally called reality. We are therefore led to think that outside of this 
image, in a distant but not remote Chinese historical past Lin Zexu not only existed, 
but possessed more or less the characteristics that the image conveys. Furthermore, 
the difference in time and displacement in space47 separating the representation 
from the supposed real referent accentuates their discreteness, and thus creates 
(again) the correspondence between them, establishing what T. Mitchell calls the 
“certainty of representation”.  
Moreover, the privileged position from which Lin Zexu’s image is observed – 
central and frontal if the image is displayed on a computer screen or tv, and central 
and from on high (almost vertically) if displayed on a book or magazine or daily 
newspaper – stresses the dualism inherent in the logic of the world-as-exhibition, 
observer/observed, representation/represented, inside/outside; divisions that, says 
Minca, are at the origin of the “modern machinery of power that inaugurated the 
colonization of the other and thus of the self”.48 In fact, this dualism reflects also an 
appearance of order to which it follows an order of appearance that allows us to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Clearly Julia Kristeva’s concept of Intertextuality plays here an important role in defining what is generally accepted 
as the physiognomy of Lin Zexu. See Julia Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue and Novel”, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1966. 
47 The spatial segragation of the representation of Lin Zexu such as the flat surface of a screen or of a page, stresses the 
acceptance of the separation between them. 
48 Claudio Minca, “L’esibizione del Mondo o il Mondo come esibiszione”, in Rivista Geografica Italiana 107 (2000), 
pp. 47-81. 
	   75	  
look at the world as a relation between image and reality.49 According to this order 
we are inclined not only to lend legitimacy to the representation – for its alleged 
ability to evoke reality – but it (the order) actually becomes a fundamental element 
of reality which though, depends on its representability. 
The segregation of the image of Lin Zexu on a restricted interior – in the sheet of 
paper or in the screen – fosters the belief and conviction that outside, in the 
exterior, we deal with reality; and that in this outside is reasonble to find what the 
image of Lin Zexu anticipated. Now, reflecting for a while on the semiological 
difference between signifier and signified, may help understand better this 
correspondence, and it might also lead, with the help of both Roland Barthes’s 
theory on myth, and Timothy Mitchell’s the world-as-exhibition, to the 
comprehension of representation as a myth. 
As I mentioned before, the dualism implicit in the logic of the world-as-exhibition 
– observer/observed and representation/represented – occurs and constitutes itself 
in the form of an order of appearance, a hierarchy says Mitchell. In fact, according 
to this logic we understand the social world in terms of the “relationship between 
picture and reality, the one present but secondary, a mere representation, the other 
(the supposed reality it refers to) only represented but prior, more original, more 
real. This order of appearance can be called the hierarchy of truth. It is in terms of 
such hierarchical division between a picture and what it stands for, that all reality, 
all truth is to be grasped. The methods of ordering, distributing and enframing that 
create the division, therefore, are the ordinary way effecting what the modern 
individual experiences as the really real” 50 . The hierarchy of truth and the 
consequent ordering of the social world that this hierarchy operates, is the final aim 
of the logic of the world-as-exhibition, and it results in legitimating the role of 
representation by granting it the ability of structuring our cognitive understanding 
of what we believe to be reality. Now, by means of this hierarchy and order, I 
would like to propose a reading and deciphering of what, in our time, one 
unproblematically call representation, and hence illustrate the mythical nature of 
the image of Lin Zexu as representation through a semiotic analysis of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Timothy Mitchell, “The World as Exhibition”, Cambridge University Press. 
50 Timothy Mitchell, “Colonizing Egypt”, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 	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term/concept. It stands to reason that the mythical nature I’m willing to enact 
hereafter doesn’t refer, yet, to the symbolic content of the image, but to its 
representative quality.  
Roland Barthes tells us that in order to decipher a myth we must identify two 
elements, a signifier and a signified, the sum of which provides what he calls the 
signification, the myth. But he also tells us that the signifier (in the second 
semiological system) must be a global sign, “the final term of a first semiological 
system”51. This means that if I want to construct a greater semiological system, I 
should first be able to provide representation as a sign, that is the combination of 
form and meaning, and thus compose a first semiological system. In our time it is 
not unusual to interchange and use indifferently the terms image and 
representation, and even in this study I mentioned various time the words image 
and representation to refer to the illustrations of Lin Zexu. Nevertheless, even 
though it is hard to find an image which is not a representation at the same time, the 
two don’t come into the world as a unity, but rather as two distinct elements. It is 
my opinion that the image of Lin Zexu comes to be a representation only at the time 
of encounter between two well defined component, graphics and design. Indeed, if 
we accept that graphics is the materialization of a substance on a surface, such as 
ink, oil color, and graphite in lead pencil, on blank pages, canvas, walls and, as for 
computer-based images, rasters and vectorials made of pixels and geometrical 
primitives on screens, we must also recognize that graphics alone can’t do all the 
work; graphics is able to provide the visual materialization of a substance on a 
surface, but it unquestionably needs a second, as much determinant, element, 
design. Design, dissimilarly from graphics, requires a decisive attribute able to 
confer the materialization of the graphic substance on a surface, a cultural form, an 
intellegible cultural expression, a meaning. This attribute is the intentionality of the 
designer as Gunther Kress points out: “Design takes for granted competence in the 
use of resources, but beyond that it requires the orchestration and remaking of the 
resources in the service of frameworks and models that express the maker’s 
intention in shaping the social and cultural environment”52. Design then as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Roland Barthes, “Mythologies”, The Noonday Press – New york, Farrars, Staus and Giroux, 1957. 
52 Gunther Kress, “Visual and verbal modes of representation in electronically mediated communication: the potentials 
of new forms of text”, in I. Synder (Ed.) “Page to Screen: Taking Literacy Into the Electronic Era” (p. 53-79), London 
and New York: Routledge. 
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ideological apparatus that provides passion, care, meaning to the sheer, naked 
substance of graphics. Design which, through narrative and display, assigns value 
and partiality to a concrete substance – here narrative must be understood as a 
networking agency operating, ontologically, “with multiple references to categories 
of subject and object” (B. Clarke, 2005:41), that is being at the same time an 
integral part of design/intentionality and graphics/technicality, in a sort of 
metamorphic dynamics, in Latourian terms53. Finally, to get back to our semiotic 
analysis, design as the signified in the first semiological system. It follows that 
graphics (the image not yet representation) is the signifier, the form without 
meaning. The sum of the two, signifier and signified ensure the constitution of the 
sign. The image is now representation, it has a direct association – by being an 
expression of it – with what Unmberto Eco calls the world of action, our social 
world.  
At this point, if the equation graphic/form – design/meaning is correct, we are in 
presence of a first semiological system (in which representation is the sign), 
necessary to build the greater system that should lead to conceive representation as 
a myth.  
Roland Barthes (1957) explains that in a second semiological system the place of 
the signifier is occupied by the third element of the first semiological system, the 
sign. Therefore representation as a sign becomes the signifier in the new system, 
and as such has two aspects says Barthes, one full, the meaning (the intentionality 
implicit in design, namely its intellegibility as a cultural form), and one empty, the 
form (the materialization of a substance on a surface, graphics). It is in this moment 
that the second element (the concept or signified) of the second semiological 
system occurs, appearing and offering itself to the signifier as (a sense of) reality, 
existence, presence, equivalence, correspondence. It distorts, rather than obliterate, 
the part which is full in the signifier, the meaning; it then deprives the 
intentionality, congenital in design, of its history, of its contingency. Representation 
(the sign/signifier) leaves its contingency – the historical intentionality – behind, to 
embrace a certain knowledge, the concept, the sense of reality or the certainty, that 
is attached to the form of the signifier (representation as a sign) as a perfect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Latour’s quasi-object occupy neither “a nature outside of society nor a society outside of nature” (Clarke, 2005: 41), 
preferring to follow their circulation (mobilization) in the network. 
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correspondence in order to provide representation with a meaning. We have thus 
two elements: representation as the signifier, and reality or the certainty of it as the 
signified. The third element, the signification, the myth, will result as that same 
hierarchy of truth Mitchell explained through the order of appearance. The 
aggregation of representation with its newly attached meaning, the sense of reality, 
establishes a correspondence and a certainty of representation which brings about a 
cognitive ordering in the mind of the observer; this order is therefore imposed as 
natural by the hierarchy of truth through the erasing of the historical procedures 
that formed it. By means of this hierarchy says Minca, “the modern thought has 
produced a system of certainties tied up to the functioning and meaning assigned to 
its representations”54. I can conclude by saying that representation, as a way of 
making sense of the social, of the real, ceases to appear self-evident, returning back 
to its constitutional nature, to its being a modern convention. Lin Zexu’s 
representations – as the objects of the modern subject’s gaze – are active mediators 
in negotiating an all-encompassing ideology and market logic (nationalism, 
individualism, consumism), and the subject’s more or less conscious tactics and 
diversions against the dominant subsumption that its mythology is able to exert.  
It is also understandable that Lin Zexu’s images, though hidden by the 
argumentations so far provided in this first part of this account, have always 
remained at the center of it by virtue of their representative quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
- Introduction to data analysis 
 
An image is a message holder, produced by few for the consumption of many. The 
technological image is a scientific fact, a fact produced as technology by other 
technology, obtained in small places such  as laboratories or research centres, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Claudio Minca, “L’Esibizione del Mondo o il Mondo come Esibizione”, (p. 50) Riv. Geogr. Ital. 107 (2000),  
pp.47-81. 	  
	   79	  
sometimes become big centres of power. Places where politics vanishes though it 
articulates the entire process of production. Lin Zexu as an image, is a 
technological product that becomes human through a bump of a magic wand. The 
science that produces it takes away, affirming that they just replicated something 
real, alredy among us, the historical Lin Zexu. Politics invests it with meanings and 
ideologies (the national hero, the essence of Chineseness, the future), though the 
same politics hides itself by wearing the mask of normality, legitimizing and 
eternalizing a mere matter of fact. 
The following data analysis is concerned with the online circulation of digital 
images of Lin Zexu on Chinese websites conveying its myth. What can be 
summurized from the analysis of the collection of images that follow this 
introduction, is that each image of Lin Zexu is a cultural space among others, where 
from to interpellate the network whithin which the image itself resides, and which 
contributes to create and expand.  
What these networks are made of? If an image is a culturally established space and, 
at the same time, itself an establishing space, it means that it doesn’t belong 
anymore to the linear progress of modern time. Indeed, if it is a space culturally 
established, is thus connected to a variety of actors, agencies, and mediators that 
through efforts of various and hybrid nature (political, economic, technological, 
cultural etc.) have come to produce it; let’s call it the “starting network” of the 
image. If in turn, it establishes cultural spaces, it means that the network that has 
produced it is expanding through the image, giving rise to a series of social 
formations (experiences as cultural forms and practices) that contour and shape the 
network itself as a peculiar expression of the social world. And since an image is 
always a culturally established and establishing space, it is thus a medium of 
communication, a social articulation, a gateway to a social world.  
Each of Lin Zexu’s images analysed in this study exemplify a distinct mode of 
knowledge, in the sense that each of them – in their modern 
conception/understanding, and as outside of the network – somehow and only to a 
certain extent, refuse the perspectival nature of a heterogeneous reality which 
require the (strategic) development of different viewpoints through the delineation 
of the network; opting instead, for an enclosed and structured projection, a structure 
of meaning that is bond to the mode of knowledge that has produced them. Each of 
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Lin Zexu’s image therefore become a practice of visualization, a specific social 
order, a space that opens up to our sight, offering mediated subjective positionings. 
Nevertheless, the images visualized hold in place a web of significance - to quote 
Clifford Geertz - which is not instantly visible, but can be ideally defined in the 
mind of the reader in the form of a future commitment, that is the will to unravel. It 
means that the cultural network we are after, is often secluded between the apparent 
attractiveness of the image, its design – in the case of Lin Zexu’s images by its 
physiological arrangement – and the ideological message or meanings they convey. 
The cultural network, though hidden by the rigid structure of the meaning that only 
apparently overwhelms it, is always at work behind the scenes. Still, even in the 
situation in which one is able to distinguish between the networking nature of the 
image, and its rigid intended objective, that is the meaning with which it is 
encoded, we still find ourselves faced to a series of binarisms typical of modernity. 
That happens when one hasn’t left the logic of the modern metaphysics of 
representation, when he or she still walk its ground. The dispositif of representation 
is still in place, which means that we are still looking for a reality behind the 
representation, and that conviction keeps us trapped into the modern metaphysics of 
representation. In this sense, and only as such, an image provides knowledge by its 
ability to convey reality, and thus accomodating inevitable dichotomous fixed ends 
or immobile theoretical stand points. Trapped in this symmetrical tension between 
what is presented and what is not, we have experience of the self and of the other, 
precisely because our position allows the mechanism of representation to project its 
fixed objectivities, of which we are supposed to become the carrying subjects. 
The will to unravel, or rather to trace back the economy of the images’ networking 
life is conditioned to an analitical operation of connection of the images’ meanings 
to the actors, to the producers of the image, and from there follow the 
communication. As such an image is a point of intersection where distinct entities - 
being the very essence of the network - might emerge, representing the core 
relationship between perception (that of the visualising subject), and that social 
power eventually turned into something immanent, opposed to any 
transcendentalism. A relationship which lives and shows itself in these interstices, 
which are also the places where it hides, where tries to escape a potential straight 
recognition. When one aims to establish the sort of relation that may occur between 
the objects or things that are used in China in a specific moment, as in the case of 
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media production, representation, and consumption, it is necessary to determine and 
define the relations by considering the modalities through which that relationship 
manifests itself, that is “the relation between the production of objects that 
conditions (human) relationships”, along with “the relations between subjects 
(human and non-human) that condition the production of the means of 
existence…”55 
The myth of Lin Zexu often results as the convergence between the state and the 
market, allowing these two actors to play with people’s conscience by representing 
themselves in peculiar ways, and last but not least by rendering a sense of national 
everyday life. The idea of everyday life has indeed secured our sense of reality, 
which through media representations is much more vivid than before. Tv programs, 
movies, Tv series, internet blogs, websites’ content, online images, music and 
movies, karaoke contests, Peking Opera, soap operas, Western commercial popular 
culture and many other media products as well as media technology, represent the 
cultural substance everyday life is made of. The extensive use of technology such as 
Tv, mobile cellphones, tablets, personal computers, but also ambient media (media 
in public places as cafés, airports, city centers and so on), suggest that beyond the 
moment in which we privately or publicly, look purposely at the flow of images 
represented in these same mediums above mentioned, it is as though the displaying 
of images continue to mediate the lifes of people (by now became everyday life) in 
a sort of ever-lasting representation of a system of symbols, and therefore of a 
system of values, that not only creates the social world in which people live, but 
most of all mediate the identities and subjectivities that populate this social world. 
The commercialism inherent in the way we look at the world and at the media 
things organized in a frontal center position, the truth and order that they convey, 
are fundamental for a cognition of the world which obeys to the rules of a capitalist 
mode of production and to a specific view of reality, of which the everyday life is 
the ultimate product. The media representations of the myth of Lin Zexu, the	  widespread	  of	   its	   images	   through	   a	   specific	  media	   technology,	   their	   designs,	  their	  meanings,	  values,	  and	  the	  other	   ideological	  considerations	   that	  concern	  the	  consumption	  of	  its	  myth	  will	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  regarding	  “the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Philippe Descola, “Beyond Nature and Culture: Forms of Attachment”, (p. 459), Translated by Janet Lloyd, 2012 | 
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 447–471. 
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centrality	  of	  visual	  experience	  in	  everyday	  life”	  (Mirzoeff,	  1998:	  7),	  serving	  as	  a	  dominant	  modality	  of	  apprehension	  of	   the	  knowledge	  that	   the	  myth	   imparts,	  as	   the	   ebodiment	   and	   symbol	   of	   the	   new	   values	   that	   have	   been	  emerging/produced	  since	  the	  ‘Reform	  and	  Opening	  up’.	  	  
 
- Image One 
	  
Lin Zexu - Image one - (http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_c4b0868b0101sung.html)  	  	  
The image one of Lin Zexu has been found by the author of this work on the 
Internet, posted on blog.sina.cn by a Chinese blogger – “学习易” (xuexi yi) – as a 
suggestion for another blogger’s request to find an interesting story for an article to 
be written. It actually is one of a series of images posted by the same blogger for 
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the same purpose (the one mentioned above). The image is a digital 56  one 
(evidently in the present context is only printed), being formed by rasters 
(rectangular grids of pixels) and vectorials (geometrical primitives as points, lines, 
and curves), and it is accompanied by three autonomous written texts57, each of 
which determinant for the understanding of the image as conceived by its producers 
or owners. Of the three texts, two are inside the image, being an integral part of the 
digital realization, while the remaining text accompanies the image58 as a detached 
entity, but nevertheless bound up to it.  
As Roland Barthes tells us, in the image one of Lin Zexu may be identified “a 
source of emission, a channel of transmission and a point of reception”59 (Barthes, 
1997: 15). The source of emission refers to the actual people/technicians which 
through the use of digital technology such as computer graphics softwares (CAD, 
CAE, CAM, CIM)60 have been able to produce the image, as well as to create and 
add the texts. Further information on the source of emission will be provided later 
on, after a better understanding of the overall quality of the image.  
As for the channel of transmission, for the moment I will maintain that it is the blog 
blog.sina.cn where the blogger posted the image, but as will be shown below 
shortly after, one of the two texts inside the image will direct the investigation 
further on to other channels of transmission as well as to other sources of emission. 
The same must be said for the point of reception which for the moment seems to be 
limited only to the public reader of the blog, as myself for example, but a deeper 
focus on the image will expand the field of action – the network – of the image one 
of Lin Zexu to a further audience. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Digitality allows the image to be reproduced infiniteless without degradation, in contrast to the analog media which 
loses quality at each new copy (Lev Manovich, 2001). It also means that it can be almost instantly transferred via 
communication network (Internet, bluetooth, intranet). 
57 Usually digital images in computer graphics use both vectors and rasters when they make use of a text alongside the 
image itself, as it is notable in the image one analysed above. 
58 This occurs always keeping in mind that the media image is a cultural text itself. 
59 Roland Barthes, “Image, Music, Text”, Fontana Press, London, 1977.  
60 The above acronyms correspond to the following computer softwares: Computer Aided Design, Computer Aided 
Engineering, Computer Aided Manufacturing, and Computer Integrated Manufacturing. See E. Sampanikou and A. 
Kawa, “The Digital Environment in Visual and Audiovisual Arts. A theoretical Approach.” ISIMD - 4th International 
Symposium of Interactive Media Design, Yeditepe University, Istanbul, 28-30 April 2006.  
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The representation of Lin Zexu is a media product wich conveys an information, a 
message, and as such is an “object endowed with a structural autonomy” (R. 
Barthes 1997: 15). This structure is formed by two cooperative but distinctive 
entities, the image itself and the written text, the latter being a linguistic structure. 
In order to understand the overall quality and message of the representation is 
important to treat the two entities separately first, and then procede by analysing the 
actual relation they have in the specificity of the representation object of study.  
Starting from the two texts present in the image one, a few words on the role of 
texts in images might be of help. The presence of a text in an image may have 
various reasons, the most common of which, according to Roland Barthes, are 
exemplified by the concept of anchorage and relay. With the term anchorage the 
French semiotician expresses the will (of the producers) to fix the floating chain of 
signifieds present in a representation, that is to determine, by means of a linguistic 
message, the denoted or symbolic meaning of an image. Therefore, a text functions 
as an anchorage when it allows the observer to establish “a correct level of 
perception” (Barthes 1997: 39), and thus understand the image, or when it serves to 
avoid, in case of a simbolic meaning, undesired readings and therefore helping the 
reception of others. On the other side, with the term relay Barthes points out how a 
text in an image works complementarily to the image itself, meaning that at the 
level of diegesis, of the narrative, both the image and the text serve to create the 
unity of the message. This is tipical of cartoons and films if we consider the text to 
be both verbal or written.  
The first text analysed here is the central superimposed one – 林则徐对联立志 
(Lin Zexu duilian lizhi) – which means Lin Zexu gives expression to his ambition 
and aspiration through the composition of a poetic couplet. A couplet in Chinese 
poetry is a composition made of two rhymed lines written on two vertical strips of 
paper (usually red), and as it is comprehensible requires high-level skills both on 
Chinese language and Chinese characters.  
Now, in order to understand the function of this text, Barthes’ previous distinction 
between text as anchorage and text as relay can be useful. Indeed, from the point of 
view of its functionality, the text can be divided into two sections, the first section 
comprises the name 林则徐, the second section the rest 对联立志. To understand 
the first part, the role of the name “Lin Zexu” in the text, the concept of anchorage 
fits quite well inasmuch as the name not only fixes the denoted description of the 
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image but it actually produces it. Why is that? Lin Zexu as a digital 
character/simulacra does not obey natural law, instead the producers of the image 
have the power over its digital quality, and are thus able to create a a-historical 
face/body which doesn’t correspond to the accepted physiognomy historically 
attributed to Lin Zexu (Sampanikou, Kawa, 2006). I doubt anyone would be able to 
recognise Lin Zexu in the image without the decisive help of the text. Nevertheless, 
as proved by the image one of Lin Zexu and thanks to the text, the observer reader 
of the image is immediately capable – if he/she has knowledge of the linguistic 
code used – to recognise the image as (the historical) Lin Zexu. Therefore, in this 
case the written text “Lin Zexu” helps the reader to identify the element(s) in the 
image. It stands to reason that the text operates from the very beginning (the first 
three characters) in an ideological way, imposing its hegemonic value on the 
signifier (the graphic form) as a signified (the fact of being Lin Zexu). This also 
explains why the text is centred and superimposed in respect to the image, for its 
centrality is not only material, but also conceptual.  
As for the second section of the text 对联立志 the concept of relay is much more 
adequate as it refers to the narrative of the image, meaning that it is understandable 
at a higher level, that of the diegesis. But in order to grasp appropriately what kind 
of story it refers to, it is necessary to take into consideration the second text present 
in the representation, the one that stands on the upper-left side of the image, which 
is none other than the CCTV.com logo, telling the reader that the image is 
undoubtedly a product of Central China Television (CCTV). Following the traces 
of the elements present in the image (the CCTV.com logo), it turned out that the 
image one of Lin Zexu is not an isolated, autonomous image, but is instead a 
captured frame of a cartoon on Lin Zexu, which in turn is part of a large-scale 
animation series, 52 to be exact, on different historical heroes of China. In light of 
these facts must be understood the caution showed above regarding the information 
on the source of emission, the channel of transmission and the point of reception 
and, as will be shown soon, these three elements shall be redefined in consideration 
of the new information provided.  
As a frame of a cartoon-like design, the image one opens itself up to a collective – 
in terms of the network that it activates – much more vast and populated than it was 
supposed to consist of, in which new actors and mediators take on their task and 
responsability.   
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The animation is a short story, lasting seven minutes, and addressed to Chinese 
children with the aim of being “informative, interesting, educational; an effort to 
transmitt an eccellent story, a rich and funny cartoon, providing children with 
happiness, being entertaining while letting the kids watch the course of the story, 
making them understand that only through an assiduous study and incessant effort 
one can attain to reason.”61 What is the value of this text in respect to the image 
one of Lin Zexu, and more important what’s the relation between the image one (the 
frame) and the cartoon? The text translated here is the first web result showed after 
having searched the words and characters “CCTV 林则徐对联立志” on the 
Internet62 . Therefore, it (the text translated above) is the result obtained by 
regarding the CCTV.com logo – laid out in the upper-left side of the image one – as 
a mediator, that is establishing, or even better, accounting for the relationship 
between the CCTV.com logo and the rest of the image. Indeed, the logo acts –  
precisely in the circumstances in which it allows and mediate the transposition – as 
a translating agent, laying out the path of the network already delineated to a further 
extension; and it does so in different manners. What does the logo do? It stands 
fixed in its corner, silent but threatening as it whispers the reader of the image 
“ignore me if you want, but you won’t get any additional understanding than a 
denoted comprehension of the image (and the centred sumperimposed text) which 
in the end tells you so little”; but it also makes noise and invites the reader any 
moment as it urges one to step up from the scarcity63 of the collective under 
examination (the image one so far analysed), to take64 the reader to the abundance 
of a new collective (though interrelated to the former), the one in which one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  The text reported has been translated from the Chinese by the author of this work, and is only a part of a longer 
account on the entire animation series published on Baike.Baidu.com. What follows is the original Chinese text: 这部动
画片集知识性、趣味性、教育性于一体，力图通过精彩的故事，丰富的卡通趣味，给孩子们带来快乐，同时又
寓教于乐，让孩子们在观赏的过程中，懂得只有通过勤奋好学，不断努力，才能成才的道理。 	  
62 	  The website address as result of the search:	  http://baike.baidu.com/view/1124399.htm 
 
63 The evaluation criteria used in this passage scarcity/abundance refers only to a quantitative estimation of the size of 
the two collectives, and not to their quality. See B. Latour, “We Have Never Been Modern” (1991). 
 
64 The use of the verb “take” shouldn’t in any case be associated with a sort of neutrality of the agent (the logo), in fact 
the carrying action of the logo is an articulation that modifies its, let’s say, cargo, the image itself.   
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discovers the cartoon, the animation series, the story of the image in terms of source 
of emission, the narrative of the cartoon that explains both the centred text and their 
connotations, as well as multiplying the channel of transmission (TV and/or 
internet video websites for the cartoon, of which the image one is part of, and the 
blog blog.sina.cn where the image one as a single frame circulates), and the point 
of reception (supposedly the children for the cartoon, and the blog users for the 
frame). Therefore, the logo as mediator expands the network of the image and 
enables part of the text (对联立志) to acts by explicating its function.  
In this way the CCTV.com logo is determinant for the contextualization of the 
second section of the centred text in the image one of Lin Zexu, 对联立志, which 
as stated before, functions as a relay in the global economy of the image. Indeed, 
the cartoon is a fictionalisation of the historical figure of Lin Zexu (represented in 
his alleged childhood), whom aspirations, perseverance, alacrity, ambition, and 
determination prove to be already an essential part of his firm character. In fact he 
is able (and he is the only one among other little students) to manage, at the end of 
the story, the diffucult task that the school teacher had assigned him and his 
schoolmates, to compose a correct and relevant couplet. 
 Now, the role of the second part of the centred text as relay is to anticipate or 
advance “meanings that are not to be found in the image itself” (R. Barthes 1997: 
41). Therefore, while the first part of the text 林则徐 as anchorage in image one  
directs the reader to the denotation of the image or to its controlled signifieds, 对联
立志 as relay sets out the story of the cartoon through a specific short-lasting frame 
that we know as image one, and it does so by anticipating the diegesis of the story, 
and by telling the reader the gist and significance of the story that the image alone 
is incapable of providing, which then must be searched at the level of  narration, the 
cartoon.        
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the figure of Lin Zexu in the framed image 
one is, as one would expect, of an adult Lin Zexu in full of his intellectual strength; 
nevertheless, the frame is taken from a cartoon in which Lin Zexu’s fisiognomy is 
produced as a child. Why is that? The image one is the first frame of the cartoon, 
and it is accompanied by a voice-over with the intent of introducing to the (young) 
Chinese public the personality of Lin Zexu by remembering, and shortly showing 
(the entire scene lasting less than a minute), his famous and audacious action of 
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sizing and burning the english opium in Humen town, Guangdong province, in 
1839, and therefore celebrating his heroic gesture that still makes him a patriot and 
a national hero. This explains the relation between the adult Lin Zexu and the 
young one, and it also explains the relation between the image one and the cartoon. 
As an adult in the first scene, Lin Zexu serves the need of signifying the entire story 
through the imposition of a fixed point of view (Lin Zexu as patriot), and by 
securing the general meaning of the story (only through an assiduous study and 
incessant effort one can attain to reason), through which is then possible to convey 
the ideology of ambition, future, career direction, but also of past, tradition, and 
loyalty, to the entire narrative of the cartoon, in full compliance with the political 
and economic (for what these words mean) trajectory undertaken since Deng 
Xiaoping’s opening and reforms. 
The cartoon has been produced by “China Central Television Animation 
Department Youth Centre” (中国中央电视台青少中心动画部）in 2004, and was 
released for domestic broadcast the following year, on July 2005. CCTV Cartoon 
Youth Program Center has been established in 1991, specializing in animation 
production (cartoon and comics), and it currently is China's largest animation 
production unit. “Lin Zexu duilian lizhi” (林则徐对联立志) is the 33th production 
of a large-scale animation series, which gathered together a total number of 52 
Chinese historical figures65 in as many short cartoons, with the official aim of 
inspiring Chinese future generations. The entire animation series, titled 中华勤学
故事 (zhonghua qinxue gushi) and premiered on CCTV-1 and CCTV-14 少儿 
(shao’er, meaning children), has been produced by Wenjiang Zhao and Wu Bao, 
directed by Lin Qiao, and adapted by Hu Yue. Needless to say, these information 
define, with regard to the image one, the source of emission, the channel of 
transmission and the point of reception; but if for the first there is no doubt that 
“China Central Television Animation Department Youth Centre”, represented by its 
staff, is the source of emission, what can then be said about the other two? They are 
clearly destined to produce a shift within their own nature, in fact if, with regard to 
the cartoon, they can be identified respectively as the “television” (the channels 
CCTV-1 and CCTV-14少儿) and the “Tv audience” (supposedly children, but not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Here are some of the historical figures (historians, painters, writers, calligraphers) used to produce the CCTV 
animation series:	  万斯同，少年包，陆羽弃，陈平，唐伯虎. 
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necessarily), for the image one – which is what mostly interests now – they can be 
identified only by looking at the blog blog.sina.cn where the image one circulates 
and is visualized. 
As stated at the beginning of this image analysis, image one has been found on the 
blog blog.sina.cn66, posted by the blogger 学习易 on 12/14/2013 at 15:08 China 
time-zone. As a result, the Internet blog is the channel of transmission of Lin 
Zexu’s image one. Under these specific circumstances the blog object of this study 
has an identifiable blogger, 学习易 ; it functions as a direct medium of 
communication towards the points of reception, the readers of the blog. 
Furthermore, the present blog blog.sina.cn is “one of China’s largest and most 
well-established web portals which includes a fast-growing blog-hosting service”67, 
which together with Blogbus, Bokee, DoNews, Microsoft MSN and many others 
has became in China, as well as in other regions of the world, part of the media 
ecosystem, having created an autonomous, if not privileged, media-space for 
discourse, interaction, interchange, and communication between varied individuals 
whithin Chinese society. Without entering into the issue of censorship and control 
in the Chinese media system, it is fundamental to understand that, as a form of 
online participatory media, blogs convey diverse type of communication - reviews, 
feedbacks, suggestions, complaints, comments and many other forms of language 
dissemination - deepening the media-space for civil discourse.   
The blog page under analysis, the one where image one circulates, though is there 
to allow the author of the blog to use it for communication, whatever kind of 
information is actually provided, it is structured as to permit specific actions and, 
evidently, to deny others. As said before the image one of Lin Zexu has been posted 
by the author of the blog along with other six images and just as many detached, 
accompanying texts. The images all represent heroes or distinguished historical 
figures of China, and as suggested by the texts, they all have in common a certain 
kind of inspirational, informational, didactic, educational and pedantic character. 
Moreover, they all are the protagonists of the CCTV animation series 中华勤学故	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The integral blog address of the image one: http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_c4b0868b0101sung.html    
  
67 Rebecca MacKinnon, “Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China”, Springer 
Science+Business Media, BV 2007, (p. 38) 
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事 (Zhonghua qinxue gushi). As for the structure of the blog, in the upper side of 
the blog page, starting from the left-side, four kind of different actions – such as 
“signin in”, “night/day vision modality”, the access to the author’s articles 
organized by category, and a “search” tool - are provided. On the other hand, in the 
bottom line, five additional actions are provided, four of which require anyone to 
sign in, in order to access specific service contents such as “QQ”, “UC Mobile 
Browser”, “Sina Weibo”, “favourites”, and eventually “comments”. Certainly, to 
consider the comments present in the blog as the entirety and exhaustive Barthes’ 
point of reception would be limiting, since not all users of blogs write reviews; 
nonetheless, the seventeen comments left by eleven readers are a number quite 
sastisfactoring to delineate an average grade of response, and to look at the 
ideological encoding/decoding process at work. 
The comments posted on the blog object of this study do not refer exclusively to the 
image one of Lin Zexu, but to all the images posted simultaneously. Of all 
seventeen comments, seven are posted by one blogger, each comment for each 
image, resuming the denoted content of the stories (the cartoons) as for example : 
林则徐自幼聪颖 (Lin Zexu intelligent since childhood); 查禁鸦片 (suppression of 
Opium); 有容乃大 (tolerance is a virtue).  The other comments have expressed in 
different ways their appreciation for the stories’ morality such as: 有教育意义 
(educational); 励志，太棒 (inspirational, great); 小故事，大智慧 (small story, 
great wisdom); 太有教育意义了 (very instructive); 好故事，欣赏！问好博友，
祝周末愉快 (Good story, enjoy! Hello bloggers, have a great weekend); 学习！ 
(study!).  
Clearly enough, these comments reveal the readers’ successfull decoding practice if 
we consider the entire visualization process of the image as seen from the point of 
view of the producers. The image one of Lin Zexu, as a multimodal media product 
– its multimodal quality is deduced by the manifold modes used in the 
representation and communication of the meaning (visual and written in the frame, 
visual, gestural, written and oral in the cartoon) – draws upon diverse meaning-
making resources that, almost innocently, impose a mythical nature to the figure of 
Lin Zexu. Intertextuality for example, plays here a relevant role, although children 
are less affected by its pervasing modus operandi, the comments in the blog 
evidently indicate a prior knowledge of the historical figure of Lin Zexu, as when 
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one comment says 林则徐自幼聪颖  (Lin Zexu intelligent since childhood), 
demostrating that the new information has been added to a prior one already 
known:  Lin Zexu became the hero we know because since he was a child he has 
proved to be ambitious, diligent, tenacious, and intelligent. The seductive cultural 
form embodied in the representation of Lin Zexu with its persuasive, rather than 
commanded, cartoonish narrative, allows on one hand to produce an ideology of 
desire, aspiration, pretension, ambition, attraction, as well as pressure, urgency, 
competition, hysterical emulation, and antagonism, while on the other hand it 
affirms principles of attachment to the nation, loyalty to the authority, tradition, 
historical linearity, and a series of feeling of collective belonging. 
 
- Image Two 
 
Lin Zexu - Image two  
http://www.zsnews.cn/epaper/zsrb/ShowIndex.asp?paperdate=20110721&part=12&article=2 
 
 
 
The image two of Lin Zexu is a digital illustration of a journalistic article on “Lin 
Zexu and corruption” or “Lin Zexu and morality”, published on 7th July, 2011 by 
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the Chinese daily newspaper “Zhongshan Daily”	   (中山日报) at page ten of its 
electronic version (e-paper) in the following webpage: www.zsnews.cn/epaper68. 
The image, along with the article, has been published under the title “林则徐：人
到无求品自高”69 (Lin Zexu: ren dao wu qiu pin zi gao) which might means “to 
become a person of high moral character, one must dim fame, dim money, regard 
material joy for nothing and cultivate its own virtue”70.  
The image two is a digital production, its dimensions being 481 x 283 pixels with a 
DPI71 resolution equal to 72pixels/inch, using an RGB72 color model generic profile, 
meaning that three light beams (colors), red, green and blue are superimposed to 
each other in order to obtains a vast array of other colors.  
The image two of Lin Zexu depicts two distinct figures standing on a dockside and 
not too far, but apart from the two figures, a cargo ship full of containers. The entire 
scene supposedly shows to the reader a “Western” and “Asiatic” personage, 
distinguishable by the different codes – clothes and physiognomies - used to 
produce the two figures, which if known allow the reader to culturally differentiate 
them.  
As for any digital production that doesn’t re-produce an accurate resemblance of 
the historically accepted form depicted, the Asian character in the image two for 
example – which we know being Lin Zexu – is first of all the work of a personal 
creative expression that combines many alterable pixels in order to create an 
intellegible graphical form – a person – which, only with the addition of other 
graphical and digital elements such texts (the title, the caption within the cloud, the 
article), the opium pipe in the hand of the other figure, the clothes of the Asian 
character itself, and the general intertextual quality of the representation, is able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  The Internet address for the image one:   
http://www.zsnews.cn/epaper/zsrb/ShowIndex.asp?paperdate=20110721&part=12&article=2.  
69	  人到无求品自高 is the lower line of the following famous Chinese couplet: 事能知足心常泰 人到无求品自高  
70 Chinese couplets are famous for being object of careful consideration, accordingly to their diverse levels of 
expression. Another understanding of the above mentioned couplet  (see note 1) might be: “Being content leads you to 
peace, and seeking no excess finds you noble.” 
71 DPI, dots per inch, is the number of dots in digital graphics that can be placed within a space of one inch measuring 
2.54 cm. 
72 RGB is the acronym for Red, Green, and Blue. It refers to the three hues of light  that can be mixed together to form 
any color in digital production softwares. TVs and computer monitors use RGB to create colorful images on the screen. 
	   93	  
convey the identity of the represented, being indeed that of Lin Zexu. The other 
figure depicted, as said above, is an anonymous westerner carrying an opium pipe – 
here is a triple association that can be made in terms of intertexuality, and of which 
specific details will be provided later on – who is disconsolately pulling back from 
Lin Zexu’s warning: “请阁下将烟具带回贵国，存入皇家博物馆当展品吧!” 
(Qing zha xia jiang yanju dai hui guiguo, cun ru huang jia bowuguan dang zhan pin 
ba!) meaning: “Please sir bring your smoking tool back to your country, deposit it 
at the royal museum for exposition”.  
The image one is followed by the text, the article, which is not hierarchically 
subordinated to the image, but it rather establishes a dialogical relationship among 
the two, underlining the continuity or unity between Chinese history and present 
condition. Indeed, although the article, recalling Lin Zexu’s outstanding service, 
points out the necessity of leaving future generations with something more than 
material enjoyment (usually gained through the practice of corruption among 
officials), such as a profound philosophy of life able to yield virtue above all; 
nevertheless, the entire text of the article carries out its function by dialoguing with 
the image on diverse levels. As it happens at the beginning of the article for 
example:大家自然会想到他是“虎门销烟”民族英雄，但同时他也是一位清正
廉明的清官 (Dajia ziran hui xiangdao ta shi Humen xiaoyan minzu yingxiong, dan 
tongshi ta ye shi yi wei qingzheng lianming de qingguan) “Naturally everybody 
thinks that he (Lin Zexu) is the national hero who burned the opium in Humen, but 
he is also an honest and upstanding official”. Now, with regard to the image, this 
sentence firstly recalls the heroic event which undisputably makes him a national 
hero; securing in this way the remembrance of a historical event that concerned and 
still concerns the nation. This kind of narrative is traceable in the image as Lin 
Zexu’s hand clearly says “no” to foreign’s unaccetable “things” (the opium pipe), 
in the same way he said no to opium back in the 1830’s and 1840’s. Secondly, both 
the image and the text dialogue when the article esplicates how the British 
representative Sir Elliot sent Lin Zexu a generous gift (read: bribe) worth more than 
ten of thousand of platinum diamond opium pipes, at which point Lin Zexu refuses, 
remembering the importance of keeping good relations between the two countries  
and stating the same sentence as the one in the caption within the cloud in the 
image two: “Please sir bring your smoking tool back to your country, deposit it at 
the royal museum for exposition”. In this way, continues the text, Sir Elliot is 
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ridicolized by Lin Zexu’s righteous behaviour.73 Therefore, the relation between 
image and text is strengthen by the positive light under which Lin Zexu – both in 
the image and text – is represented, negatively connoting not only the British 
official (in the text), but the entire western world – for the image depicts an 
anonymous westerner, a business man. In fact, the two figures in the image, do not 
only represent Lin Zexu and a smuggler; their connotations stress the binary 
opposition self/other in order to lead the (Chinese) reader of the image to identify 
him/herself with the myth of Lin Zexu for his clear, digitally produced, ethnic 
quality (physical traits, and emperial fashion), and historical identity (the shame for 
the opium war is still reproduced in China), and to implicitly re-affirm the citizens 
belonging to the vast community called Chinese nation.  
Furthermore, Lin Zexu’s image marks a distinction between tradition/past and 
modernity. The image (along with the article) subtly becomes “an imagined, 
traditional, and authentic” (for the moderns) Chinese cultural space from which to 
“evaluate the progress of modern society” (T. Oakes 1993:514)74. Lin Zexu, 
belonging to a humiliating past of Chinese history, functions as a remembrance of 
what Chinese modernity is no more part of; though at the same time, the image one 
having the aesthetic (digital) quality that constantly valorizes its patriotic-national 
behaviour and positive moral values, serves the attitude of “praising progress by 
eulogizing tradition” (T. Oakes 1993:514). It is therefore possible to say that the 
image two of Lin Zexu is an image of both modern break, rupture and disjunction 
from a backward Chinese past, as well as it is an image of modern continuity with 
the great tradition of Chinese culture and history. A binary order inscribed in the 
image that is dependent on the aesthetic, designing quality of the image itself, 
which might highlight either one or the other ideological understanding. In 
considering these two overlapping features of the image of Lin Zexu, I should be 
careful in delineating too early  their frontiers. It should be left apart any tendency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The part of the text in Chinese as reported above: 1839年，林则徐奉命查禁鸦片，英国代表义律送来一套价值十
多万英镑的白金钻石烟具，林则徐义正词严拒绝说：“这套烟具属于违禁品，本当没收，但两国交往，友谊为
重，请阁下将烟具带回贵国，存入皇家博物馆当展品吧！”义律被讥讽得无地自容。 	  
74	  Timothy Oakes, “Place and The Paradox of Modernity”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 
87, No. 3 (Sept., 1993).	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of fixing boundaries and identities, and rather ask what is the correspondance that 
allows these two apparently different principles, acts, practices, and modes of 
production to yield a hybridizing effect. In fact, to concetrate exclusively on the 
difference between them, renovating and re-authorizing their dialectic in terms of 
stable oppositions, of contrasting terms, in the losing binary game, would only 
reproduce a uniqueness that doesn’t exist. In image two, the representation of Lin 
Zexu should be seen as a tradition revival or, as the natural celebration of a hero. 
Lin Zexu as tradition, history, culture is a legitimation force, as well as a tightening 
ideological/cultural embrace against the frightening mass mobilization; it is in favor 
of a globalized interdependent economy as shown in the image two, where the 
cargo ship seems to be waiting for the smuggler to leave with its opium pipe, to 
moore and discharge its precious cargo, symbolizing trade, symbolizing free will, 
symbolizing the newly (re)acquired power of China among the other nations; it is 
the past that is produced (through a digital image) as modernity by staging the 
differences between Lin Zexu and the smuggler, Asia and the West, virtue and 
corruption, past and present, and as Timothy Mitchell explains “the modern occurs 
only by performing the distinction between the modern and the non modern”75, as 
well as it performs the differences between the proliferation of signs76 and things 
(the former intended as Clifford Geertz’s system of symbols of a culture, the latter 
to be considered in Latourian terms ), namely all cultural forms - as the image two 
does - that make up culture and society; and the great, isolated repository called 
CULTURE in the modern constitution 77 . Lin Zexu’s image naturalizes and 
normalizes that sense of direction performed by those grandnarratives of progress, 
development, objectivism, and by universals such as “fraternity, innovation, 
tolerance and harmony” – as stated in the website of the “China Zhongshan”78 (中	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Timothy Mitchell, “The Stage of Modernity”, p. 26, in T. Mitchell (Edt.) “Questions of Modernity”, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000. 
76 Clifford Geertz in his “The Interpretation of Cultures” maintains that culture as a system of symbols produce a web 
of significance that may be analyzed through a semiotic approach to culture itself, by orientating the symbols toward 
the actors present in the specific cultural context whithin which the researcher is working. See C. Geertz “The 
Interpretation of Cultures - Selected Essays”, Basic Books, Inc., Publisher New York, 1973. 
77 Bruno Latour defines the “modern constitution” as a structure that determines the division between human and non-
human, their properties, relations, competencies and group divisions. See B. Latour “We Have Never Been Modern”, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussets, 1993. 
78 The website address for the 中国中山(政府之窗) China Zhongshan Government portal: http://www.zs.gov.cn/. 
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国中山) government portal – that populate the networks within which what we call 
Chinese culture and society are produced.  
To this end, a look at the Zhongshan Daily (中山日报) as the source of emission of 
the image two, and at the online digital publication as its channel of transmission, 
may help understanding the kind of moblization (in terms of actors and mediators’ 
mobilization) resulting in the image’s network.  
The image two of Lin Zexu and the article of which it is part of, has been published 
on a digital copy of the Zhongshan Daily (中山日报) a hundred and seventy years 
after the occurrence of the opium burning in Humen Town, Guandong Province at 
the hands of then emperial official Lin Zexu. The Zhongshan Daily is part of the  
Zhongshan Network (中山网) three media’s group: 中山网 (Zhongshan wang), 中
山日报 (Zhongshan ribao), and 中山商报 (Zhongshan Shang Bao). The group was 
established in 2005, and since then has been in charge of the city propaganda 
committee in Zhongshan city. The Zhongshan Network (中山网) is a media and 
news group which reports policy measure and provides news and lifestyle 
information as well as economic information and business services, in an integrated 
media network with the above mentioned media outlets. Moreover, by clicking on 
the lettering “other” (更民) of the Zhongshan daily (中山日报) it is possible to 
access public services such as “life inquiry” (生活查旬), “financial business” (财经
商务), “transport enquiry” (交通查旬), administration” (行政部门), “tourism 
services” (旅游服务), resulting in a comprehensive online portal integrated with 
the municipality of Zhongshan. Indeed, the group is also an important media 
window for the Zhongshan municipal government (中山市委市政府), working as a 
relevant platform for the integration of network resources, dissemination of online 
information, and guidance of public opinion. The Zhongshan Group together with 
Zhongguo Zhongshan (中国中山) Government Portal - the latter under the care of 
“Zhongshan Municipal People Governement Office (中山市人民政府办公室) – 
provides public services for the interaction with citizens of the municipality, and for 
the communication between the governement and the community of Zhongshan 
City through dedicated government information channels.  
Furthermore, through Zhongshan Shang Bao (中山商报) the Zhongshan Group 
focuses its attention on economic issues and current social dynamics, involving 
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people’s livelihood by means of entertainment sections, leading fashion consumers 
guide, and the omnipresent political news.  
Therefore, the media group represented by the Zhongshan Network (中山网), acts 
as an all-emcompassing and superimposing source of knowledge both for the 
citizens of Zhongshan city, and the overall Chinese readers that might end up 
reading the journals of the group. In this context politics, economy, culture and 
society as indipendent, autonomous entity, result destabilised by the combined 
networking process put on play by the Zhongshan Group. The socio-economic 
effort carried out by the Group, aimed at technological development and social 
integration, the market competition that it necessarily produces, the use and 
imposition of computer technologies, the convergence with global culture and 
labour, all these factors do not induce social transformation, they are already that 
transformation, they give rise to specific ever-changing social and cultural 
conformations79. Considering, for example, the contemporary anxiety yielded by 
the new lifestyle in urban china - where the search for jobs, the consumistic urge, 
the technological communication, and the general bewilderment felt by many 
citizens around the country - we see how Lin Zexu digital image and its online 
article, published by the Zhongshan Daily (中山日报), might be able to provide a 
consolation and an utopian appeal to its ideal anxious readers. In fact, being Lin 
Zexu a historical, national hero, whose personal relevance is deeply rooted in that 
ideal national space filled with nationalistic narratives and ideology (as does image 
two), with its confucian fashion and nationalistic ardour, it conveys a comfort and a 
utopian relief dispersing and dissolving the anxiety of daily life. At the same time, 
the reading page of the Zhongshan Daily (中山日报) promotes that same anxiety 
and bewilderment that Lin Zexu’s image may prove to soften, by publishing in its 
dedicated advertisement banners80 luxurious real estates publicities that might work 
as sources of uncertainty. And in doing so, the Zhongshan Group has the power of 
producing knowledge that contradicts itself  (as it has been showed right above) in 
an coherent system of representations.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Stefan kramer, Peter Ludes (Eds.), “Networks of Cultures”, LIT Verlag Dr. W. Hopf Berlin, 2010. 
80 The cost for private use of an advertisement banner in the Zhongshan Daily (中山日报) is 500 RMB per day for the 
bigger banner, and 300 RMB per day for the small ones. 
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- Image Three 
 
古有林则徐虎门销烟，今有⋯⋯？此处省略7个字，求跟帖 
 
Lin Zexu - Image Three - http://bbs.zhongsou.com/3/20120530/5229242.html 
 
 
 
The image three of Lin Zexu has been found by the author of this work in the 
forum section (论坛 luntan), BBS portal of the Chinese site zhongsou.com. It has 
been posted on the forum of the zhongsou.com website by the blogger 妒云恨雨 
(du yun hen yu) on 2012-05-30 at 12:52 under the title (thread) “古有林则徐虎门
销烟，今有⋯⋯？此处省略7个字，求跟帖”(Gu you Lin Zexu Humen xiao yan, 
jin you……? Ci chu shenglüe 7 ge zi, qiu gen tie), meaning “In the past Lin Zexu 
burned the opium in Humen, today/presently……..? Seven words are omitted here, 
please find the thread”. The image three is a digital image made by 437 × 322 
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pixel, with a DPI81 resolution equal to 72pixels/inch, using an RGB82 color model. 
The image displays a severe Lin Zexu, drew in profile and in a centered position, 
pointing with two fingers of its right hand to something, allegedly to the opium 
confiscated (if intertextuality, thrust by the text above, works properly), though 
nothing is actually displayed. However, down on the left side of the image, right 
where its fingers point at, is a text formed by four lines: 傅众家之所长	  (fu zhu jia 
zhi suo zhang); 看人生之百态	   (kan ren sheng zhi bai tai);	  文向心之冷暖	   (wen 
xiang xin zhi leng nuan); 思社会之责任	  (si she hui zhi ze ren). It seems to be a self 
evaluation of Lin Zexu, or a comment upon its historical exhortations and 
propositions . The possibility of being a poem has been rejected as it lacks the strict 
standard format of Chinese poetry. Nevertheless, the following translation of this 
text may bring a closer attention to the general meaning of the image, as well as to 
specific aspects of the elements present in the digital representation: “learn 
advantages/specialities from  other schools” (傅众家之所长 ); “onlooker of 
the vicissitudes of life” (傅众家之所长); “write down about the unfairs and fairs of 
society” (文向心之冷暖); “think about social responsibility” (思社会之责任). The 
denoted meaning of the text should be clear enough if the translation is accurate, 
but to identify what kind of relationship this text establishes with the other elements 
in the image, may help the overall understanding of it. 
As it is visible on the upper side of the image three, there is a “no smoking” logo 
which in my opinion establishes a double semiotic relation with the figure of Lin 
Zexu, having at the same time the function of signifier and signified. In fact, as a 
signifier, the logo receives its (connoted) meaning from the illustration of Lin Zexu 
(the signified), which signifies the logo by conveying a sense of “authority” (see 
the severe and austere digital face of Lin Zexu) already inscribed – in this and in 
other representations – in Lin Zexu’s mythical understanding. On the other hand, 
the logo functions as a signified by investing the image of Lin Zexu with a sort of 
“contemporary” meaning. Indeed, through the re-production of a specific Chinese 
past (Lin Zexu in front of the sized opium) it is possible to serve the needs and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 DPI, dots per inch, is the number of dots in digital graphics that can be placed within a space of one inch measuring 
2.54 cm.	  
82 RGB is the acronym for Red, Green, and Blue. It refers to the three hues of light  that can be mixed together to form 
any color in digital production softwares. TVs and computer monitors use RGB to create colorful images on the screen. 
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interests of present time (forbid smoking on public places for example) 
determining, among the people, a normative consesus that Lin Zexu’s mediated and 
media representation is able to articulate. Now, the first line of the text in the image 
three  seems to suggest to rely on Lin Zexu’s schools of thought to learn how to 
deal with specific matters; the second line to be weary of what surrounds us; the 
third line to determine what is right and what is not within society; the fourth line 
expresses the aspiration to a civic society. The three main elements of the image, 
the text, the “no-smoking” logo, and Lin Zexu (he is accompanied by two guards 
whose role is to reinforce Lin Zexu’s authority, and therefore to naturalize the 
ruler’s identification with military force), communicate in such a way as to enact a 
solid and authoritative regulatory intervention or prescriptive action, oriented 
towards a cognitive model (Lin Zexu as authority, as intervention and sanction) 
able to induce feelings of obedience. The mythical role of Lin Zexu, as this entire 
study is investigating, served and still serves various interests that cannot be too 
naively classified or labeled as political, economical, or financial powers, for these 
are obscure forces that vanish under the weight of their own inconsistency, but 
must be analysed within the pertinent system of simbols that nourish life 
understanding, and life interacting, that nurture culture in an incessant flow of 
signs-making, signs-dissemination, and signs-consuming, whatever form these 
processess (producing, communicating, and consuming) might take.   
The four-lines text in the image three, for example, do not only works by adding its 
regulatory discourse to the general meaning of the image, but it expresses a 
surreptitious message which can be read if the (vertical) linguistic code is known or 
individuated. In fact, if the first character of each line are read vertically, they form 
the following composition 博看文思 (Bo kan wen si), that is the name of  a Beijing 
based company (iBokan Wisdom), providing 3G technology platform to IOS, 
Android, and HTML5 for mobile telecommunications technology, complying with 
the International Mobile Telecommunications 2000 (IMT-2000) specifications. 3G 
telecommunication networks support services that provide an information transfer 
rate of at least 200 kbit/s. It finds application in wireless voice telephony, mobile 
Internet access, fixed wireless Internet access, video calls, and mobile TV. 
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 The reference 博看文思 (Bo kan wen si) functions in the 
image as an agency, molding the ethical value of the text to the extent that the text 
itsef strengthen the pervasiveness of the agency by legitimating its entrenched 
occurrence, meaning that the presence of a symbol of technology, which is also a 
symbol of progress and advancement, might well fit, as it does, beside the figure of 
Lin Zexu and within the text precisely because of its onward, progressive, 
continuing attitude and orientation. This reinforces Lin Zexu’s contemporary 
mythology. Indeed, as T. Hjellum explains “one myth of maoism was  that China’s 
backwardness was a result of Western imperialism from the time of the opium war. 
This idea justified isolationism. As China has opened up to the outside world, this 
idea has lost much of its legitimacy.”83 Since the 1980’s and through the 1990’s and 
the 2000’s, Lin Zexu’s mythology had been revised in function of the new 
modernization policy, becoming much more pragmatic as it also represented the 
natural convergence between two interdependent Chinese social classes, politicians 
and enterpreneurs, and now undertaking under its mythological umbrella the 
symbols of technological advancement and progress. However, there is another 
important aspect that is worth  to be considered while investigating the presence of 
the vertical reference 博看文思 (Bo kan wen si) in the four-line text of the image 
three of Lin Zexu. In traditional Chinese graphic arts, distance 远近 (yuanjin) or 
perspective, was disciplined or dealt with through different conventions, as Cordell 
D. K. Yee specifies in “Chinese Cartography Among the Arts”. One of these 
conventions was the use of variable viewpoint: “The standpoint of the observer, 
instead of being fixed, is movable without restriction or else multiple. Each portion 
of the composition is drawn with its own viewpoint perpendicular to it at some 
distance. This convention was useful for composing a spatially dynamic sequence 
of scenes on, for example, scrolls, one of the traditional media for Chinese painting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 T. Hjellum, “On the Legitimacy of the Dengist Regime”, (p.3), The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 1996. 
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and maps.”84 Although the peculiar presence of the text 博看文思 (Bo kan wen si) 
might be easely exemplified by the vertical linguistic code officially in use until 
1956 in China, and still employed in arts representations and other social practices 
as in the production of red strips of paper hanged on the two sides of many Chinese 
doors with couplets written on them, or those carved on stones in Chinese parks; 
nevertheless, the production of paintings and maps with multiple viewpoints in 
ancient China – though still practiced during the Qing dynasty as attested by the 
“Tai Shan Quan Tu” (complete map of Tai Mountain)85 – indicates that the reading 
of graphical representations was conceived, essentially, to allow the reading subject 
to visually penetrate the painting or map from diverse entry points, as the vertical 
text in the image three is not complementary to the (horizontal) text that it 
simultaneously creates, rather it assigns to the whole image an alternative entry 
point for the reading of the digital representation. In this sense, if one is accustomed 
to the above mentioned 3G technology platform (iBokan wisdom), and is thus able 
to recognize it (vertically) before reading the text horizontally, does not only 
visually enters the image from an alternative point of view, but he or she will also 
be affected by its instrumental function in the overall narrativity of the image, as it 
has been stated above with regard to the agency function of the vertical text. 
There are two other written texts in the image, both of them at the bottom of it, 
respectively in the left and right side of the digital representation. The text on the 
left side comprises two different linguistic codes, chinese language and english 
language: “该图片由妒云恨雨 上传到” (gai tu pian you du yun hen yu shang 
chuan dao), meaning “picture uploaded by envy-clouds-hate-rain”, and right 
besides it the english reference “Club.China.com”, which is the same text that we 
find on the bottom-right side of the image, but this time produced as a logo and 
with the chinese reference right below it “中华网论坛” (zhonghua wang luntan), 
that is the chinese equivalent of Club.China.com. 
At the beginning of this analsys, I pointed out how the image three has been found 
on the BBS page of the zhongsou.com website, but before disclosing some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  Cordell D. K. Yee, “Cartography in China - Chinese Cartography among the Arts: Objectivity, Subjectivity, 
Representation”, (p. 146), in J. B. Harley and David Woodward (Eds.), “History of Cartography, (Volume Two) 
Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies, published by the University of Chicago Press,1994.  
85 IBIDEM. Field Museum of Natural History, Chicago. 
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interesting relations and information about the hosting website of the image, I wish 
to start by following the sign Club.China.com in order to trace back the original 
posting of the image before it got in the forum section of zhongsou, and try to 
understand better its motivations. As said above, in the zhongsou.com website the 
image three has been posted on 2012-05-30 at 12:52, while in the Club.China.com 
on 2012-05-30 at 11:26, meaning that the latter had posted the image prior than the 
former, but on the same day. The image has been posted by such 舒和钟甘 (shu he 
zhong gan), whose profile image is a red heart with the five chinese flag’s stars, and 
the Chinese caption “zhonghua wang zhongguo xin”, meaning “China’s network, 
China’s heart” as shown here: 
	  It	  is	  even	  too	  easy	  to	  determine	  the	  feelings	  of	  attachment	  and	  belonging	  to	  the	  motherland	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  舒和钟甘 (shu he zhong gan), author of the 
post. What is of concern here is why has the image been posted on the same day in 
two different sites, although both were forums (luntan), by two Club.China.com 
Internet users? The May 30, 2012 (date of the post), was the day prior to the 31th, 
which would have been the 25th “World No-Tobacco Day”. In fact, since the 
1950’s many studies have demonstrated the risks for human health caused by 
tobacco, and the World Health Organization in November 1987 proposed to 
institute every year on  April 7 the “World No-Tobacco Day” which started in 1988. 
Nonetheless, since 1989 the “World No-Tobacco Day” is celebrated each year 
world wide on May 31.  
As such Lin Zexu becomes the medium of a transnational event, mediating the 
perception of a global sentiment (smoking harms your health) by way of a process 
of translation. Lin Zexu in the image three serves the need to accomodate the  
global,  and therefore foreign, message into the system of symbols that circulates 
and are used in China. Then, it is not only a matter of conveying the message 
“smoke kills” on the day of the “World No Tobacco Day” in China. It rather is a 
matter of participating to a global event by means of a sentiment, which is 
addressed through the particular digital realization of Lin Zexu’s image, and the 
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transposition of the value of its narrativity86 (in the representation) to reality (the 
global event). Therefore the past is remembered, the community is re-imagined, 
tradition celebrated, authority re-emphasized, and participation (to a global 
righteous event) guaranteed.   
The image three has been found in the BBS site of zhongsou.com Internet page. 
What is a BBS site? Bulletin Board Systems are internet forums and discussion 
boards. They are computerized systems used to exchange pubblic messages and 
files, as well as learning about products and sometimes even making purchases 
through the BBS sites. Most bulletin boards serve specific interest groups, and 
many users also enjoy sharing stories about their personal life, publishing posts, 
participating in polls and enjoying the type of communication such sites provide. 
Currently about 70% of Chinese BBS sites use the Discuz! system. Discuz! is a  
software developed by Comsenz Technology Co., Ltd, and it is the most popular 
platform for BBS sites in China. Chinese internet users enjoy expressing 
themselves and their opinion on BBS sites, and the advent of social network hasn’t 
decreased the use of BBS forums, rather it seems that BBS and social networks co-
exist successfully in China's internet sphere. Lin Zexu’s image has therefore been 
posted on such ensemble of media spaces where there is an infinite number of 
categories, article titles, posts, and internal pages where the flow of news is never 
ending. Such condition needs to be pointed out inasmuch as it may affects the 
reception of the meaning/ideology that any image conveys. 
However, the website that hosts the BBS site where the image three of Lin Zexu 
has been posted is zhongsou.com, which after an attentive search has resulted being 
a Beijing-based leading third-generation search engine services and technology 
provider. Since its establishment in 2004 中搜网 (zhongsou wang) has been 
committed to the third generation of search engine technology providing Internet 
information search services to users and customers. To put it simple, 中搜网 
(zhongsou wang) is a competitor of Google and Baidu as it functions as a search 
engine service for Internet users. The web search engine is designed to search for 
information on the World Wide Web or any kinds of web servers, but the precious 
characteristic of 中搜网 (zhongsou wang) is that its founder and CEO Chen Pei 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Hayden White, “The Narrativization of Real Events”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer,1981), pp. 793-798, 
Published by “The University of Chicago Press”. 
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released, in 2005, the first type of "Third Generation Chinese Search Engine" as 
chief designer. Chen Pei has developed a personal gateway from a single search 
engine, whose key technique combines search engine technology and personalized 
syndication technology. Compared with the competition (Google and Baidu) 中搜
网 (Zhongsou Wang) facilitates the retrieval of real-time information and provides 
customized interactive services. The home page adopts a conventional vertical 
layout with a search box in the middle. The page also offers e-commerce search 
functionality, as well as vertical search functionality for companies, supply and 
demand, books, financial information, and others. The company generates revenue 
from offering business companies the chance of replacing or complementing their 
own single website with a higher or lower ranking on search results returned by the 
seven leading national portals (Sina, Sohu, Wangyi, Tom.com, 3721.com 87 , 
263.com) with whom zhongsou is affiliated.  
As a tool to search for information, the search engine works as an immense online 
archive, which through customized applications and services provides information, 
demonstrating the media adaptation to cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic codes. Even 
though processes of globalization and of internationalization often “are insensitive 
to deep cultural diversity”88, in the case of 中搜网 (Zhongsou Wang), the greater 
knowledge of the Chinese market – not only in terms of clients hoarding, but also 
of clients understanding – mostly made of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME), allowed Chen Pei and his company to cut out Google from the Chinese 
market and launch a serious challenge to the most used Chinese research engine, 
Baidu. This kind of information are fundamental inasmuch as they define the 
context – which is neither political, nor economic, nor cultural, in the same way it is 
neither national, nor international, but a dense and complex hybridization of actors, 
agents, mediators, intermediaries that interact relying on sistems of symbols that 
make up the networks in which they act – where certain aspects of nationalism (Lin 
Zexu’s heroism) go hand in hand with profound transnational processes (Google 
approaching Baidu to challenge Zhongsou in China); or where the historical shame 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 In 2003 Yahoo has acquired 3721.com. 
88	  Gunther Kress, “Visual and verbal modes of representation in electronically mediated communication: the potentials 
of new forms of text”, (p. 3), in I. Synder (Ed.) “Page to Screen: Taking Literacy Into the Electronic Era” (p. 53-79), 
London and New York: Routledge.	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suffered for the Opium Wars (still conveyed by Lin Zexu’s digital representation) is 
mediated by the IOS software highlighting advertisement banner; or again where 
the ethical and moral integrity communicated by the image of Lin Zexu is 
negotiated by the erotic appeal of nearly naked young women that show prosperous 
body forms, enticing one to articulate social desires and consequent needs 
(cosmetic surgery and so on). In this way Lin Zexu’s images, along with many 
other online representations, becomes part of an online culture that supports the 
goals and interest of diverse social actors.  
Furthermore, Chen Pei’s designing of "Third Generation Chinese Search Engine" is 
not an isolated case of technological advancement in China, it rather is a 
contribution to an exceptional growing development of digital communications 
technology that precipitated what Esarey and Qiang define as the “Information 
Regime III”: the digital age. As the authors explain “by the early 2000’s, millions of 
citizens had purchased telephones, cell phones, and personal computers and 
subscribed to broadband Internet service. A growing percentage of Chinese citizens 
gained the technological capability to express their views via digital networks 
around the country”89, as well as to rely to the same technology to get information 
and thus consume a well-structured knowledge of the world around them, allowing 
digital media to be integrated to people’s mode of communication and ways of life, 
and to grant people, from diverse backgrounds, to share common experiences 
related to digital media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ashley Esarey and Xiao Qiang, “Digital Communication and Political Change in China”, (p.7), International Journal 
of Communication 5 (2011), 298–319. 
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-­‐	  Image Four	  
名人名言林则徐图片 
	  
Lin Zexu – Image Four - http://www.nipic.com/show/4/137/9a9aefa4d1f41a51.html  
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The image four of Lin Zexu has been found by the author of this work on the 
Chinese website 昵图网 Nipic.com, posted by an anonymous user whose 
username is song0985, and uploaded on 2009/11/3. The user’s only personal 
information provided, besides the pictures and images posted, is the “personalized 
message” 个性签名 (ge xing qian ming) published on the user’s profile space and 
meant as a characteristic signature: 好好学习，天天向上 (hao hao xue xi, tian 
tian xiang shang), “study hard and make progress every day”. The website 昵图网 
Nipic.com is a photo sharing network platform, intended for “creating shared 
value” 共享创造价值 (gong xiang chuang zao jia zhi) as stated in the website’s 
logo. The website is an online platform that allows users to share photos, publish 
multimedia digital images, exchange amatorial photo creation, and even sell 
professional designed images. A website thought to be an online space where 
visual culture is not only produced, exhibited, exchanged, commercialized, and 
consumed; but a website in which visuality is the only thing that matters. Further 
information on the website and its role as an expression and producer of media 
culture, as well as the user song0985’s visual orientation will be provided later on, 
after Lin Zexu’s image will have been detailed dissected. 
The image four is a digital production, created through a raster graphics editor 
(photoshop)90 with a DPI (dots per inch) resolution (分辨率) equal to 300dpi; it is 
made of 3455×4636 pixels (像素),using an RGB91 color model (颜色), whose 
overall format is PSD (CS2)92.  
Besides the linguistic reference, that is one of many of Lin Zexu’s exhortations, 
and which will be analysed later, the entire representation is characterised by four 
well-distiguishing features: the portrait of Lin Zexu in the upper-centred position, 
the dragon-alike image in the upper-left side, the traditional decorative auspicious 
pattern right above Lin Zexu’s portrait as well as on the down-left side, and 
finally the foggy mountains as the background of the linguistic reference in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 A raster graphics editor is a computer program that allows users to create and edit images on computer screens and 
save them in different formats such as JPEG, TIFF and so on. 
91 RGB is the acronym for Red, Green, and Blue. It refers to the three hues of light  that can be mixed together to form 
any color in digital production softwares. TVs and computer monitors use RGB to create colorful images on the screen. 
92 A PSD file is a layered image file used in Adobe Photoshop. PSD, which stands for Photoshop Document, is the 
default format that Photoshop uses for saving data. CS2 refers to the 2005 Photoshop version.	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lower side of the representation. The global meaning of the digital image, in the 
process of construction of the myth of Lin Zexu, conveys a comprehensive ethical 
and moral value inscribed in a standardized impression of Chineseness, 
communicated by the recurrent Chinese signs as are the dragon, the decorative 
pattern, and the foggy mountains. The portrait of Lin Zexu has been copied in a 
digital format by the user of the website 昵图网 Nipic.com from an existing oil 
painting (100x80cm), produced by the Inner-mongolian painter 王燕青 Wang 
Yanqing in 2006, resembling in my opinion the cinematic poster of Zheng Junli’s 
1959 movie “Lin Zexu”, played by Chinese actor Zhan Dao. Although the whole 
ideology communicated by the 1959’s movie offers a perspective on the issue of 
the opium war during the Great Leap Forward, and thus subject to major 
ideological concerns such as maoism (here meant as Maoist socialism opposed to 
Soviet socialism), imperialism, and anti-rightist campaigns among others; 
nevertheless, the ideology that Lin Zexu positively conveys in the present digital 
representation aims at different objectives: industrial and technological 
development, global trade promotion (these two archetypes also suggested by the 
logo of the “Guangdong College of Industry and Commerce” in the low-right side 
of the image), as well as more general modern paradigms such as progress, future, 
development, and historical linearity. It is clear that the ideology communicated is 
the result of the entire narrative made up by the relation between all the features 
displayed in the representation. Lin Zexu and the dragon for example, work 
together in constructing the ideology of technological development through the 
medium of water. According to Qiguang Zhao, in Chinese mythology, dragons (as 
the one featuring in the upper-left side of the image) are associated with and 
control of water in the context of a “Chinese hydraulic culture”. “The term " 
hydraulic," as Karl Wittfogel defines it, draws attention to the agromanagerial 
and agrobureaucratic character of Chinese civilization.”93  
For the ancient Chinese paesants the dragon has been a symbol (myth) of water 
power94, and as such has always been connected not only with the geography of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Qiguang Zhao, “Chinese Mythology in the Context of Hydraulic Society”, (p.231-232), Asian Folklore Studies, Vol. 
48, 1989: 231-246.  
94 “Like legendary Yu, the dragon is a product of the hydraulic system. The royal position of the Chinese mythological 
dragon should be attributed to the early integration of water control and national leadership, started in Xia Dynasty 
with Yu as its founding father. The dragon's behavior is that of a water god. It is believed " to descend into the waters at 
the autumnal	  equinoxes. At the vernal equinoxes, it rises from them and ascends into the sky " (XU 1972, Vol. 3, 30). It 
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the country – “the names of forty Chinese rivers contain the word dragon”95 龙 
(long) – but also with the figure of the emperor regulator of the water, 
consequently becoming a symbol of emperial authority: “Since 221 B.c., the time 
when Qin Shihuang 秦始皇 first styled himself Huangdi 黄帝 (emperor), the term 
wang has denoted merely the local ruler. Having achieved its greatest degree of 
transfiguration, the Chinese mythological dragon emblematizes imperial 
power.” 96  In fact an alternative attribution to the emperor was 真龙天子 
(zhenlong tianzi), to indicate the “true dragon emperor”. It is also reasonable to 
think that the symbol of the dragon in the image four refers to a mere expression 
of Chinese (traditional) popular culture, where the dragons stands just for China, 
without any further meaning. Nonetheless, its association with Lin Zexu in the 
context of the opium war, and with regard to the new ideology inscribed, since the 
Reform period (1978), into the representation of Lin Zexu as the promoter of 
technological advancement, after having suffered but understood – though too late 
– the “water despotism” of the British navy as a result of their superior naval 
force, it is plausible to think that the two features – Lin Zexu and the dragon – 
make use of the medium “water” as an agency that communicates the ideology of 
progress. Indeed Lin Zexu, during his assignement in Guangzhou as imperial 
commissioner, employed four assistant translators in order to obtain adequate 
Western sources of knowledge to better understand the origin of the British 
technical superiority in shipbuilding. Lin Zexu therefore had the 1834 
Encyclopedia of Geography 97  written by Hugh Murray translated as the	  
Geography of the Four Continents (四洲志), becoming the source for the 
geographic treatise “Illustrated Gazetteer of Maritime Countries” haiguo tuzhi (海
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rides on the wind and clouds; its very breadth, condensed, forms the rain - not only the gentle rains of spring and 
summer, but the fierce storms that make rivers overflow their banks. The dragon's spiral paths to the highest heavens 
form tornadoes, whirlwinds, and waterspouts.” In Qiguang Zhao, “Chinese Mythology in the Context of Hydraulic 
Society”, (p.234-235), Asian Folklore Studies, Vol. 48, 1989: 231-246.  
95 IBIDEM see pages 236-237 for a list of Chinese rivers containing the word dragon 龙 (long). 
96 IBIDEM (p.241). 
97  Hugh Murray, William Wallace, Robert Jameson, Sir William Jackson Hooker, William Swainson, “The 
Encyclopedia of Geography !: !Comprising a Complete Description of the Earth, Physical, Statistical, Civil, and 
Political !”, Longmans, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, & Longman, (1834). 
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國圖志) written and published in 1844 by	  Wei Yuan98 (魏源). This is to say that 
Lin Zexu’s contribution to the development of Chinese social and political 
thought wasn’t directed only toward the understanding of the world in terms of 
geographycal mapping and/or location of the western powers, but was rather 
focused in mastering the fundamental views and ideas that had made, at that time, 
Western science so vital. In this sense should, in my opinion, be read the 
correlation between the dragon and Lin Zexu in the image four, the dragon as the 
symbol of water and the myth of emperial authority (origined from the hydraulic 
water control), and Lin Zexu as the master heroic pratriot which understood the 
necessity to “employ the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control 
them”99, namely the techniques of shipbuilding (but not only) to win the dominion 
of the British in the oceans. These two myths together, make use of the most 
powerful semiotic resources to convey a sense of power and authority as well as a 
strong exhortation to make progress in every field of science. In this respect 
should indeed be comprehended the logo of the “Guangdong College of Industry 
and Commerce” (广东工贸职业技术学院) in the low-right side of the image. A 
university institution that offers knowledge and career opportunities in diverse 
sectors within the fields of industry and commerce: computer network technology 
(计算机网络技术), computer software (计算机软件技术), computer multimedia 
technology (计算机多媒体技术), software outsourcing services (软件外包服务), 
computer information management (计算机信息管理), computer art and design (
电脑艺术设计), networking application technology (物联网应用技术), computer 
application technology (计算机应用技术). The relationship of Lin Zexu and the 
dragon with the Guangdong College of Industry and Commerce, confirms, again, 
the myth of Lin Zexu in contemporary China, the patriotic hero that looks at the 
future and promotes progress.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857) was a late Qing period philosopher and writer. He also participated in the translation of 
Hugh Murray's “Encyclopaedia of Geography” that was published by Lin Zexu as 四洲志 "Geography of the Four 
Continents". 
99 魏源 Wei Yuan. 海國圖誌 Haiguo tuzhi (Illustrated Gazetteer of Maritime Countries). 50 卷 juan in 2 ze. 1844; 60 
卷 juan. 2nd ed. 1847; 100 卷 juan. 3d ed. Yangzhou, 1852. In Sergey Vradiy, “The Interest in World Geography in 
19th Century China and “Fundamental Information about the Russian State” by Lin Zexu”, Slavic Research Center 
(June-October 2008). 
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However, there are two more Chinese traditional characteristics in the image that 
reinforce the sense of Chineseness mentioned above: the decorative patterns and 
the foggy mountains. The decorative patterns are produced through computer-
generated programs which offer many algorithmic possibilities for creating two-
dimensional decorative effects, showing also the convergence between traditional 
decorative design models and modern technology. 100  Chinese traditional 
decorative patterns are part of a rich and wealth heritage of Chinese visual art; an 
art that today contributes to nurture the representation of Chinese official culture 
in China as well as worldwide. Nevertheless, as Chi Han warns us “if just only 
blindly indulging in the tradition and simply copy it (the traditional decorative 
patterns) to today’s works while no new nutrition, it will doom to die, and we will 
eventually face a large number of antique copies in our times.”101 Many of these 
decorative patterns have different meanings, depending on the context in which 
they are used or the context that they make up. Usually they possess a general 
meaning of “auspiciousness” and “fortune”, though in the digital image four 
further meanings can be individuated. The symmetrical open rectangulars that 
seem to be hanged to the curve but straight line (the term straight here indicates a 
progressive pace) signify rationalized repetition, indicating that what has been 
achieved in the entire history of China is maintained and used, while the straight 
curve line that goes upward expresses the evolution and progression of Chinese 
civilization toward a brilliant future. The image of Lin Zexu right above the 
decorative pattern emphasizes this sense of direction and progress. 
As for the foggy mountains, they have the role to increase and underline the 
Chineseness and the identification of it with Chinese culture, for the reference to 
traditional Chinese paintings is clear. Furthermore, the infinite horizon that the 
reproduction displays supplement the idea of looking onward, facing the future 
that has to come. Moreover, if all the features of the image four are made spoken 
together and not individually, they all express “direction” (the line of the 
decorative patterns and the gaze of Lin Zexu) and “open spaces” intended as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Kulwant Singh, Atul Kumar, Nitin Sharma, “The Mathematical Aspects in Art to Create Decorative Effect in Design 
Patterns”,  International Journal of Innovative Technology and Exploring Engineering (IJITEE) ISSN: 2278-3075, 
Volume-2, Issue-2, January 2013. 
 
101 Chi Han, “A Study on Application of Chinese Auspicious Pattern in Modern Design”, Asian Social Science; Vol. 10, 
No. 12; 2014 ISSN, 1911-2017 E-ISSN 1911-2025, Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education. 
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infinite world where the Chinese nation might culturally expand (the water 
reference of the dragon as well as the intertextuality implicit in Lin Zexu’s 
attempt to achieve the dominance in the oceans, and the landscape offered by the 
mountains). But that is not all.  
There is an important linguistic reference that provides the codes and keys to 
understand the image:  
 
海纳百川 (hai na bai chuan)，有容乃大 (you rong nai da) 
壁立千仞 (bi li qian ren)，无欲则刚 (wu yu ze gang) 
 
“The sea can contain thousand of rivers because posses the virtue of tolerance”. 
“The cliff can stand high because has not desires”. 
 
Meaning: People must be educate to be tolerant and open-minded, and refuse 
useless desires to stand strong facing life.  
Again, the sense of direction embodied in the myhtology of Lin Zexu is expressed 
to naturalize the course of Chinese society since the opening and reform 
undertaken by Deng Xiaoping’s policy, and improved since then. And again 
tradition and present, if not future, meet to create a historical sense of progression 
and belonging; in fact not only Lin Zexu is recalled, but also specific forms of 
civic education (and in a confucian style) are reproduced.   
Finally, with regard to the role of the image four in the website 昵图网 Nipic.com, 
although at first sight it would seem that the representation of Lin Zexu has been 
made to represent or promote the Guangdong College of Industry and Commerce 
as a part of their promotional strategy – for the presence of the logo of the 
University would lead anyone to think so – I’ve come to the conclusion that 
considered one the aim of the website 昵图网 Nipic.com – 如果你想出售自己的
设计、摄影作品，昵图网同样能够满足你 – as stated in their presentation page, 
it deals predominantly with a specific global commercial service known as 
“crowdsourcing”, more specifically called “crowdsource design”, which is the 
process of getting a specific work (design of fashion, furniture, logos and so on) 
done by many people, which somehow compete (usually online) each other in 
order to see their own work chosen, for a specific commercial need, by private 
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companies and/or multinationals. In addition to this, an analysis of further images 
posted and produced by the user song0985 seems to confirm the crowdsourcing 
function of the image four, as many other digital productions have been found on 
his/her profile with similar characteristics and, apparently, with the same 
commercial and consuming destination, for I failed to find the same images in the 
websites, the logos of the images where supposed to lead me to. Therefore, the 
image four of Lin Zexu might be considered as a media product whose hybridity 
and multipositionality stems “from its complex interaction and entanglement with 
globalization”102 (Liu Kang 2004: 13) and global capitalism, being part of a 
contemporary visual culture which constantly produces and changes identities, 
values, and subjectivities; and where the process of decoding of an image is 
mediated by ever-changing advertisements brightly shining, and often overlapping 
the image itself, with meanings and ideologies of various nature, but seemingly 
entrenched with a consuming culture that produces popular cultural forms, which 
in turn impose themselves on the people as the everyday life.  
 
 
 - Image Five 
 
Lin Zexu - Image Five - http://pm.findart.com.cn/bigimg.php?aid=967022 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Liu Kang, “Globalization and cultural trends in China”, (p.13), University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004.	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The image five of Lin Zexu has been found on the website findart.com.cn103 (搜艺
搜), an online Chinese search engine dedicated to the research of pieces of art to be 
sold at (online) public auctions. The image is a digital re-production (JPEG) made 
of 800(height) x 396(width) pixels (像素), with a DPI (dots per inch) resolution (分
辨率) equal to 72dpi, using a generic RGB color model (颜色). It specifically is a 
digital reproduction of an oil on canvas, produced in 1999 by Chinese painter Guo 
Beiping 郭北平 (1949) in occasion of the celebration for the returning of Macau to 
China’s sovereignty. The painting is a super size historical oil painting entitled 林
则徐视察澳门 (Lin Zexu inspects Macau). The painting is three meters wide and 
six meters long. It records a rare known historical event prior to the 1840’s Opium 
War. Lin Zexu, the representative of the Emperor Daoguang of Qing Dynasty, 
visited Macau and expressed the Emperor’s favour and cares to the Macau people 
and the Portugal residences. The painting made three records in Chinese art history: 
the largest size, the most figures, and the shortest period of time (it’s been produced 
in less than three months).  
The painting has been object of exhibitions, as well as prizes:  
- in 1999 林则徐视察澳门 (Lin Zexu inspects Macau) participated in a Beijing 
exhibition in the “China Revolutionary Museum” (中国革命博物馆), Chinese 
History Museum (中国历史博物馆), to celebrate the return of Macao to the 
motherland, promoted by the People's Republic of China, Ministry of Culture. 
 - in 2000 it has been exhibited in Macau in the context of the 中国艺术大展 
“Chinese Art Exhibition”. 
In both occassions the 郭北平 Guo Beiping’s painting has been awarded a prize: 
the “Gold Award” (获金奖), and the “work n°1” by the Cultural Affairs Bureau of 
the Macao Special Administrative Region (澳门特別行政区政府文化局). It is also 
said that Guo Beiping (郭北平) in order to meet the timeline of the celebration of 
the return of Macau to China’s motherland, after having been asked by the Ministry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The following is the complete Internet address of the website where the image five of Lin Zexu has been found: 
http://pm.findart.com.cn/bigimg.php?aid=967022. 	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of Culture to paint a celebrating art-work, painstakingly undertook the task working 
fourteen hours per day, and successfully finishing the painting in 100 days.  
Guo Beiping (郭北平) was born in 1949 in the northwest Chinese province, 
Shaanxi (陝西省), being one of the best student of art of the only art school of 
Xi’an (西安市). During the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) Guo Beiping was 
sent in the north side of Shaanxi province, in a poor and isolated area and was 
assigned to a small unit of work composed only of five people. In this period he had 
contact and experience with people and social conditions that might have 
influenced his painting attitude and subjects (mostly portraits and figures studies) 
that often appear in an ideal-space and/or historical background. Guo Beiping oil 
painting art is considered to be realistic with abstract expressions, both elements 
rooted in realistic and idealistic feelings that tell the historical vicissitudes of life of 
the figures that he has been painting. In the context of a historical Chinese culture, 
that is the progressive evolutionary orientation so much debated among Chinese 
scholars and non, realism as a category of ideology stands as a sort of universal 
humanism whose credibility lies in its “melodramatic and sentimental” critic of a 
deplorable human condition in China, thus regarding the grandnarratives and the 
entire architecture of enlightment as the source through which is possible to leap 
forward to a better future. In this sense most of Guo Beiping’s works depict human 
figures belonging to a revolutionary, as well as to a post-revolutionary condition, 
revealing a modern frustration in the eternal search for alternatives. In this way 
should be understood the role Guo Beiping, as an istitutionalized personality, and 
the work 林则徐视察澳门 (Lin Zexu inspects Macau) play, as a representative of 
the so called “official culture”. In fact, he currently serves as vice president, 
professor and doctoral tutor of Xi’an Academy of Fine Art 西安美术学院 (AFA) 
as well as council member of China Oil Painting Society. He is also considered to 
be one of the most important Chinese artist able to understand the inner essence of 
Western oil painting adapted to the Oriental aesthetic ideal. Indeed, the American 
Oil & Acrylic Painter’s Society granted Guo Beiping its overseas membership, 
becoming the first and the only Chinese artist who received the honor. 
As for the image five, the digital reproduction stands in a particular relation to the 
original Guo Beiping’s painting. Walter Benjamin explains that “what whiters in 
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the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art”104, where for loss 
of aura he intended a meaning that goes beyond the artistic environment. The 
reproduction in series of the Guo Beiping’s painting 林则徐视察澳门 (Lin Zexu 
inspects Macau) in a digital format, perturb the function of the work of art, 
actualizing and incorporating it into the present condition both of the viewer and of 
the dominating ideology. If the original painting’s function, at the time of its 
production, served the propagandistic need of celebrating a collective national 
moment, namely the return of Macau under the authority of the motherland China, 
and thus performing an ideology necessary for that specific historical moment – 
recall the humiliation of the opium war, reaffirm China’s nationalism as central, 
reshape the other, and so on – the technical reproduction, as Benjamin calls it, 
surely serves many other needs. In the context of a nation building-process and of 
mass consumption, popular cultural forms work by approaching the masses as close 
as possible, both spatially and humanly; they almost interactively engage the 
viewer/consumer within the logic of possession. The media product as the image 
five is, being digital and online, has the ability to enter collective and private spaces 
in such a way that the original could not in any case; in the best situation, that of a 
public exhibition, there would be some hundreds of people that might hierchically 
and in an organized mode visually access the original. The digital image possess a 
pervasiveness that isn’t comparable to the private, sometimes isolated original 
work of art. In this sense, the technical reproduction of the image of Lin Zexu is 
only a way of calling the gaze that hides its functional, interested and partial nature, 
a nature that cannot be defined neither as political, nor as economical for these two 
terms represent a reduction of the reality in which this reproduction consume its life 
as a cultural form. I haven’t yet delineated the global commercial role of the 
website in which the image five has been found – an online Chinese search engine 
dedicated to the research of piece of art to be sold at (online) public auctions – 
nevertheless it is possible to distinguish the image five’s characteristic as a media 
product. First of all, the digital reproduction is positioned within a context, the 
website, itself expression of an ideological process. Within the website it 
immediately becomes an object of consumption in two specific terms; one through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Walter Benjamin, “L’opera d’arte nell’epoca della sua riproducibilità tecnica”. Arte e società di massa, trad. it. di 
Enrico Filippini, Einaudi, Torino 1966, 1991 e 1998. 
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a visual consumption (if one just look at it),  and the other through a previously, 
imagined and strongly idealized tactile feeling that the desire of possessing the 
thing is able to convey (for example if one pays the best price and award the 
auction, or in case the user requests to rent the piece of art for an exhibition). 
Furthermore, in the moment in which the image is visualized, it is said to enter the 
context (meant as the reality in which the user lives) of the viewer, when instead it 
contributes to construct around the viewer that sense of everyday life that the media 
and their products constitute, providing a mediated reality that naturalizes itself. 
The observer also adjust itself, both physically and cognitively, to the image. It 
does so by positioning itself in a centered position; he or she is allowed to observe, 
through the focus options that the media offers, details of the digital image that 
otherwise wouldn’t have been noticed; the user ideologically understand the image 
– or at least this is what is expected to do – by attaching to it an economic, 
commercial value that the website findart.com.cn (搜艺搜) conveyes with its 
expressed scope (the two banners, for instance, that appear on the left and right side 
of the screen displaying an object with a price of 600 yuan underlined by the red 
color).  
Moreover, the specific subject of the image – Lin Zexu in its imperial fashion 
standing elevated in front of the Macau officials and populace, gathered there to 
celebrate his visit right after the burning of opium in Humen in 1939 – with its 
strong ideological meaning, doesn’t allow for a critical review of the image itself, 
as it is the celebration of a national hero whose importance and relevance in 
Chinese history is inscribed in the cognitive imagining of the nation itself.  
However, deconstructing the image five by labeling it only as a commodity would 
mean limiting this analysis to a Marxist interpretation. In turn, I would like to direct 
the investigation toward a questioning of the modern dichotomies such as local-
global, East-West, high-low, art-commercialism. The network in which the image 
five is embedded and that it constitutes, overcome the modern binary system 
because the network itself excludes constrictions that are not in play. It would be 
too easy to define the image of Lin Zexu only as an opposition of the local (the 
closed China in the 1840’s) and the global (the British empire and its imperialism); 
or the opposition between the self (china) and the other (the colonialist portuguese 
in the representation). “Visuality in contemporary China”, as Sheldon H. Lu 
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maintains, “partakes of a transnational cross-cultural politics of representation”105, 
and Lin Zexu’s image as a cultural form that circulates online, whithin a website 
that supposedly promotes art as a commodity, and  which surely promotes visuality 
as a value, becomes part of a transnational flow of images and capital that 
constantly reshapes fixed terms and dichotomies such as nation, subjectivity and 
experience itself. Knowledge becomes a mediated and mediatized space, within 
which the symbolic environment is nurtured by the media that serves both as the 
projection technology, and as the content of the symbolic environment. Therefore 
the network building process as an emancipatory practice that destabilizes 
superimposed, transcended, immobile and fix structures.  
Lin Zexu in the image five becomes a historical perspective; a firm grasp of history; 
a mediated access to past and present; a strategy to contain national fragmentation 
both from ouside (transnational culture) and inside (subnational expressions of 
culture, economy, politics and altogether), through the displacement of its images 
which create a national space in the attempt to achieve national homogenization; it 
becomes the appropriation of the other as history, and the appropriation of itself 
through the other; it is a specific mode of temporal engagement through which 
memory is enacted; a commercial form of popular culture; a masculine national 
ideal; an instigator of cultural predation and consumistic anxiety; a sign of high 
culture within a restricted elitist group of art experts or collectionist. It is a symbol 
of capital flow, as when the original Guo Beiping’s painting has been sold in 2007 
at a public auction for Yuan 8,690,000. It also becomes a sign of China’s 
transnational competitiveness if one looks or has knowledge of China’s success in 
the global auction market. In fact, according to the 2011-2012 “The Artprice 
Annual Report” “China, has become the most upscale in the world”, accounting for 
the “90% of the Asian market and generated € 109 million more from 
Contemporary art than the United States from approximately the same number of 
works sold (China and the USA each accounted for about 15% of global 
transactions).” The same can be said if one looks to these financial trade, which the 
image of Lin Zexu is part of, has led to: “the creation of the first financial centre 
dedicated to art in the city of Xiamen. The International Art & Xiamen Financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Sheldon H. Lu, “China, Transnational Visuality, Global Postmodernity”, (p.218), Stanford University Press, 
Standford, California, 2001 
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Center is a project implemented by Beijing Huachen Auctions, the 24th auction 
company in the world for Contemporary art sales, to try to impose a new platform 
via exhibitions, auctions and other services linked to art and its market.”106 
Finally Lin Zexu’s image five as representative of a particular technological 
advancement, of a distinct political commitment and economic development.  
Lin Zexu as a specific visualization practice. 
 
 
 
- Conclusion 
 
The myth of Lin Zexu expressed in the images above is thus a series of digital 
representations that the viewers, purposely or not, visualize on a digital screen in 
interaction with other (digital) popular, commercial elements – ads and links. As 
with the digitality of the illustrations, the viewer’s interaction with the images is 
very limited, if not completely absent, meaning that there is not a massive 
participation of the senses, as it would be in the case of virtual reality, where the 
positioning of the viewer in a parallel reality necessitate an important physical 
(bodily) involvement (Sampanikou, Kawa, 2006). The term dynamic would perhaps 
be more appropriate to characterize these images of Lin Zexu, for they are produced 
and set in order to dialogue with the (written) texts which, though are detached 
from them, are an essential part in the general economy of the representations.107  
However, Lin Zexu’s myth is the product of a digital technology (computer 
graphics using rasters and vectors to construct the images, illustrated in the 
previous pages of this chapter), which is part of a digital environment 
(Sampanikou, Kawa, 2006) that embraces almost all fields of visual arts at 
professional and non-professional levels, directly serving the web pages’s content 
of which the Internet is populated. The images of Lin Zexu displayed in this chapter 
are part of the state’s aim of nurturing an online culture that support its goals and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 “The Artprice Annual Report”, 20111-2012, founded by Thierry Ehrmann. 
107 As I have pointed out the producers of the images, having the power over their digital quality are able to create a a-
historical face/body which doesn’t correspond to the accepted  physiognomy historically attributed to Lin Zexu. In this 
sense the written texts accompanying all images, allow the viewers to recognize the national hero (民族英雄). 
	   121	  
objectives. China’s post-industrial condition – represented by its information-based 
economy – enables, both directly and indirectly, a multitude of actors to make use 
of “visual forms of representation and communication” (Gunter Kress, 2004: 2), 
here epitomized in the digital images of Lin Zexu, able to ideologically 
territorialize the nation and its imagining within the media space represented by the 
Internet. Computer graphics and design explicited in Lin Zexu’s images and 
essential to them, articulate a specific modality of visualization which, inasmuch as 
Timothy Mitchell (1988) has sustained, reveals the interested construction of an 
idea of reality that is always dependent on its (possible) representation(s), and the 
order of appearance that such representations put forward. The myth of Lin Zexu 
uttered in the digital images analysed above, indicate also the extent to which forms 
of nationalism and of ideologies in general, rely on the visual as a preferred mode 
“for carrying and 'processing' great amounts of information” (Gunter Kress, 2004: 
2) that have been previously produced in a digital environment, where the producer 
– too often ontologically invisible to the viewer – enters and exits this cultural 
space (almost at its own pleasure), by virtue of the fact that it is the one who has 
produced it. It also becomes clear that as cultural expressions, Lin Zexu’s images 
are part of a network of signs, or a web of significance (Geertz, 1973) that these 
signs convey, that the media technology of the Internet and of digital screens 
entwines. 
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Chapter III 
Media Photographs of Lin Zexu 
 
 
 
The present chapter deals with the media representations of Lin Zexu’s celebratory 
and/or commemorative spaces in China. It aims at understanding what processes 
are involved in the production of media images (photographs and texts) that 
supposedly are representative of actual spaces – memorials, museums, squares – all 
dedicated and/or entitled to the historical figure of Lin Zexu. By relying on a 
plurality of approaches that question any institutionalized, self-evident 
interpretation of these representations, I suggest that media representations are used 
as complement to architecture, urban settings, historical artifacts (as in the case of 
musuems), as well as to speeches and written texts in the production of space. 
I also suggest, given the fact that each spatial organization requires an adequate 
system of representation of space, that the media have a direct relationship with a 
certain experience of space. In this sense, I will thence focus on the meanings and 
ideologies that legitimate specific visions of Chinese society, and norm distinct 
behaviours both within the media space – that is during the interaction with media 
technologies and culture – and in the physical spaces dedicated to Lin Zexu. 
Indeed, the apparently banal photographs of such commemorative places in which 
Lin Zexu is regarded, conceal a complex knitting of concrete social relations and 
social reproduction that regulate the way people make sense of social space, both 
physical and in the media.	   
Geography, cultural geography, has for long time reflected and debated on the role 
and significance of landscape practices, comprehended as a socially constructed 
form of knowledge (Harley, 1988) able to articulate and structure our 
understanding, and consequently our experience of the social. 
As a means of representation, a medium which produces space and a miscellaneous 
of other cultural forms, landscape, to a great extent, approximates the outcomes – 
the naturalization of historical intentions – of present communicational media 
technology and content (pc, laptops, mobile phones, conveying images, texts, 
videos, and sounds); indeed, media representations due to their graphic nature, 
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more than often have the power to dispense their producer and promoter from 
social responsibilities and consequences; and landscape seems to resemble quite 
considerably this characteristic, being it visually acknowledged as the natural 
conformation of space or history. 
Indeed, in the processes of production of space, both landscape and present media 
technology, besides the important fact of being themselves the final result of such 
productions and, therefore, being forms of social space of their own, they also 
contribute to construct their represented spaces through modes that express 
impartiality, objectivity, inevitability and certainty; whereas the values, beliefs and 
principles designating those spaces are produced as processes dependent on human 
agencies and individual/collective interests.  
The representations analysed in this study are, ostensibly, rendition of urban places 
and landscapes which, seemingly, are naturally bound to the mythical figure of the 
historical Lin Zexu, and thereby mythical themselves. These visual renditions of 
Lin Zexu’s representational spaces, materialize in the form of digital photographs 
on different Chinese websites, and in most cases are accompained by parasitic texts 
that sublimate the images (Barthes 1977: 25). The abundance of valuable images 
(photographs) springing from the Chinese Internet, and the necessity to assemble 
them in a manner that would help obtain a collection as assorted as possible, 
required, clearly enough, a discriminating reasoning that led to the choice of five 
images that best embody, in their discrete characteristics, a mythical quality of the 
space represented, produced. 
The following explorations therefore aim at mapping a portion of the media terrain 
in China, intended as the battleground in which knowledge and culture are caught 
up merely as contingencies, that is to say in the moment of their production and 
communication, transversed by objects and people and their relations, united by 
system of ideologies that reproduce dominant social conventions (Kellner, 1980), 
and ripped apart by tensions and contradictions. 
The media terrain within which Lin Zexu’s places in the form of photographs are 
circulating, far from being conceived of as a grand abstraction, it is seen as a 
moment of interaction and convergency between actors (the producers of the 
photographs), agencies (the websites), and mediators (the Internet); each with their 
own profusion and/or scarcity of power, inspiration, leverage, impact, bias, and 
weakness that can only be assessed by examining case by case the circumstances in 
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which such qualities, as well as others, are carried out. The myth of Lin Zexu in its 
media forms has been an important contribution to the consolidation of Chinese 
nationalism, which has truly transformed the people’s acknowledgement and 
relationship with the Chinese nation-state, its institutions, and the territory, 
triggering a strong sense of patriotism among the people, highlighting specific 
moral values and beliefs that contribute to the ideological construction of collective 
identities as the result of a definition of the self in contrast to an alleged other. The 
photographs of Lin Zexu’s representational spaces analysed in this study are, as a 
mediating technology, knowledge in a double measure. As a result of  an image 
focused onto film, or on a sensor made of pixels, these photographs are 
consolidated knowledge, stabilized in the form of their own funcionality 
(photographs as form of communication, acknowledged through visualization). As 
the image displayed before a Chinese audience, as signs within networks of signs 
(the web pages’ signs, but not limited to them), along with the specific way through 
which the photographs are displayed to, and decoded by the viewer(s), these 
photographs are fluid knowledge, spasmodic in character as their are dependent on, 
and subject to a variety of factors that might affect their decodification, both in 
terms of meaning production and of visualization practice (two separated proccess 
that actually sustain each other) (Barthes, 1977; Berger, 1982). Therefore Lin 
Zexu’s representational spaces, (digitally) materialized in the form of photographs 
circulating in the Chinese Internet, inasmuch as they are a manifestation of culture 
– here intended, with Clifford Geertz (1973), as a network of signs producing a web 
of significance driving social action – necessarily come to be read (interpreted) in 
conjunction with other cultural signs, for instance those present in the web pages in 
which Lin Zexu’s images have been found and somehow interfering with them (one 
may thing at the advertisement banners that strike at once with the digital 
spectacularized light they make use of), or the previous knowledge (intertextuality) 
of the representations visualized. 
For an analysis to be historical in character, to be contingent, requires that one 
looks at the object of enquiry to seek what it is dependent on, what it is subject to, 
and who it is determined by. Said in a succint manner, one must direct his/her own 
investigation by asking what are the historical conditions of its existence? Let’s 
then first define properly what this present attempt is dealing with, what is the 
object of its research in a more detailed manner, at cost of sounding a bit redundant
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As has been stated above, the focus of this study is on a number of photographs, 
five to be exact, found in different Chinese Internet websites, representing spaces – 
places and landscapes – commemorative or celebratory, probably both, of the 
historical figure of Lin Zexu. Spaces whose sense of history and past seem to be 
deeply rooted into the ground belonging to such sites, or felt as a breeze in the air 
reminiscent of the (secular) sacredness of the national past. Such is the power of 
history…… or was it of space? And what about the photographs then? 
Seemingly, three elements challenge as early as at this stage the analysis on the 
media representations collected for this study; and precisely from this, from the 
significance of media representation I intend to start weaving the network to which 
the media representations of Lin Zexu’s places belong, both materially and 
discursively. 
On the one hand, it is nowadays clear (or thus should perhaps be) how much and to 
what extent, a distinct cultural space, one that may be defined media space, is 
always at reach by means of technological devices. A space that can be entered and 
exited at one’s own whish 108  by turning on and off pc, mobiles, laptops, 
(i)whatches, tablets, radio and television; a space literally populated by signs and 
signs only, whose visibility is dependent uniquely on the fact of being produced and 
arranged (and visualized of course) or not. From the graphical digital traits that 
make up words and punctuation, and which in turn create news articles, stories, 
reports, essays, studies, reviews, column, blogs, and so on, to the fabrication and 
fashion of digital images by means of computer softwares (CAD, CAE, CAM, 
CIM, and others)109, that produce all the images we see for example on the Internet 
– except for photographs and film images, although these last two have joined the 
computer-graphic image manipulation family, too, and which in any case belong to 
the broader space of media products and signs. And if, as Clifford Geertz maintains, 
we understand culture as a system of signs that has to be approached, among other 
ways, semiotically, we therefore defy the abstraction of culture itself and direct our 
attention to a conception of culture seen as a web of significance (C. Geertz, 1973) 
in which an extraordinary population of signs – acting within, and as a discursive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Undeniably, this is a controversial subject, for media space is more and more producing the social space people live 
in, and has therefore rendered difficult any distinction between mediated and unmediated space/activity. 
109 Computer Aided Design, Computer Aided Engineering, Computer Aided Manufacturing, Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing 
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practice – produce, mediate, and disseminate the material substance of power, 
knowledge. 
On the other hand, the presence of mass media technological devices is becoming 
more and more intruding as they are invading the actual places we live in, both 
private and public – this last being a distinction that media are rendering extremely 
problematic – imposing their cultural forms and logic (practices and performances) 
on people and institutions almost regardless of their  dispositions, constitutions, and 
attitude; providing the means for the construction or implementation of subject-
ivity.  
The spatialization of power performed by the media is therefore twofold, for it 
spatially distributes the means (the technological devices) through which the texture 
of the social world (signs, symbols) is conveyed and cognitively understood. The 
media-as-techne110, and the media as the signs communicated through the cultural 
forms produced, represent together, and to a great extent the main modality and 
content of culture. The technological devices used to convey the myth of Lin Zexu 
as its representational spaces in the form of digital photographs, spatialize power 
through the materialization of the communicative appliances and equipment (both 
the interface technology of communication such as laptop, TV, and mobile phones; 
and the technological resources that allow the former to function in specific ways, 
such as wires and cables to transmit signals, satellite signal receivers, routers), as 
well as through the digital renditions (the visualized) of the native house of Lin 
Zexu, of its Xinjian residency, or of its museum. Culture become in this way not 
only the product of media content, the sign communicated, but also of the 
modialities through which the content is produced/communicated/expressed. Lin 
Zexu’s representational spaces indicate that culture itself is a form of spatialization 
of power, materially and cognitively. Clearly enough, the media does not provide 
the entirety of signs-traffic circulating in a society, nor is the only agency doing so. 
Nevertheless, the relevance of a media space within (Chinese) society is something 
that as much as it needs to be demonstrated and substantiated, it cannot surely be 
ignored. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The term techne here refers to the technologies used to set in motion communication. It refers to the communicative 
devices used to communicate (Pc, mobile phones, TV and so on). Clearly, it also entails the understanding of their 
workings. 
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Lin Zexu’s media representations, or better the photographs and texts representing 
Lin Zexu’s places are undoubtedly part of what constitutes Chinese society, this 
grand abstraction; and they are so in such a complicated and tortuous way as to 
justify the following explorations. Lin Zexu’s representations articulate conflicts in 
order to legitimize power, to displace politics and knowledge, and to control the 
ongoing social transformations and crisis experienced by society at large and by the 
Chinese state; but what distinguishes this study, is that Lin Zexu’s media 
representations are, most importantly, the expression of the transformations caused 
by China’s convergence with global capital and culture, as well as the expression of 
the role that the popular media had in facilitate this convergence, and of being 
simultaneously its product. 
The common expression Chinese society in itself expresses vicious generalizations 
if not adequately grounded on actual cultural manifestations – material forms (the 
photographs uttering Lin Zexu’s myth) and social practices (behaviours, for 
instance consuming the media forms of Lin Zexu) – that are generated by, and 
generate relations among themselves and others, the actors and agencies that 
produce, communicate, consume, or that in other ways interact with them. Things 
and people every moment perform some kind of interaction, constituting in this 
way relations that unfold in a variety of social formations. Interactions, relations, 
and formations, far from possessing fixed qualities that are common in time, are 
instead the result of specific historical conditions and negotiations that make them 
unpredictable and erratic. The media representations of Lin Zexu’s places, as I 
stated above in a very abstract way, are part of a so called Chinese society. But if I 
attempt to reduce this generalization and start establishing a first qualitative contact 
with them, I would acknowledge them as being expressions of a Chinese media 
space – itself a generalization – in the form and content of photographs which have 
been found, by the author of this study, on the Internet. Although I’m in presence of 
a good deal of information that would allow me to identify additional elements and 
relations to further my enquiry, I wish to briefly stress that this analitical work is 
not an attempt oriented to provide an ontological status to the photographs 
analysed, as that would perhaps expose them too close to a metaphysics whose need 
for essences would make it incapable of grasping the processes that constitute them. 
Instead of asking the photographs what they are, I’m rather concerned with the 
question how have they come to be produced as such? and how do they express 
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themselves? These are in my opinion the kind of questions that problematise to a 
fair extent the object of this investigation. 
A simple thing as a photograph of the Lin Zexu’s stele in Shaojiao Fort (see page 
11) is hardly regarded as problematic in its daily use and consumption, inasmuch as 
it seems to reveal itself completely in the moment of its visualization; such 
photograph, regardless of its content, is a banal object, something that may slip 
under anyone’s nose without posing, ontologically, a serious challenge. The 
representations of Lin Zexu’s places, the photographs of the sites in which its 
historical figure is highly regarded and payed homage to, notwithstanding the 
transiency of their occurrence in people’s sigth/understanding, are not only the 
expression of a media practice (their in-place production through the use of a 
camera, and their later positioning on an Internet web page) that make them 
potentially visible to a mass audience, but also of entanglements with social 
discourses – mainly originating from the same media – that motivate their existence 
and confer them the quality they possess. Such ideological discourses are, mostly, 
popular expressions of the historical figure of Lin Zexu, which the Chinese media 
have expanded to a considerable extent, and made them circulating whithin society 
as a natural and genuine cultural form intrinsically present in the alleged national 
territory of China. They are therefore constituted by cultural flows – connoting Lin 
Zexu’s myth and other associated meanings – which never operate neutrally or 
unbiased, although the apparent narrative fragmentation they purportedly show (the 
fact of being isolated images) may lead one to think they are disconnected elements 
swaying uncontrolled; whereas their cross-reference to ongoing (national) 
discourses communicated by the overall media practice in China, “allow the society 
in which they are told, on the one hand, to define its criteria of competence and, on 
the other, to evaluate according to those criteria what is performed or can be 
performed within it” (Lyotard, 1984: 20). 
At first must be registered the practice of making photographs. In fact, what urges 
this impulse and inspire or activate it, both at professional and amatorial level, is 
not at all banal, nor should it be taken for granted. In any case, making a 
photograph inplies at a very basic level the fact of being there using a device able to 
record appearences. Lin Zexu’s photographs analysed in this study, like computer-
generated images, require their specific modalities of production both in technical 
terms and at level of intentionality, that’s why it is necessary to follow them step by 
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step from their very conception till the moment in which arranged with a text they 
are displayed and visualized by people on a flat screen while surfing the Internet. 
Let’s then approximate, for now, by saying that each of the images of Lin Zexu’s 
place are taken in-place and consciously to record a moment or a thing, therefore 
with a distinct purpose. These same photographs of the Chinese hero’s mythical 
places  are usually transferred through various means to a computer, and from there 
uploaded to a website along with texts that sublimate the images. The moment in 
which the photographs are communicated via Internet – but it could be via 
television, or displayed on a screen in a Chinese metro train in the form of 
entertainment image or commercial, as it is very likely to be – in that instant the 
photographs are no more apparent banal objects among others, communicating 
images of reality, but become cultural forms connected with that Chinese media 
space I have mentioned above. This connection, far from being of little importance, 
transform the Lin Zexu’s photographs considerably. Still, this transformation 
essential to our comprehension of the images and of the media space that the 
photographs contribute to create, require a prior appreciation of what a photograph 
in very general terms conveys. It is a denote message or a connoted one? It is a 
message without a code111, or the coexistence of two messages? Is the message a 
translation or a quotation? Evidently we must be able to answer these questions 
before we embark trying to understand what a photograph becomes once it is 
mediated by a mass media communication technology. 
With the aim of addressing a peculiar characteristic pertaining not to the media 
representation in general, but to the very subject of this study – the media 
photographs of Lin Zexu’s representational spaces – I maintain that media 
photographs are those pictures that after having been taken by a photo camera (a 
media in itself) in-place, have been communicated through other media devices 
(here distinguished for their capacity of communicating informations to a broad 
audience) – television, Internet, entertainment display in public spaces and so on – 
to a mass audience, assimilating or embodying a media logic that I understand also 
as the capacity of media cultural forms and media representations in general to 
sustain the coordination of social activities and relations between various actors, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Roland Barthes in “Image, Music, Text”, defines a message without a code the apparent (and only apparent) literal 
reproduction of reality that a photograph is able to reproduce, ostensibly claiming to be the perfect reprodution, and 
therefore beyond any ideology.  
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institution and people (André Jansson 2005: 27). I think for example at social 
discourses and practices such as politics, tourism or sport to name just a few, as 
actors and agents that make large use of media representations to express, 
hypothetically, legitimate visions of the world, of the social fabric, using their 
power (and that of the media) to create common sense: objective relations of power 
tend to reproduce themselves in symbolic relations of power, in visions of the social 
world which contribute to ensuring the permanence of those relations of power. In 
the struggle for the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, in which 
science itself is inevitably involved, agents wield a power which is proportional to 
their symbolic capital, that is, to the recognition they receive from a group (Pierre 
Bourdieu 1984: 238).  The need to look at these two processes – Lin Zexu’s 
photographs in-place and the media photographs of Lin Zexu, is not dictated, as 
one might think by personal creativity, rather I think it is implicit in the way Lin 
Zexu’s photographs behave and express themselves in their entire existence, in-
place and in the media. Here is a schematization that may help appreciate to a 
greater degree the point I wish to make clear: 
 
Photograph in-place                     ←←←→→→                          media Photograph 
 
- small scale consumption                                                   - large scale consumption 
         - low number of meanings conveyed                - high number of meanings conveyed 
         - low mobility                                                                                        - high mobility 
         - practice type: landscape              ←←←→→→        - practice type: media logic112 
 
As it shown above there are at least four different features distinguishable for the 
two kind of photographs. Photographs in-place are all those photographs that most 
people in their leisure time (but not necessarily), making more or less an amatorial 
use of a photo camera, take for personal reasons. Normally shared with very few 
people, photographs in-place are more than often taken by the same subject that 
charge them with personal meanings; meanings that are the by-product of the 
relationship – a practice or mode of relating to – established with the specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Media logic can be defined as the inherent rules that govern the mechanics of representation, or of display. The 
format, genre, style of storytelling, and “the requirement to be successful in the battle for people’s attention” 
(Strömbäck, 2008: 240). 
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space/place in which one shoots the photo. If the photograph is not materially 
uploaded in, and communicated by the media, then the number of people that are 
actually able to visualize it are controlled by the owner of the photograph itself 
(small scale consumption); it evidently follows that the meanings conveyed are 
limited because of the restricted number of people that look at it (low number of 
meanings conveyed). Stored on a device such as a mobile, pc, camera, or even 
framed, a photograph has not great chances of being an object of mass 
communication (low mobility). 
Finally photographs in-place are the result of a practice that has its roots in the very 
way people understand and have experience of a specific sense of space, landscape. 
In fact, I argue that landscape as a category of knowledge, and thus within a distinct 
discourse peculiar to the idea of space and to its production has provided, and still 
does, functional modes of perception, interpretation, awareness, and assimilation of 
those qualities we conventionally ascribe to the category of space. These modes – 
examined in the following pages – are able to articulate different set of practices, 
making them appear as natural operations. What are then such modes embodied in 
the idea of landscape, and how do they work in order to articulate practices as 
ordinary as those concerned with the production of a photograph?  
The two groups in the scheme aforementioned are organized as to indicate the data 
generated, according to their group of belonging. These features are therefore 
classed in compliance with the uniqueness of the group they are part of. 
Nevertheless, as it is visible, I have drawn arrows in between four elements; among 
the two main component constituting each section, namely photograph in-place and 
media photograph, and between the last two features of both units, that is practice 
type: landscape and practice type: media logic. The arrows clearly enough do not 
point toward one (progressive) direction only, but are rather reciprocal; they, in 
fact, exemplify the way the two photograph units inform each other through a 
constant flux of techniques and procedures – the modes mentioned above – that 
define, organize and naturalize the significance of a photo as a practice (in-place) 
and as a media experience (visualized through a mass media communication 
technology). Indeed, even though Lin Zexu’s places photographs in the media, as 
we will see in the course of this analysis, has become something different, they 
neverthelss maintain and unsuspiciously convey those discursive conditions that 
had previously informed the photograph in-place, better known as landscape 
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practice. Therefore as these landscape practice’s residuals become part of the 
photographs in the media, I argue that Lin Zexu’s media photographs through the 
mythical aura they convey, work also in order to epitomize how space has to be 
seen or looked at, and how as a result has to be acknowledged, treated and 
practiced. 
林则徐纪念碑破损亟待修葺
 
http://news.sun0769.com/dg/headnews/201507/t20150724_5640277.shtml 
 
林公则徐纪念碑的碑沿已经出现脱落碑文化源远流长。在中国近代史的开篇
地之一的虎门，沙角炮台的林公则徐纪念碑与爱民抢险七勇士纪念碑、新湾
董德庚烈士纪念碑，除了能解读到林则徐的民族大义与解放军官兵的舍生取
义，更能让人们知道虎门不同时期的人文发展。然而记者近日发现，上述纪
念碑的现状令人担忧.113 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The presence of shedding pieces in the commemorative stele of Lin Zexu, has already a long history. In China’s 
modern history, the opening of Humen’s Lin Zexu and the Seven Brave warriors commemorative stele in Shaojiao Fort,  
and the commemorative stele of the new bay Dong Degeng Martyrs, besides allowing the understanding of the overall 
national interest of Lin Zexu and the PLA’s martyrs, it also allows people to know Humen’s human development in 
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The above digital (media) photograph of Lin Zexu’s commemorative Stele in the 
Shaojiao Fort, Humen County (Guangdong province), and the text that goes along 
with it, has been published on July 24, 2015 in the Chinese website 东莞阴光网 
(Dongguan Yinguang Network) at the following Internet address 
www.sun0769.com. The website, opened since 2005, is a national key website 
sponsored by the Dongguan Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Department, 
and Dongguan Radio and TV station. As one of the top ten national key News 
website in Guangdong Province, the Dongguan Yinguang Network is considered 
to be an influential local news portal, and it declares to be a network ethically 
bound to the “local community, to the nation’s view, as well as being world-
oriented”, a three level network – regional, national, and global – whose all-
encompassing orientation is made clear in the unterminable list of services that it 
provides to the networking community. 
The press photograph and text have been published in the section Dongguan 
Headnews (东莞要闻) of the homonym website under the title “The Damaged Lin 
Zexu’s Commemorative Stele to be Urgently Repaired”,  to denounce the damages 
on the Stele of Lin Zexu, and on the Seven Brave Warriors stele located in the 
same area, and to urge a sensibilization campaign in order to make people (youngs 
especially) understand the value of national heroes and patriots, and therefore to 
respect such (sacred) national spaces. This is the denoted message conveyed by 
the online article, clearly constituted by a photograph and a text. In fact, through 
the particular relation established by the two main elements, it is possible to 
produce a (denoted) meaning that, to say the least, is evident and quite 
indisputable. As a matter of fact, the photograph with its undiscussed (read: 
alleged) quality of quoting from reality without expressing any connotative 
dimension, provides realistically the forms (appearances) of reality. The text 
supports and carries out the argumentations that the photograph renders 
incontrovertible. We therefore see with our eyes, and without doubts read about 
the true existing damages on the stele of Lin Zexu.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
different periods. However, journalists have recently discovered that the current situation of the above-mentioned steles 
is worrying. 	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Nonotheless, the press photograph and the text are able of providing a connotative 
dimension that contributes to the already existing and constant process of 
mythicization of the figure of Lin Zexu, this being an aspect that renders the 
physical place where the stele is located – Shaojiao Fort in Humen County 
(Guangdong province) – somehow sacred or mythological (the figure of Lin Zexu 
functioning as a signified); at the same time, the function of the media photograph 
and text, in the production of social space (both in the media and physical), and in 
the representation of places, confirms the ubiquity of historical contexts (in the 
exercise of politics, of economic practices, and in the production of media forms) 
in which the creation and staging of specific knowledge is the core process. This 
media representation becomes a dimension in which different contexts are fused 
together, the production of (national) history, the preservation of the nation-state, 
the affirmation of authority, and perhaps even the declaration of property rights. 
This narrative claims, pertaining to the connotative perimeter of the photograph 
and text, are attained through various expediences employed in the text. The 
photograph is the tangible, immobile arbiter that provides foundation and 
materiality to the content of the text, and this happens despite the fact that the text 
goes well beyond the narrow depiction of the photograph.  
Lin Zexu, in the text, is addressed as the “honourable” Lin Zexu (林公则徐), the 
character gong 公 establishing at such an early stage (gong is the second character 
of the text) a permanent basis upon which re-construct (re-presenting) the myth of 
Lin Zexu, which as I said above functions as the main signified. The place is then 
rendered nationally territorialized through the communication of the presence of 
other two commemorative monuments dedicated to the Seven Patriots Warriors (
爱民抢险七勇士), and to the grave of the martyr Dongde Geng (董德庚烈士).  
The damages on the stele become a mere excuse to express the national values the 
heroes convey 除了能解读到林则徐的民族大义与解放军官兵的舍生取义, and 
what they meant to the locals 更能让人们知道虎门不同时期的人文发展. 
Furthermore, the use of the characters shen 身 or shangba 伤疤, respectively 
meaning “body” and “wound/scar”, to represent the lesions and damages occurred 
to the monument, emphasize the embodyment of the myth of Lin Zexu in the stele 
itself, and thus making the overall national body (the stele but also the physical 
space that host it) literally wounded (伤疤). It is interesting noticing that the stele 
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of Lin Zexu has been built in the 1930’s under the Guomindang ruling; the party 
symbol (the shining sun) is still visible in the upper part of the stele, within the 
crown that stands above the inscription 林公则徐纪念碑. This might be read as 
the contemporary convergence of a political vision between two historically 
antagonistic parties, the Guomindang (国民党) and the (present, or since Deng 
Xiaoping’s) Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党), which see Lin Zexu not 
only as a way to bind the people to the territory, but also as a drive for economic 
purposes, functioning as a moral authority whose alleged desire for technological 
development – a narrative and meanings well conveyed in Xie Jin’s 1997 
blockbuster movie The Opium War (鸦片战争) – is naturalized by means of 
staging in specific ways different kind of representations. Much of the effort put 
on the narrativization of a digital representation of a place, and thus to the 
communication of precise meanings and ideologies, lies in the fact that collective 
memory, national memory, requires a commonality of experience to ensure that 
the process of decodification of the viewer reaches the (ideological) objective 
previously determined. In this way taking a photograph, one of the most ordinary 
action people perform daily, becomes a complex knitting of concrete social 
relations and social reproduction that regulate the way people make sense of 
social space, both physical and in the media. 
As the opposite of a pindaric flight, the link between the photographs of Lin Zexu’s 
places and landscape is the correlation of two cultural forms and two practices – we 
make, and look at photographs, as well as we engage with, and in, landscape – that 
beyond being bond by the fact that nowadays very often a photograph is a 
landscape, and a landscape becomes a photograph, implying therefore that they are 
determined by similar or even common constituents, they are more importantly 
informed by traditional assumptions on the idea of space as something existing 
prior to human action and understanding, something natural that can be found any 
moment, anywhere. 
The comparison between Lin Zexu’s places as photographs and landscape, is an 
effective tool to understand how, in a game of correspondance, photographs show 
the way people invent, embody, and perform landscape, both in-place and in the 
media. It also tells us how specific qualities attached to the visual sight are adopted 
uniformly, so much so that all that is made visible is at the same time arranged for 
the spectator (John Berger, 1982). 
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As a matter of fact the usage of photography in China114 as well as in other 
countries, has always been intimately connected with making stage-sets, 
panoramas, and moving diaoramas (Denis Cosgrove, 2003: 257), granting 
legitimacy to space as the natural, universal measure for imposing systems of 
classification and ordering. Photographs and landscapes need to be historically 
investigated in order to bring to light to what extent the production of those spaces 
that are supposed to embody and materialize the myth of Lin Zexu, and as the 
photograph of the stele shows, are connected to a precise idea of territory and of 
nation, to their scaling and mapping, fragmentation and unification; and to assess 
how much the mechanization of vision as a means for experiencing space – in locus 
and in the media – has made representations a powerful form for experiencing 
imagined geographies. Lin Zexu’s images and the concept of landscape are both 
part of a system of certainties intrinsic in the way a representation is produced, 
communicated, and understood. However, they distinct themselves from other 
forms of representation, inasmuch as their claim to legitimacy seem to be 
constitutional of their form, that is, their claim to be exactly what they appear to be. 
They both pretend to speak to people through their very appearances (the Shaojiao 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 In China, photography, perhaps due to its mechanical origination, doesn’t seem to have developed in ways dissimilar 
to those it did in Europe, meaning that its fundamental characteristic, that is being able to stop the flux of experience in 
a picture that quotes reality (appearances) as it is, has been regarded with the same enthusiastic and public praise it had 
in Europe. The “Opium war” period in China is traditionally considered to be the epoch of the blossoming of the 
photographic medium. The Western commercial interests, the opening of city-ports in China, and the treaty port system 
in general, increased the public curiosity toward China to an extent that European travelers and merchants had only 
started to feed. The establishment of photographic studios in the main coastal cities incremented the spreading of 
photographs of China in Europe – for the visual enlightment of the European – but it also reached an indigenous 
audience, materializing through the spreading of native press agencies, which relied on the photographic industry that, 
in the short term, had boomed considerably (see Cody and Terpak, 2011). Photography has therefore been part of those 
technologies known among the Chinese population to be of colonial origins. The two best known Chinese commercial 
photographers in the second half of XIX century were Lai Afang (or Afong) (赖阿芳, 1839-1890), and Liang Shitai 
(also known as See Tay) active in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tianjin in the 1870s-1880s. Nevertheless, most accounts 
on photography in China are still focused on foreign photographers and collections, and the censorship exerted on 
photography by both the Chinese and Japanese governments from 1937 to 1949 – the years of the Sino-Japanese war 
and the Civil war – has perhaps precluded the springing of analysis and investigations on the early photography in 
China, from which present-day scholars would have strongly benefited. In fact, only recently scholars have started to 
pay much more attention on the development of the photographic medium in China, since during the Maoist era the 
Communist Party controlled the entirety of the media system, and accounts on previous photographs, even if possible, 
would have surely been doomed by the political orientation of the period, namely the Maoist ideology (Cody, Terpak, 
2011). In any case, present-day photography and media photography in particular, seem to have reached a 
standardization as a global visual language, as to render it a conventional and innocent practice that serves a myriad of 
individual and collective, professional and amatorial activities and circumstances; and China is not an exception, it only 
needs to be addressed in its specificity, which is what the media photographs (and texts) of Lin Zexu’s places are 
intended for, as the object of this study.  	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Fort as a sacred national space), their materiality (the damaged Stele of Lin Zexu), 
without any kind of cunning mediation of reality. 
The media photographs of Lin Zexu’s representative spaces epitomize the 
interrelation of spatial categories and media logic. The media photographs of the 
Chinese national hero, as the result of a landscape practice that informs 
photographs in-place, are concerned with representations and social interactions in 
specific spatial terms. The need for a comparative approach between media 
photograph and landscape lies exactly in this equation that makes Lin Zexu’s 
representations relevant in media terms as much as in spatial ones. It is important to 
clarify that the idea of landscape is not of something that necessarily has to have 
mountains and forests, or rivers and valleys, or oceans and hills, as the canonical 
turistic conception of landscape would tell us. Landscape here is any land or area 
(any urban place) visualized from a previously determined, naturalized vantage 
point. A vantage point is any point that provides a perspective visualization of the 
object one looks at. As David Cosgrove declares, a vantage point serves to detach 
the viewer from the landscape, to put her/him in the outside, and thus establishing a 
correspondance appreciated through the reification of meanings that designates the 
boudaries of the landscape itself, a relationship of dominance and subordination 
between differently located viewer and object vision (D. Cosgrove, 2003: 254) from 
which many photographs are taken. The correlation between the capacity of the eye 
to register the external world – from a position outside, and seen as an object – and 
the specific imaginative faculty that renders a simple sense impression full of 
meaning, ordered and rational (even if abstract and chaotic), this correlation might 
be said to be at the roots of an aesthetic principle tied up with other distinct 
historical processes that constitute the (modern) subject, understood here as an 
individual with a precise way of seeing, experiencing space as landscape (the 
Shaojiao Fort for instance) and practices (the photograph of the Stele) according to 
common modes and procedures that have the power of turning material space into 
landscape (D. Cosgrove, 2003: 254). 
Perspective imagines the world from the point of view of the seeing eye/subject, it 
emphasizes the dominant role of the visual in the understanding, as well as in the 
representing process, of reality as truth. That is the why we see the Stele of Lin 
Zexu from a point of view that probably anyone would consider normal. 
Perspective serves to naturalize the ideological origin of landscape practices that 
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people perform at Shaojiao Fort, and of one of its material outcome, the photograph 
of Lin Zexu’s Stele. The naturalization process of the meanings encoded through 
the arrangment of the Stele at Shaojiao Fort (the landscape), which is seen from a 
specific designed vantage point, is aided by regarding vision as a guarantor of truth 
(D. Cosgrove, 2003: 258). Such truth, useless to say, is a national truth, possible to 
the extent that the vantage point and the encoded perspective from which is 
acknowledged, remain the main principles of the kind of visuality that Lin Zexu’s 
spaces impose. Thence, each of Lin Zexu’s image is a practice of visualization, a 
specific social order culturally established by the image itself, a cultural space 
projecting networks of meanings that create order producing a sense of reality, the 
nation. Lin Zexu’s public spaces – the places in which its national figure is 
celebrated – are more than often represented from the same point of view, 
emphasizing perspective as the only natural vision. How many photographs of 
Tiananmen Square have we seen, both at professional and amatorial level, that 
portray the Beijing symbol differently from the traditional view – Mao’s picture at 
the center of the red wall between the two chinese inscriptions, with the Chinese 
traditional architecture that arises behind it, the chinese flag lifted on its flagpole, 
and the vast, huge space of the square that divides the viewer from its object. 
In conclusion, what is central in the practice of landscape as one of the 
constitutional factors informing the way we make and understand photographs in-
place and as the media photographs of Lin Zexu’s representational places, is not 
what we see in it, the objects (the stele), natural or material, and the meanings (the 
territorialization/naturalization of national belonging and of national history), but 
how people see it, as subjects (national citizens) whose positionings – physical and 
cognitive – and way of seeing allow for a reading of the Shaojiao Fort not as a 
cultural text, namely the Shaojiao Fort as where the ideologies of Chinese societies 
are expressed and naturalized by means of its design and appearance, and reflected 
by people’s visual measure established in relation to an object that is seen, and to 
which one does not belong (people’s point of view is detached from the object); but 
by seeing it as the natural and eternal (traceable in history) convergence and 
expression of the bond (a bloody one) between the people and the territory, that 
sacred soil that still today may be homaged by the citizens by visiting it, or more 
simply by consuming it through a photograph curculating in the Internet. This is in 
my opinion the way photograph and landscape come to be part of a ubiquitous 
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discursive practice that connects space production, visualization practice, and 
representation within the same social network. 
A media photograph of Lin Zexu’s residence is among all things a photograph, and 
this is what needs to be looked at now. The Chinese Internet, just as any other 
Internets, allows enormous amounts of images to flow as an endless stream of 
messages and meanings that make up the content of communication. Of all the 
images that one may encounter during the use of the Internet, some are the product 
of softwares for computer-generating images, digital images; whereas other images 
are photographs. Photographs are said to be one way to capture reality as it is  - the 
other is said to be videos (Barthes, 1977; Berger, 1982) – without interferences of 
sorts that somehow might construct (a false) reality. Photographs it is said, do not 
lie, they stand before our sight as analogon of reality. Other forms of representation 
are too much related to artistic conceptions, creativity or inspiration, they are too 
visibly the product of an expert who uses various means of production to generate 
them. Photographs instead are true – the advocate says.  
To challenge this claim would be difficult for anyone if not adequately equipped 
with the necessary tools – sight is one of these – to approach a photograph. Of all 
the structures of information, the photgraph appears as the only one that is 
exclusively constituted and occupied by a ‘denoted’ message, a message which 
totally exhaust its mode of existence. In front of a photograph, the feeling of 
‘denotation’, or if one prefers, of analogical plenitude, is so great that the 
description of a photograph is literally impossible; to describe constists precisely in 
joining to the denoted message a relay or second-order message derived from a 
code which is that of language and constituting in relation to the photographic 
analogue, however much care one takes to be exact, a connotation (Roland barthes, 
1977: 18). The perfect resemblence of the apperances that the above photograph of 
Lin Zexu’s stele is able to convey, makes it difficult for anyone to speak of 
connotation (even though I have already demonstrated to what extent the text works 
precisely to this end); even the description of a photograph, maintains Barthes, 
would operate as to signify the denoted message, and thus building on a meaning 
created by the codification of a structure external to it,  the language used to 
describe the image. Nonetheless, if one takes into account the production process of 
a photograph, and asks how the analogy with reality should be read, it might be the 
case that the general functioning pertaining to the shooting of the photograph 
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produces the conditions for a connotation to occur. In fact, as for any other image, 
the photograph of Lin Zexu’s stele in Shaojiao Fort, in order to be visualized must 
first be produced, and the decisions taken during this process through the authority 
exercised by the photographer – the subject chosen, treated, and choreographed – as 
they correspond to aesthetical or ideological standards or models, they act as 
connotating factors producing specific effects (still objective in form) resulting in 
just as many meanings. These decisions the photographer takes, come into being 
through the employment of codes (the aesthetic, professional rules) that affect the 
reading of the image through its connection to a traditional stock of signs (R. 
Barthes, 1977: 19). In other kind of images different from photographs, the 
connotative message or dimension has the main task of, somehow, guiding the 
navigation of meaning, as Marcel Danesi sustains, through the representation’s 
narrative. Ensured the presence of a connotation encoded in the photograph’s 
production process – the aesthetic for instance – it is a matter of clarifying how this 
connotation develops and works in the overall reading of Lin Zexu’s photographs.  
Barthes sees the presence of denotation and connotation in a photograph as a 
paradox: the photographic paradox can then be seen as the co-existence of two 
messages, the one without a code (the photographic analogon), the other with a 
code (the ‘art’, or the treatment, or the ‘writing’, or the rethoric of the 
photograph); structurally, the paradox is clearly not the collusion of a denoted and 
a connoted message (which is the – probably inevitable – status of all the forms of 
mass communication), it is that here the connoted (or coded) message develops on 
the basis of a message without a code (R. Barthes, 1977: 19).  
The difficulty in reading and treating properly the connotative dimension of Lin 
Zexu’s representational places (photographs), lies in the peculiar collaboration 
between denotation and connotation; in fact the coded messages of such 
photographs, being the result of decisions applied on the broad class of aesthetic 
and technical treatments, are set apart from the entire structure. The recording effect 
provided by the photograph of the stele of Lin Zexu, the objectivity it is respected 
for, undermine the work and presence of those procedures that as a matter of fact 
affect the message of the photograph. The myth of its objectivity (the myth of the 
photograph) is built on two central aspects: the mechanicalness of the photograph 
origination, seen as a scientific instrument to capture reality as it is; and the 
photographer presence – the in-place practice I’ve underlined above – the there and 
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then awareness conveyed by any photographic image. What we have is a new time-
space category: spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority, the photograph being 
an illogical conjuction between the here-now and the there-then. It is thus at the 
level of this denoted message or message without a code that the real unreality of 
the photograph can be fully understood: its unreality is that of the here-now, for the 
photograph is never experienced as illusion….its reality that of the having-been-
there, for in every photograph there is the always stupefying evidence of this is how 
it was, giving us, by a precious miracle, a reality from which we are sheltered (R. 
Barthes, 1977: 44-45). This quality of quoting from reality, instead than of 
translating or transforming from it, allows a mechanism of naturalization to be laid 
at the expenses of any culturalization of the photograph, allowing the myth of Lin 
Zexu to be visualized as the natural expression of a historically existing, instead of 
created, space. The analogy of the apperances the photograph shows, has the power 
to naturalize the symbolic presence by means of its own forms, the denoted image. 
It follows that the cultural signs that are in the image (the stele) are considered to be 
found in nature or being its articulation. Nevertheless, we now know that 
photographs can be connoted through the use of certain procedures that sabotage – 
even if not acknowledged – the photograph claim of using a truthful and accurate 
language.  
Barthes has identified six elements that, according to his reasoning, are able to 
impose a second meaning on the photographic message, a connotation. Those are 
respectively “trick effects”, “pose”, “objects”, “photogenia”, “aestheticism”, and 
“syntax” (see Barthes 1977: 21), qualified procedures that allow the reading of the 
signifieds of connotation. It is possible to say that these procedures connote the 
photograph from the inside, although in a paradoxical way; but it is also true that 
another element – this time external to the photograph’s structure – forces its way 
in, to burden the photograph with an additional connoted meaning, the text.  
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林则徐纪念馆
 
http://spot.125uu.com/detail/linzexujinianguan 	  
蒲城县林则徐纪念馆位于陕西蒲城县城内杈把巷六号，属县城繁华地段。该
馆依托"林则徐寓所"（王鼎族弟王益谦家宅），由原县文化馆馆长高起胜及
长子高小明个人出资历时五年创建起来的，整个建筑规模宏大，气势宏伟，
庄严肃穆；院落里青砖漫地，飞檐斗拱，雕梁画栋，古色宜人，建筑面积
1080平方米，是一座十分精美的清代宦官人家宅第，也是渭北保存最为完整
的关中典型的四进室宅院。整个院落布满各色木雕、砖雕、石雕艺术品，雕
刻手法娴熟，生动逼真，生意盎然，有出神入化之妙。该院内仅高浮雕看墙
就有十多块，木雕有200多幅，各种砖雕就有数百种，雕刻有龙凤、鹿、狮
、虎、猴、鼠、人物、花卉山水等。两边的走廊不但能观赏字画、花草也是
游客休息的绝佳场所.115 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 The Memorial Hall of Lin Zexu in Pucheng county is located in the alley 6 of the urban branch of Pucheng, in the 
Province f Shaanxi, belonging to a flourishing section of the county town. The museum relies on the residence of Lin 
Zexu, the former county cultural head-curators of the museum Qi Shengji, elder son of Gao Xiaoming, provided a 
personal contribution for a period of five years to the creation of the entire building’s grand scale, its magnificience, the 
solemn atmosphere; the courtyard’s disseminated bricks, the bracket’s cornice, carved beams and painted rafter, the 
pleasant patina, constructed on a surface of 1080 square meters, it was a fine mansion of a eunuch during the Qing, and 
is also the best preserved four-room house typical of the Central Shaanxi plain. The whole courtyard is covered with 
coloured wood carving, tile carving, sculpture artworks, hand-carved sculputures, that are vivid, full of life, superb and 
wonderful. The courtyard had only a dozen high-relief on the wall, 200 pieces of carved woods, hundreds of tile 
carving, carved with dragon and phoenix, deer. Lions, tigers, monkeys, rats, figures, flowers, landscapes etc… At both 
sides of the corridor, not only can be appreciated the paintings, but the flowers and plants are also an excellent place to 
rest for the tourists. 
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The above media photograph and text have been found in the Chinese website 125
旅行网 (luxingwang) – 125 Travel Network - a network technology platform 
which provides comprehensive e-commerce services for the whole world  of 
tourism enterprises and individuals. The website offers a full range of services 
both for enterprises interested in marketing and trading their touristic products and 
services, and for individual travelers who whish to purchase domestic and 
international air tickets, make hotel reservations, and be informed about the most 
popular attractions in various Chinese cities. In the specific, the above image 
displays a traditional Chinese construction that, as the text below the photograph 
informs us, is the Lin Zexu Memorial Hall in Pucheng County 蒲城县, a former 
residence of Lin Zexu in Shanxi province 陕西省. The text indeed provides a full 
and detailed, as well as partial description of the architectural design of the Qing 
dynasty residence, illustrating the size of the building and the material constituting 
the courtyard, praising the vivid and full of life wood and stone carvings, not to 
mention the numerous carved animals - dragon, lion, tiger, deer monkey, rat – and 
human figures, as well as paintings of flowers and plants in the traditional Chinese 
style, and landscape. All these details are apprehended only through, the reading 
of the text. The photograph is there to provide truthfulness to those objects that 
are nonethelss invisible.  
It is however curious to notice that, in contrast with other representations, there is 
no mention of the heroic gestures of Lin Zexu as the national hero (民族英雄) of 
China. Nothing, apparently, seems to suggest, or attempts at conveying a mythical 
dimension to the media photograph and text. I say apparently because, as a matter 
of fact, it is identifiable an ideological representational strategy that conveys the 
myths, in the plural. Those are respectively, the myth of Lin Zexu and the myth of 
the place, and both originate from the objects described in the text, from the Qing 
dynasty architecture to the paintings, passing through the wood and stone 
carvings, and the human and animal figures, that create a narratological stage 
upon which an imagined historical richness of culture is set. The objects described 
become in this way non-human actors, or mediators, able of uttering meanings 
whose shape, entity and quality are defined by the objects themselves. The wood, 	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and stones and paintings missing in the photograph, but present in the text, are no 
more stable and predictable entities, but are instead put at the center of a 
negotiation of meanings that conveys the myth of in-place cultural patrimony, and 
of Lin Zexu. The text in fact imposes second-order signifieds which, depending 
on the hierarchical structure that holds the two – meaning the correlation that 
takes place among the text and the image (news article and commercial 
entertainment assign different role to text and image) – may characterize the text 
as parasitic or leading. It should be pointed out, though, that the figure of Lin 
Zexu may contribute to the mythification of such space if, as it is likely to be, 
there is a prior knowledge of its historical figure. The specificity in the 
construction of the myth(s) in the present photograph and text is accomplished by 
virtue of the capacity of these objects of translating, rather than transferring, 
specific knowledge. They take on the role of promoting – touristically – alleged 
long standing (Chinese) tecniques, and (Chinese) procedures of manufacturing 
artifacts, worth to be appreciated for their beauty and emotional power 
historically. But they also take on the role of encouraging (human) actors, namely 
tourists, to socially respond, or react, to such an abundance of signs by subsuming 
the values they mediate.  
The media photograph and text of Lin Zexu’s place showed above is a cultural 
space of accumulation; accumulation of knowledge, of historical progression and 
unity, of identity, of separation from the other, of devotion, and of power. But it 
also is a space for the accumulation, arrangement, and ordering of objects that are 
dependent on spatial categories, to the construction of specific spatial codes – 两
边的走廊不但能观赏字画、花草也是游客休息的绝佳场所 – that guide, even 
though only hypothetically, the readers/visitors’s understanding (and behaviour if 
physically there) of such spaces.  
As a platform serving the touristic industry, the website “125 Travel Network” by 
means of this media representation creates an imagined national-oriented tourism 
that relies on the invention of a tradition, and in the communication of historical 
myths within a nation-building process that undergoes market logics. Within this 
touristic logic, the objects represented in the text and only partially visible in the 
photograph, play a fundamental role as symbols that become part of a national 
heritage, creating a national past, a history of continuity. More interesting from 
our pont of view, is the use of ancient materials to construct invented traditions of 
	   145	  
a novel type for quite novel purposes. A large store of such materials is 
accumulated in the past of any society, and an elaborate language of symbolic 
practice and communication is always available. Sometimes new traditions could 
be readily grafted on old ones, sometimes they could be devised by borrowing 
from the well-suplied warehouse of official ritual, symbolism and moral 
exhortation (E. Hobsbawm, T. O. Ranger, 1983: 6). State interests, under the 
innocent label of “Industry of National Artistic Heritage”, and market interests, 
under the attractive practice of “Tourism”, intertwine each other within a media 
logic that makes ample use of the power of representation, and of a precise form 
of commercialization of history, for communicating visions of the world (and 
encouraging practices within it) that sustain those interests. These existing social 
relations, therefore, come to be concealed within a web of significance as symbols 
whose fashion is naturalized in the forms (and meanings) of media popular 
culture. 
The photograph and text above result then to be a partial description of the 
architecture displayed and the objects narrated, as their treatment of time and space 
is not at all objective, nor pertain to an alleged denoted dimension a photograph is 
supposed to convey. Understanding this partiality means to get hold of the 
motivations that lie behind the manoeuvre that mystify what we look at. The 
production of the present photograph and text being published in the 125 Travel 
Network, has an objective, a goal, that is quite obvious – motivating people to 
practice tourism, which in turn means to consume cultural forms, and to embody 
landscape. In order to do so, the photograph and the text rely on already established 
social conventions that regard cultural relics, works of art, national heritage and 
other such places (museums, themed parks, landscapes, gentrified city centers and 
so on) as valuable spaces. This conventions though – they have been partly 
analysed in the present study when the concept of landscape practice has been 
treated – seem to me to have been entirely misconceived, indeed the word 
convention entails the acceptance of a certain behaviour for specific, accepted 
reasons; and I personally doubt that this would be the case. Nevertheless, they have 
not always been present, but are rather young and in constant evolution. This 
conventions, I maintain, belong to the transcendental category of space, to a certain 
way of conceiving space in all its contemporary facets and scales – local, regional, 
national, global, but also urban space, rural space, public space, private space, 
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natural space, restraining space, wild space and so on ad infinitum, and to the 
immanent mechanic of photographs. In China, this conception of space has been 
impressed in its present form when the abstract term of modernization – with its 
corollary of paradigms as nation, development, culture, society, subject – invested 
China with the Western discourse of modernity as a universal signifier (Oakes 
1995: 98). The media photograph of Lin Zexu’s places displayed above, offer a 
“profound mythology of space”, as David Harvey would perhaps say; a mythology 
that participates of, and sustains the language through which Lin Zexu as a myth is 
acknowledged; even so, as an historical knowledge and a form of collective 
memory, this mythology of space is an indipendent and comprehensive mythic 
framework that signifies culture as essentialist: “the idea of culture carries with it 
an expectation of roots, of a stable territorialized existence (Clifford, 1988: 338). 
Here, culture and nation are kindred concepts: they are not only spatializing but 
territorializing; they both depend on a cultural essentialism that readily takes on 
arborescent form” (L. Malkki, 1992: 29). The cultural essentialism that constructs 
“China” as a nation-state is the result of a tendency to treat space, or better of 
producing space, in order to provide an intact sense of history and geography that 
the media (photographs of Lin Zexu) with their profusion and streams of signs, 
seem to fragment in infinite particles only to the extent that each of these particles 
are autonomous units efficient in yielding and disseminating narratives of roots and 
soil as “symbols associated with national life” (H. Bhabha, 1993: 4). As the cultural 
production of Chinese (historical) space, the Lin Zexu Memorial Hall maintains a 
particular relationship with the actual physical site it pretends to objectively 
represent. As a spiral, the media photograph and the actual place set up a game of 
correspondence that can never stop, inasmuch as they would reveal the ideological 
origin of both practices and understanding. Indeed, in the cultural production of 
history both the media photographs of Lin Zexu Memorial Hall, and the physical 
national heritage site the image represent, make use of a common perception of 
history, so that “the presentation of history on site only makes explicit” (M. 
Azaryahu, K. E. Foote, 2008: 1) that which is implicit in the media, whereas the 
production of history in-the-media only makes explicit that which is intrinsic in the 
local landscape, meaning that whatever of the two experiences (in the media or on-
site) one may undergo, the other one comes to support and naturalise the meanings 
expressed by the chosen practice. This correspondence on the other hand, brings 
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about a sequentiality – in a non stopping progression media 
photograph→landscape practice→media photograph – that unfolds in a sort of 
imagined story-line. Most images of Lin Zexu are in fact accompained by texts that 
provide a sense of temporal progression necessary for any account on national 
history to be such; a temporal progression conveyed even when the text is absent, 
as in a few media photographs displayed in this account, in which the specific 
arrangement of things on-site – this is actually one way story-lines develop in many 
historical sites – resulting also in the photographs, have the power of reifying the 
temporal progression as historical narrative. 
In this sense, in the beginning of this work I affirmed that the representations of Lin 
Zexu’s places are used as complements to architecture, urban settings, historical 
artifacts, as well as to speeches and written texts, in the production of space, 
presenting common denominations, a common myth of common ancestry (Han), a 
common shared memory (the opium war and the myth’s deeds), the association 
with a specific homeland (China) and a specific culture (Chinese), offering cultural 
dimensions that become intrinsic of the social space that people make experience 
of. However, these narratives conveyed through the photo of Lin Zexu Memorial 
Hall revolve around visual and linguistic modes that connotatively express distinct 
beliefs, values, and ethics, all in support of feelings of national attachment and 
belonging, but also in the production of a defined (Han) ethnicity, and in the 
production of touristic identities (the subject’s gaze) within a touristic sense of 
space. Moreover, our hero’s rendition have a direct relationship with a certain 
experience of space, for the image is able to impart precise ideas of how this space 
should be used; it has therefore a normative character and function, which evokes 
senses of inclusion and/or exclusion. “Images and texts construct a narrative of 
place in which people see themselves reflected – and which they themselves then 
reflect. But also indicates the way in which space is to be used – for the parading of 
gentrified middle class glamour. By saying what space is for, images and text say 
who the space belogns to and who is entitled to it” (A. Desiderio, 2013: 2-3). 
For this reason, the media offer what could be called a democratic access to (urban) 
space, as it allows anyone who, technologically equipped, whishes to perform space 
by being illuded by it. What actually one experiences is a networking process of 
interactions between entities, whose result is the production of forms of media 
culture, media photographs and texts, that produce and displace senses of 
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(mythical) national space. The mythology underlined by the media phtographs, as 
said before, is the merging or intersection of two different, but related, types of 
myths; the myth of Lin Zexu, partly constructed in these same media photographs, 
though mostly conveyed by a supposed previous awareness of it (intertextuality); 
and the myth of sacred, national space. These two kind of myths, by converging in 
the representations below, produce a unified new economy of the myth, which is 
composed by three overlapping features as Eric Hobsbawm declares: “those 
establishng or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or 
artificial community; those establishing or legitimazing institutions, status or 
relations of authority; and those whose main purpose was [is] socialization, the 
inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour” (Hobsbawm, 
Ranger, 1983: 9). Accordingly, the media photographs of Lin Zexu Memorial Hall 
in Pucheng County 蒲城县, for the myth it conveys, invent a tradition that informs 
us on the qualities of a certain, more or less contemporary, Chinese nationalism, 
which in turn enlighten about the procedures, though only some of them, used to 
produce peculiar forms of space, both in-the-media and in-place; and thus 
providing the means for an estimation of the extent media forms and institutions 
participate in the ever-lasting production of cultural signs that make up what, not at 
all unproblematically, we call Chinese society and culture. It is therefore plausible 
to say that the above analysed photo of Lin Zexu’s place, ideologically convey the 
natural association of a culture (Chinese culture), of a territory (China), and of a 
people (Chinese people). The care and sophistication of the (visual and written) 
language of the photograph and text in the media, rely on conventional ways of 
conceiving space, but they somehow reveal the media logic to which they have 
been consigned, the media logic that intensifies and even spectacularises the object 
represented to distort (augment in this case) the experience of place one does in the 
media, and is supposed to do on-site. A network of social relations that sees the 
tourist industry make use of modern conventions for the understanding and practice 
of space, that materialize and communicate such values through a media technology 
(Internet), that imposes its own logic through specific forms of representations 
(photograph and text), which are supposed, by conveying meanings and ideologies, 
to function as drives for leisure experiences that sustain tourism as an industry, and 
at the same time manage the constitution of national subjects moving within a 
national territory. 
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东莞特色还有啥 人文历史旅游景点也很多116 
 
虎门林则徐纪念馆117 
 
虎门林则徐纪念馆是为了纪念民族英雄林则徐而建立的历史人物纪念馆。位
于广东省东莞市虎门镇口村南面的林则徐销烟池旧址内。虎门林则徐纪念馆
收藏的文物主要有：销烟池木桩、木板、鸦片烟具、林则徐手迹等。该馆基
本陈列《林则徐禁烟》分三部分：鸦片战争前的形势；罪恶的鸦片输入；林
则徐与广东禁烟。该馆通过讲解宣传、录像放映等形式向观众开展爱国主义
教育.118 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 	  Published at the following Internet address: 
http://sn.ifeng.com/lvyoupindao/youfenxiang/detail_2014_02/12/1838049_0.shtml. 
117	  Humen Memorial Hall of Lin Zexu.  	  
118 The memorial hall of Lin Zexu in Humen has been erected in commemoration of the national hero Lin Zexu. 
Located in Guandong Province, Dongguan city, Humen town, in the south side of the old pool site where Lin Zexu 
burned the opium. The main artifacts collected in the Humen Memorial Hall of Lin Zexu are: the pegged stakes of the 
pool, the planks, opium smoking set, Lin Zexu’s original handwritings etc… The Memorial main exhibition “Lin Zexu 
bans Opium” is divided in three parts: the situation before the Opium War; the plague of Opium import; Lin Zexu and 
the Guandong ban of opium. The museum’s guided propaganda is actualized through video screenings and other forms 
for developing the viewer’s patriotic education. 	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The photograph and text above, display and describe the “old pool” (池旧) in 
which, in 1839 Lin Zexu (in Humen town) supervised the destruction of about 
20.000 boxes of opium sized to the British opium smugglers, an act historically 
considered as the culmination of a series of political measures adopted by the 
“Imperial Commissioner” (钦差大臣), which led to the first Opium War (1840-
1842). They have been published in the Chinese website Phoenix New Media (凤
凰新媒体 fenghuang xin meiti) at the following Internet address www.ifeng.com. 
With an average of about 47 million daily users, Phoenix New Media, founded in 
1998, is today a Chinese leading media network integrating three media 
platforms, Phoenix Mobile Phone Network (手机凤凰网), Phoenix Mobile Client 
(移动客户端), and Phoneix Video (凤凰视频). It is also the holding of Phoenix 
Satellite TV Media Group, providing media services and content of other media 
institutions, but also producing and communicating its own media products as 
audio and video content, in-depth reports, editorials (观点评论 ), financial 
products, interactive applications, online games, as well as other customized 
services.  
The photograph and text representing the famous “old pool” have been published 
in the travel/touristic section (旅游频道) of the Shanxi Province of the website, 
under the entry travel sharing (游分享), and as part of a wider account on the 
cultural and historical attraction of Dongguan city to which Humen town belongs. 
The article is nine pages long, and each page displays photograph and texts (brief 
descriptions) of the most important attractions of Dongguan, among which are the 
“Opium War Museum” (鸦片战争博物馆), the “Shajiao Fort” (沙角炮台), the 
“Maritime Warfare Museum” (海战博物馆), the “Humen Bridge” (虎门大桥), 
the “Songshan Lake” (松山湖 ), the “Dongguan Science and Technology 
Museum” (东莞科技博物馆) and others.  
What is of interest with regard to the photograph and text above, is that the entire 
conception of the account published in the Phoenix New Media website, is 
intended as a sort of anti-campaign against the sex tourism, and the pornography 
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business for which Dongguan is famous119. The article therefore reassures all 
potential tourists of the numerous and alternative, cultural and historical 
attractions that the overall area of Dongguan offers, and for which it is worth 
travelling to. Henry Lefebvre, in his famous work “The Production of Space”, 
maintains how representations of spaces play a determinant role in combining 
ideology and knowledge with the aim of constructing or modifying specific 
spatial textures. “Representations of space have a practical impact, that they 
intervene and modify spatial textures which are informed by effective knowledge 
and ideology. Representations of space must therefore have a substantial role and 
a specific influence in the production of space” (H. Lefebvre, 1991: 42).  
If it is reasonable to think that a representation of space such as the one above is 
effective in providing a new knowledge and a new ideology, in opposition to a an 
existing, but also imagined, cultural space (Dongguan’s sex tourism and the 
pornography business related to it), then it is as much plausible to believe that the 
photograph and text under consideration produce an alternative (or only a 
supplementary alternative) imagined cultural space of Dongguan city, which 
might be translated120 in actual (on-site) practices and behaviours. When in the 
first pages of this account I stated that the media has a direct relationship with a 
certain experience of space, I was referring to the fact that our behaviours, 
practices and performances in a certain physical space, are motivated by sets of 
expectations, opinions and beliefs – a prior knowledge – that are more than often 
communicated by media representations, as for instance the one we are presently 
dealing with.  
More generally speaking, each system of spatial organization requires an adequate 
system of representation of space, for the media representation frequently works 
as a first-line producer of space within a wider endevour of producing, controlling 
and governing space. This is especially true within the touristic industry system, 
where the media acts as the primary creator of (imaginary) spatial experiences, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119近日，全国最火的地方非东莞莫属吧。轰轰烈烈的扫黄活动不光扫得东莞色情业从业者心惊胆战，也扫得全
国网友沸沸腾腾。原本大家心照不宣却异常火热的色情业，被视为东莞的一大特色，如今这把火被浇上了一盆
水。有想去东莞旅游的人该何去何从呢？别急，除了大保健，东莞也有很多值得旅游的地方，下面编者为大家
一一道来。	  
120 The term translate stands to indicate the negotiation, in forms and contents, of certain imagined, media induced 
beliefs and convictions while attempting to employ them in-place. 
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communicated in the form of conventional landscapes’ or places’ images, and 
conveying meanings that in their unified assembling generate an ideology of 
leisure and entertainement (or educational 教育), as opposed to a routined 
working daily life. The photograph in this sense is a powerful instrument as it is 
effective in providing the exact shape and form of the apparences it displays.  
The representation of the old pool in which Lin Zexu demonstrated an eviable 
righteousness, stands as a mythological space, where a mythic action – the 
burning of opium – had been carried out by a mythical historical figure. Therefore 
the mythical aura of this media space is uttered, and most importantly motivated 
to support a precise commercial policy, tourism, and perhaps even a  political one, 
crack down on pornography and sexual business, by relying on a specific form of 
nationalism, a pedagogical or educational one, as declared in the text: 该馆通过
讲解宣传，录像放映等形式向观众开展爱国主义教育. The kind of socialities 
and cultural forms that the media provides, come to be combined with the kind of 
socialities and cultural forms that the physical space of landscape and place offer; 
“social space interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves upon 
one another. They are not things, which have mutually limiting boundaries and 
which collide of their contours or as a result of inertia” (H. Lefbvre, 1991: 86-
87), they are rather essential to each other, as the media historical development, 
with its diffusion and logic, has been incorporated in many other institutions’ 
operational logics (see Stig Hjarvard 2013) – the touristic industry, the political 
arena and institutions for example – supplying its own peculiar cultural forms in 
an interaction and integration with other cultural forms and practices (do exist 
cultural forms independent of the media?).  
It could also be argued, that the motivation of cracking down on the pornographic 
business in Dongguan, authorizes the media representation to act as a form of 
biopolitical power imparting, on the viewer/subjects of the image, meanings that 
if successfully decoded might result in an ideological self-managing of the 
subject’s body, in its understanding and behaviour. In this case, the myth of Lin 
Zexu and of the space (the old pool) conveyed by the photograph and text above, 
would function as mediators of senses of gender and class as results of a specific 
way of thinking about territory and practice through the media.  
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南后街林则徐老宅 最新福州好玩的地方列表 
	  
Lin Zexu’s former residence in Fuzhou (Fujian Province) 
 
 
南后街，每天生活在钢筋水泥都市中的我们。去逛逛南后街吧，会让你放松
心情让你进入小镇的轻松感觉。在快逛完南后街时候，推荐你去看一看爱国
人士虎门销烟禁毒英雄林则徐的住宅。林则徐故居，我去过很多次了，印象
很好，你面有很多展区有很多媒体设备还有导游介绍，播放相关的资料让游
客更直观的了解林则徐的一生事迹。很出名的十无益家训。皇帝御赐的石碑
纪念林则徐。双抛桥（车站）下车。如图所示你就可以看到标有南后街几个
大字的大门。往里走。逛完30分钟.121 
 
The above photograph and text have been published on the Chinese website 在外地 
(zaiwaidi) in date 08.08.2015, at the entry “Fuzhou Speciality” (福州士特产), in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 The text is analysed below. 
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the sub-section “interesting places” (好玩的地方)122, under the title “Lin Zexu Old 
Residence in Nanhou Street, the Latest list of Fuzhou’s Interesting Places”  (南后
街林则徐老宅最新福州好玩的地方列表).  
As for many visual representations (photographs, computer-generated images, 
paintings, and maps), the photograph above, although is mechanically qualified to 
resemble the appearances in their original shapes and colours, it nonetheless 
necessitates two different forms of written texts (the title and the commentary), to 
render intellegible the denotation intrinsic, but yet unnamed, in the photographic 
image. While the photograph is used to provide materiality to the representation – 
the materiality in the photograph is a proof, it stands for reality – the text instead 
supplies the meaning of the image, that “is a function of who has the power to 
represent” (D. Mitchell, 2003: 242). The ambiguity of a photograph - an ambiguity 
produced by the break of a continuity, the flux that the photograph interrupts 
creating a discontinuity – is concealed by the setting of written language whose 
function is to transform that ambiguity into a certainty (see J. Berger 1982).  
The text informs the viewer/reader of the image, of taking the opportunity to go for 
a relaxing walk in Nanhou Street (南后街) – an old-fashioned Chinese style street 
within the famous and wider “Three Lanes and Seven Alleys”123 (三坊七巷) area, 
located in the city center of Fuzhou – and it reccomends to pay a visit to the former 
residence of the patriotic figure, the national hero Lin Zexu, famous for the burning 
of opium in Humen. It is interesting noticing that the text of the photograph, that as 
said above is supposed to render intellegible the denoted dimension of the 
photograph, points out the fact that within the former residence (故居) of Lin Zexu, 
one can make use of on-site specific media equipment (有很多媒体设备), and have 
the possibility to take advantage from guided tour (还有导游介绍). The media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 http://www.zaiwaidi.cn/haowan-1.html 	  
123 Three Lanes and Seven Alleys is an important heritage site under the national protection that belongs to the Top 10 
Historical and Cultural Street of China. Covering an area of 38.35 hectares and originally built in late Western Jin 
Dynasty (265-316), it keeps the basic street patterns of Tang and Song dynasties (618-1279) with 159 buildings in the 
styles of Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911), of which including 9 national protected historical sites, and 8 
provincial protected historical sites. According to the history, after the An Lushan Rebellion in 755 of Tang Dynasty 
(618-907), many people took refuge in this southern part of the city of Fuzhou, and gradually this residential block took 
shape being inhabited by many officialdoms and intellectuals. It gave birth to numerous Chinese historical figures and it 
still hosts many former residences of modern heroes and celebrities such as Lin Zexu, Zuo Zongtang, Zheng Xiaoxu, 
Deng Tuo, Yan Fu, Bing Xin, Lin Juemin. 
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photograph and text represent other forms of representation, of mediation. If in fact 
it is true that the text provides the meaning to the photograph, similarly the media 
equipment and guided tour on-site are there to provide a meaningful narration that 
the architecture alone is unable to provide. The text in the present representation, 
and the media equipment and guided tour in-place, they both function as narrations 
emotionally and symbolically charged by profound meanings whose role is not only 
that of, clearly enough, connoting the photograph and the material substance of the 
site, namely the house, or the architecture, but they also sustain a specific function 
that gives solidity and consistency to the opaque values that often surround both 
photographs and landscapes. How many time has happened to physically be in a 
historical site and, although being aware of the meanings that place stood for, 
nevertheless experiencing that those meanings were intangible, elusive, 
inintellegible, as if the place’s material existence and setting alone weren’t enough; 
how many times have we been looking at photographs for which we demanded 
explanations (narrations), for it wasn’t capable of expressing what explicitly 
displayed. “Their significance lay precisely in their undefined universality” (E. 
Hobsbawm, T. O. Ranger, 1983: 11), by being evasive and fleeting they give the 
illusion of transcending culture or historical contingency, a transcendence that in 
the case of Lin Zexu means the manifestation of a mythical dimension that common 
men and women can only imagine about, or made be imagine about.  
Media representation and landscape practice come to play a game of constant 
mediation in which, the previous holder of a consistent meaning, the text in the 
representation, passes the baton to the new relay, that is the media equipment and 
the guided tour on-site.  
This kind of understanding of the media representation of Lin Zexu’s former 
residence, is then perpetrated through the narrativization of the photograph, for 
which the text is the main conveyer. This textualization of the picture, a 
textualization that goes beyond the mere fact of having a written text to support the 
meaning, is the very cultural space within which the viewer/reader of the image 
constantly moves. With the photograph as the main reference, the textualized 
meaning is offered through overlapped layers of meaning that, on the one hand re-
produce the myth of Lin Zexu and the myth of a territorialized space, and on the 
other hand come in support of a set of ideas, values, and beliefs as well as 
“unquestioned assumptions about the way a society is, or should be organized” (J.-
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N. Duncan, 1988: 123), that inform the viewer/reader on how to embody and 
behave in physical space. Thus if one, after having had experience of the media 
representation analysed in this pages, then takes on the commitment to go and visit 
the residence of Lin Zexu in Nanhou Street (南后街) in Fuzhou, he/she will be 
likely to rely on the media representation for all the assumptions and expectations 
that might occur in his/her understanding. This also means that even in-place, one 
would consider normal the fact of entrusting the media equipment and guided tour, 
as producer and conveyer of the meanings that the place is supposed to possess 
regardless of them. 
The media representation communicates spatial narratives whose codification 
require a “complex configuration of geographic elements including buildings, 
markers, memorials, and inscriptions positioned with great care to provide a 
spatial story-line or to capture the key locational and chronological relations on 
historical event” (M. Azaryahu, K. E. Foote, 2008: 2). The progression and 
sequentiality expressed here by the text of the image, does not unfold only in 
relation to the figure of Lin Zexu and to the mythical space object of the 
photograph and text, but also in relation to a more general standardization, if not 
normativeness, of the subject’s behaviour in-place: “go for a walk in Nanhou 
Street” (去逛逛南后街吧);  “you are recommended to go see….while you are 
strolling around” (在快逛完南后街时候，推荐你去看一看…); “go in” (往里走
); and yet “have a walk for 30 minutes” (逛完30分钟). This apparently docile 
imperatives, have the power of naturalizing the process of governmentalization 
that, to us, to the /viewer/reader of the image, look merely like useful suggestion.  	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  福州林则徐广场 
 
 
The above photograph displays a statue of Lin Zexu in the omonym square in 
Fuzhou city (福州市), Fujian Province (福建省). One important analogy between 
photograph and landscape (or place) constist in the fact that both have 
demonstrated adequate capacities in dispensing their producer and promoter from 
social responsabilities and consequencies, inasmuch as they construct their 
represented space through modes that express impartiality, objectivity, 
inevitability and certainty. Photograph and landscape entail distinct concepts of 
production, and carry out distinct acts of producing, nevertheless they attain at 
similar, if not equal, objectives, especially in those cases when media photograph 
and landscape practice become part of the same logic, as the one analysed here.   
On one side there is the media representation, the photograph, whose acts of 
production involve the displacement of the scene depicted onto a digital image or 
film (used to produce photographs) by means of a camera, as well as another kind 
of displacement, this time through a different means of communication, the 
Internet, by which the, yet-to-be-analysed connotative dimension of the 
photograph, is conveyed at an extensive scale. To this moment the photograph is 
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still a message without a code, as Barthes maintains, “from the object to its image 
there is of course a reduction - in proportion, perspective, colour - but at no time 
is this reduction a transformation (in the mathematical sense of the term). In 
order to move from the reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary to divide 
up this reality into units and to constitute these units as signs, substantially 
different from the object they communicate; there is no necessity to set up a relay, 
that is to say a code, between the object and its image” (R. Barthes, 1977: 17). 
The first-order message a photograph displays, its denotation, is retained and 
acknowledged even when its connotation has been deployed, they stand together 
as two distinct entities operating their own processes, denotation and connotation.  
On the other side, there is the media representation as concepts of production, 
indicating with this term the totality and assemblage of operational choices, 
treatments, and procedures aiming at creating and imposing a second connotative 
meaning, and thus implying a specific intentionality. It goes without saying, that 
what I’ve termed as concepts of production requires acts of production, they thus 
become visible as distinct processes only for the sake of the analysis one is 
committed to conduct. However, these choices and treatments one imposes on the 
photograph, and which I mentioned before in this account, are “trick effects, pose, 
objects, photogenia, aestheticism,and syntax” (R. Barthes, 1977: 21). The 
preparation, organization and arrangement of the objects composing the scene 
may be artificially managed by the photographer, and then made invisible in the 
denoted image of the (media) photograph. Nevertheless, this operation of 
concealing the procedures that stage intentionally and subjectively the scene, is 
not always possible. If, in fact, we take a look at the photograph of the square (and 
statue) of Lin Zexu in Fuzhou, we realize how such modification of reality is 
unattainable, since such modification would imply an endeavour too great to 
realize.  
Does this mean that what has been said above about the photograph is not correct, 
or that there are exceptions to these general rules?  Not at all.  
This is another of those moments when landscape practice and production come 
to sustain the credibility of the denoted message in the (media) photograph of Lin 
Zexu; by being connoted on-site, or in-place, the landscape unburden and relieves 
the photograph from any responsabilities (the decodification of partial meanings 
and consequently the appropriation of a dominant ideology) – what actually 
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happens is that the landscape comes to be part of the photograph, and therefore as 
a unity (as a media photograph) express the connotative dimension of the space 
represented. The production of a space on-site implies the construction of a 
“spatial configuration”, a process of signification that unfolds in the 
narrativization of space or the arrangement of stories as space (M. Azaryahu, K. 
E. Foote, 2008). As the concretization of social relations, as a “complex moment 
in a system of social reproduction” (D. Mitchell, 1996: 35), space is produced 
materially to rationalize, organize, and then display ordinary visions of the world 
to a subjective gaze that visualizes the objects on the land as the natural order of 
things, and not as mediators or agencies that take part in the construction of 
ideological narratives.  
In the Square of Lin Zexu in Fuzhou city, the spatial narrative reflected in the 
media photograph, is obtained through a relative simple configuration of things; 
the installation of the statue of Lin Zexu in a central prespectival position, and 
within an urban pedestrian area  - to be noted that the statue without the signifying 
text carved in the black marble below would be anonym, and above all would lack 
the sequentiality and linear progression necessary to every historical narrative, a 
temporality that nevertheless is lost in the photograph; and the naming of the 
square (林则徐广场) which textualizes the urban territory of the city in a national 
fashion, making the viewer/reader of the image, but also the citizen that physically 
encouters the square, performing such space as a text. “The act of social magic 
which consists in trying to bring into existence the thing named may succed if the 
person who performs it – the city’s institutions of Fuzhou, or the Chinese State 
itself through national policies – is capable of gaining recognition through his 
speech for the power which that speech is appropriating for itself by a provisional 
or definite usurpation, that of imposing a new vision and a new division of the 
social world” (P. Bourdieu, 1982: 223). 
The acknowledgement of the space of Lin Zexu, namely the square, by means of 
its naming (Lin Zexu), and the setting of objects in it (the statue), naturalizes the 
bond between territory and people, between territory and the state, and yet 
between people and the state both on-site and in the media photograh, as the signs 
physically distributed in-place, and the act of reifying abstract spaces by naming 
them, bring into existennce what they assert (P. Bourdieu, 1982). 
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The spatialization of politics that this kind of production of space entails (the 
setting of things in, and the naming of, the square of Lin Zexu), and the 
consequent  mediatization of such spatialization (the media photograph above), 
are part of an everyday language and tactics that essentialize the meanings of the 
social space that surround (Chinese) people. This is not to say the the 
acknowledgement of such spaces, represented or not, involves the automatic 
decodification of the dominant ideology supposedly produced by means of an 
encoding process, as in this way one would confer a certain fixity to the nature of 
these spaces, eradicating and disqualifying practices, which we know are at the 
base of every relationship and thus of the life of everyday, both in the media and 
in-place. Nevertheless, it is also true that specific (represented) spaces such as 
natural parks, memorials, themed parks, heritaged areas and others, are highly 
normative places, meaning that the practices one is allowed to perform in them, 
are strongly regulated as well as limited in number. 
However, the media photograph of the square of Lin Zexu above showed is the 
materialization of the displacement of Chinese historical past, of national 
narratives and traditions, but it is also the exemplification of the criteria that make 
up a tradition “through which the community’s relationship to itself and its 
environment is played out. What is transmitted through these narratives is the set 
of pragmatic rules that constitutes the social bond” (J. F. Lyotard, 1979: 21). 
The mediatization of the narrative produced in the square of Lin Zexu, allows a 
local national narrative – locale inasmuch as it is limited to the local people of 
Fuzhou city – to become a collective national narrative that spatializes and 
territorializes the values and beliefs that link the Chinese people with the Chinese 
State. We have therefore seen how a photograph, though accurately quoting  from 
reality, cannot be considered to be neutral, it cannot escape the cultural dimension 
from which it is produced and within which is consumed. From the arrangement 
and setting of stages, passing through the manipulation of objects, to the use of 
texts that help channeling the message of the image, a photograph reveals its biased 
manner of dealing with specific aspects of what we call reality.  
Regardless of how the aforementioned procedures or elements are employed in the 
construction of a meaning in the photograph, I suggest that the production of space, 
in the form of landscape, and understood as a type of place is crucial in the practice 
and knowledge of photographs. As mentioned before, Lin Zexu’s photographs of its 
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reresenational spaces showed above, demonstrate the way people invent, embody, 
and perform landscape, both in-place and in the media, and this is so because the 
physical places we live in, and the virtual places we look at when before the 
photographs of Lin Zexu’s representational places analysed above, are the 
combination of materiality, meaning, and practices that become constitutent agents 
in building, shaping and organizing people’s perception of the social, both at 
individual and collective level. By trying to reconstitute in its specific structure the 
code of connotation of a mode of communication as important as the press 
photograph we may hope to find, in their very subtlety, the forms of our society (R. 
Barthes, 1977: 31).  
In the 1980’s, the cultural turn in Human Geography allowed for a reading of space 
and of landscape that entailed the refusal of paradigmatic approaches in favor of 
interpretations that encouraged the understanding of the specific historical 
conditions under which space in general, and landscape in specific, have been 
constructed as forms of articulation of power. Although space – in the form of 
landscapes and places – is not a universal value common in every society; 
considered that the cultural approaches to landscape originated in Europe, and that 
the conception of landscape in China has strong roots in different sphere of Chinese 
society, and has worked as a joint force that combines and articulates peculiar 
forms of expression and communication addressed in the course of this analysis; 
nevertheless, I maintain that today landscape is a transnational language shared by 
disparate nation-states in the making of their spaces as national territories; in the 
shaping of national identities; in the distribution and organization of people 
according to their ethnicity and gender; in the planning, construction, and 
administration of national and global economies, both public and private; in the 
dissemination of national and global imagined geographies by means of media 
technology and representations; in the ideological construction of the other; not to 
mention the enormous capitalist industry that produces and offers leisure 
experiences, namely tourism, a practice that since the advent and spreading of 
mass-media technologies has drastically relyed on the universal language of 
landscape representations.  
The photograph of the square of Lin Zexu, as a type of Landscape, is a specific 
form of producing space, is a concretization or reification of social relations (Don 
Mitchell, 2003: 240) through which staging particular forms of social life. The 
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image of the famous square in Fuzhou is thus a product that allows for the 
stabilization of a definite, although not always entirely containable, flow of features 
that are organized as to present themselves as lasting, essential, and most of all 
natural; whereas they are actually fleeting – though some permanencies do exist – 
acquired, and utterly historical. These features that apparently characterize the 
media image in a permanent way, are humanly created resources (D. Mitchell, 
2003: 239), therefore resulting not from something as a system, abstract, immobile, 
transcendent, but from a network of actors and agencies that are themselves 
involved in making the most out of it. Landscape is at the same time the 
concretization of the relationship between social actions – meaning-making 
processes, ordering, arrangement of things, as well as struggle over them – on the 
one hand, and the abstraction of these facts through a translation that turns them 
into dreams, desires, imaginations, passions and inspirations on the other; it is thus 
coded not only to convey certain meanings that are then rendered through specific 
set of ideas and practices, but also to conceal the conditions under which such 
manifestation, the landscape itself, has been produced. As a social product, this 
space called landscape does not contain the social relations of production that 
created it, it rather is the expression of these social practices and actions that 
impose - and are simultaneously regulated by – the order of a specific symbolism. 
Obviously, the factors in play in a given landscape, and the network of actors and 
motivations that sustain it, can only be addressed by analysing the society’s 
peculiar space and its individual and collective meanings.  
This is then the first important peculiarity of the landscape’s practices that are 
residual in the photographs of Lin Zexu, that of being ideological instruments for 
the expression of naturalized values that seem to emanate genuinely from the 
territory, the landscape; used for the production, exchange and consumption of 
collectve ideas, values, and meanings that render the landscape a commodity as any 
other. One of the thing that landscape is for, then, is the establishment of patterns of 
circulations, patterns of production and reproduction (D. Mitchell, 2003: 240).  
As with regard to the production of  Lin Zexu’s images, it is reasonable to say that 
the commodity-quality through which the landscape is acknowledged, is reflected 
in the photograph’s (of a place) utilization as an object able to guarantee the 
authenticity of what is represented, testifying therefore the thereness of the subject 
who made the photograph and whose consuming-driven experience (of the 
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landscape) is embodied and materialized through, and in, the photograph. I show a 
photograph of Beijing’s Tiananmen Square (天安门广场) to some friends of 
mine, and that photograph becomes the proof not only of my “being there”, but 
also that I experienced/consumed the specific values and meanings the urban 
landscape of Tiananmen Square is meant to convey. If this is true, if we have 
experience of landscape as a commodity – actually most places in our cities are 
planned and constructed to guide and/or encourage consumption – it means that 
the physical arrangement of a landscape suggests or imposes a determined visual 
order necessary for the reading of its narrative. Landscape denotes particular 
‘way of seeing’ (to use John Berger’s felicitous phrase) wrapped up in a particual 
relationship to land understood as property. That is to say, while landscape as an 
areal association or assemblage of things on the land is a moment in processes of 
production and social reproduction, as an ideology it is a particular means of 
organizing and experiencing the visual order of those things on the land (D. 
Mitchell, 2003: 241-2).  
Lin Zexu media photographs are first of all representative of a specific aspect of a 
Chinese media culture that may be designated as territorialized, that is, related to 
the nation-state as the reference focus. In fact, the media photographs of Lin Zexu –  
as contemporary communication technology – are the reworking expression of the 
bond between the Chinese nation-state and the citizens, between territory and 
people. 
The mythical role of Lin Zexu, as constructed by media discourse performs, 
through its ability of making sense of the world, a spatialization. What we call 
media culture, that specific part of the texture of the social world, cannot exist 
without a spatial distribution. This distriution – the spatialization – needs to be both 
physical and theoretical. It is physical inasmuch as it needs infrastructures to allow 
the communication carried out by the media. At the same time this distribution is 
theoretical as it permeates our cognitive understanding through the 
assimilation/consumption of the meanings that the signs – themselves materially 
present – convey. “Thus a sheet of paper or a screen, for example, impose their 
own form of spatiality which inacts a particular logic of position and juxtaposition” 
(M. Callon, J. Law, 2004: 5). The media therefore play an integral part in the 
constitution of physical spaces, the national territories, and it produces a media 
culture able to evoke and suggest the experiencing of actions through specific 
	   164	  
practices. This is the reason why I assert that Lin Zexu’s media photographs are 
territorialized media culture, they entail (as constituted by media) a participation in 
the costruction of physical (national) space, while being socially acknowledged 
elsewhere. These media photographs as a matter of fact are a form of imagined 
geographies or “imagined territories” (Cosgrove, 2003: 263) playing a powerful 
function in territorializing or re-territorializing – as it is often the case – the role and 
place of nation-states, by naturalizing their existence in a specific territory and in a 
precise political form.  
With regard to Lin Zexu’s representations, “a majority of citizen may never have 
visited these landscapes, but know and treasure them through pictorial images” 
(Cosgrove, 2003: 254). Every time we happen to encounter the images of Lin Zexu, 
we are confroted and reassured by the idea of being part of an integral national 
territory that is supposed to naturally contain those abstract principles and values 
from which our subjective identities allegedly originate. This is in my opinion the 
main aspect of an ideology nurtured and fed by the particular kind of media culture 
that the media photographs of Lin Zexu’s places convey, an ideology of territory 
constructed as the outcome of the convergence and intersection of varied social 
relations, where media, politcs, market and industrial entities as tourism, along with 
the essential gaze of the subject/viewer, all produce social space, its practices, and 
its representations. However, it must be pointed out that such an understanding – 
media culture as territorialized – does in no way deny the existence of a 
transnational media culture, nor consider them both to be exclusive. On the 
contrary, much if media culture, territorialized or not, is understood and receipted 
as flows of signs (images, texts, sounds, videos and so on) whose connotative 
dimensions, although cognitively operative, are barely noticeable if not through 
detailed analysis.  
It is been shown above how through the interpretation of landscape formation and 
positioning one might apprehend how to make sense of a media photograph. Lin 
Zexu’s representations have actually a palimpsestic character of their own, for the 
media photographs are the mediatization of photographs in-place, which in turn are 
the result of landscape practices, that is, of lived spaces; these practices are yet the 
reification of specific ways of seeing (the viewer detached and positioned in a fix 
point of view) that are often imparted by other media representations of landscape. 
If this is true, if this network exists and can be traced back, it means that the media 
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photographs of Lin Zexu’s places are not only what they claim to be, but are a 
production of sort themselves, meaning that what we look at when visualizing them 
is their own cultural space, and not only another’s place’s space. Having their own 
cultural space means for these media photographs that they are able to convey, 
regardless of the referent they point at, senses of one’s identity, of one’s social 
position or self-representation, from which it is legitimate to experience various 
social impressions and beliefs which might materialize in different type of practices 
whose range may oscillate, for instance, from feelings of expectations, of desire, 
and anxiety, to the concretization of plans or the materialization of ideas. 
Nevertheless, the specific structure of almost any media photograph maintains a 
relationship with its analogon, with the appearances they capture in the sensible 
world. This strong relationship originates on one side from the photograph’s 
characteristic of producing an image identical to the object photographed (as 
mentioned above), and on the other side from the confidence people have 
historically developed toward representations.  
I have so far tried to trace back what in my judgment is the discoursive and material 
network informing the cultural form I call media photograph. I have accounted for 
the role played by landscape production and practice in the constitution of a 
photograph in-place, and how residual of these practices are still present in the 
media photograph.  
 
 
 
- Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I endevoured to show how a simple photograph acknowledged on 
the Chinese Internet, is an object or thing (in Latourian terms) whose overall 
network of belonging – the network that precedes its formation, and the same 
network expansion by means of the (media) photograph interaction with other 
actors and agencies – comprises the reciprocal interplay and convergence with a 
particular way of conceiving of space, that is landscape; it also comprises the very 
practice of such space, what I have called landscape practice, an apparently 
innocuous and genuine exercise, which turns out to be the result of historically 
constructed knowledge whose employement of precise codes (visualization, 
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perspective, material settings) frame precise way of “articulating and structuring 
the human world” (J. B. Harley, 1988: 278). Although, as Gunter kress (2004) has 
maintained and as it is appropriate to mention, individuals are also the remakers of 
the resources of representational modes, and not stable users in a system of uni-
modal processing, but active users within multimodal networks of representational 
practice, that may alter the expected (ideological) outcomes. 
Moreover, I delineated how this peculiar understanding of social space (as both 
landscape and place) and the social practices that we perform in it, are a constituent 
part of another social practice, that of taking photographs in-place. The detachment 
of the viewing subject by way of its central positioning, and whose perspective and 
way of seeing is determined by the very material production of those spaces, not to 
mention the normative functions they often exert on people, all these features are 
retained in the in-place production of a photograph. In addition to this, I maintained 
that a media photograph – which I understand as a photograph that after having 
been taken by a photo camera in-place, and after having been communicated 
through specific media devices to a mass audience, assimilating or embodying a 
media logic that I apprehend as the capacity of media cultural forms and media 
representations in general to sustain the coordination of social activities and 
relations between various actors and institution and people (André Jansson 2005: 
27) – retains much of the codes and procedures that inform the production of space 
and the consequent landscape practice that this production implies. In this sense 
I’ve demonstrated in the course of this analysis that although a media photograph, 
similarly to other type of media representations, creates its own cultural space and 
forms regardless of the referent the image points at, and thus contributing to the 
creation and fashioning of a media culture that fuses with the rest of social 
formations; nonetheless, the power of the denoted dimension in a (media) 
photograph is enough to maintain, or give the illusion of maintaining a strong tie 
with its referent, and for this reason I say that the media has a direct relationship 
with a certain experience of space.  
The media representations of Lin Zexu’s places are designated to embody the 
values, beliefs, and principles of its historical figure – the hero, the national patriot 
– but as spaces for the representation of collective identies and codes of behaviour, 
they are built, assembled, and set, to provide their own indipendent mythical 
dimension, a quality that is supposed to stress senses of territorialization and 
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attachement to the the sacredness of national soil, a quality that treats the territory 
as natural.  
In the image analysis I’ve instead demonstrated to what extent the mythical 
dimensions these representations convey are produced as processes dependent on 
human agencies, by means of individual (tourist industry) and collective (the state 
and the rulers) interests; how these images “help control social behaviour, and 
shape identities by homogenising the use and practice of the space” (A. Desiderio, 
2013: 11). As attempts of national territorialization, or perhaps re-territorialization, 
these media representations are the rationalization of national territory, what makes 
social space a social product. Furthermore “the partial erosion of spatially bounded 
social worlds and the growing role of the imaginations of places from a distance” 
(A. Gupta, J. Ferguson, 1992: 11) assigns to these representations the function of 
connecting imagined people to imagined territories; also, the mobility and 
displacement of people has an impact of how distinct perceptions of territory, of 
homeland and home are re-created through different forms of (media) memories.  
I do believe that the media photographs and texts of Lin Zexu’s places fucntion as 
claims of national identity and belonging, as a result of the spatialization of 
historical narratives that are determined by distinctive spatial dynamics inherent 
both in the media communication and in photographs; and although in China the 
right to urban space is a problematic and contradictory issue, these media 
representations as forms of imagined geographies allow a democratic, as well as a 
higly ideologized, access to such imagined spaces. 
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Chapter IV 
Mediatisation and the Myth 
 
 
 
This chapter’s objective is to account for the mediatisation of a specific form of 
historical knowledge epitomized by Chinese media through the representations of 
the myth of Lin Zexu. I intend to look at the contingent processes through which 
the media forms of the myth of Lin Zexu exemplify a diversified cultural 
phenomena that I understand as the mediatisation of historical knowledge currently 
underway in China, that is the process through which the historical is culturally 
produced by the Chinese media – TV, Movie, Internet – in the form of a myth (Lin 
Zexu’s), allegedly conveying historical truth, and thence becoming facilitators of 
specific cultural experiences that people are taught and encouraged to recognize as 
Chinese history, namely the(ir) past. The media representations of Lin Zexu, as a 
form of historical knowledge, are indeed expression of such mediatisation, a 
cultural process involving a variety of actors, a specific number of heterogeneous 
technologies, a common social ground (the national territory within which such 
actors operate) upon which such actors and technologies negotiate their products 
and services, as well as their internal constitutions, their logics, and their modes of 
interacting around the activity of the media, and within the in-the-making 
surrounding social world. The myth of Lin Zexu is therefore emblematic of a 
mediatisation process that I intend as the activity of the media meant as a process of 
production of the social, or as the social itself. 
The present work illustrates different media forms of the myth of Lin Zexu, which 
entail the use of different media technologies, serving and framing the 
communication of the myth itself, and consequently providing and sustaining 
distinct ways of experiencing popular forms of historical knowledge in China. 
These media forms of Lin Zexu have been singled out among a huge amount of 
media representations of China’s heroic figure, and have been selected according to 
their multifarious media forms and their social relevance in purporting the myth of 
Lin Zexu – though as it will be shown in the course of this investigation, the 
outcomes, repercussions and ramifications for all social actors involved, voluntarily 
or not, in such media processes (production, communication, and consumption) will 
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extend beyond the simple fact of communicating (mediating) such cultural 
phenomena. Thus, I analyse different media forms as movie, documentary, cartoon, 
videogame, born-digital images, music, Baike Baidu database information 
technology, and blog, to emphasize the peculiar impact that each of these media 
technologies and products have in representing the Chinese mythological figure of 
Lin Zexu within Chinese society. These media products have been mostly taken 
from the Chinese Internet, exceptions made for the movie The Opium War (鸦片战
争, yapian zhanzheng) – whose symbolic content has already been  analysed in this 
work; and the TV documentary program “Archive” (档案, dang an), subtitled “old 
times”, on the (allegedly) misterious death of Lin Zexu (林则徐死因之密, Lin Zexu 
siyin zhimi). Not at all surprising, these two last forms of media representation of 
Lin Zexu are easily accessed for visualization through the Chinese Internet, too. By 
means of these media representational modes I aim, firstly, at developing a 
theoretical framework able to account for the ways the myth of Lin Zexu is 
produced and made circulating as a media influenced commodity-sign (Jansson 
2002), on account of the various media illustrations of Lin Zexu; moreover, while 
the myth of Lin Zexu is being visualised and consumed as a media form of 
popularized historical knowledge, I will look at how the Chinese media system, or 
the media operating in China, are embedded in political and cultural power, and to 
what extent they are allowed to exert their influence and authority over social actors 
and practices; finally, the two analysis just mentioned, along with the analysis of 
the media forms of Lin Zexu, will allow me to have a precise and particularized 
viewpoint on distinct aspects of the everyday life phenomenon that the media 
representations of Lin Zexu, as an expression of the mediatisation of historical 
knowledge in China, nourish and carry on. 
Then, before we turn to the analysis of the media modalities through which Lin 
Zexu, as a national myth, has been represented and by means of which I maintain 
for an existing process of mediatisation of historical knowledge, it is necessary to 
clear the air about the terminology used so far, and in use in the course of this work, 
and understand their significance and versatility to the present Chinese context. 
This certainly is the most critical passage, requiring a process of translation suitable 
enough for the kind of argumentations that I wish to make intellegible in order to 
interpret specific (media) processes in contemporary China.  
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Expressions such as mediatisation and reflexively mediation; media logic;  
historical knowledge and, consequently, history, all need to be addressed 
considered also the magnitude of symbolic weight they are charged with.  
As a matter of fact, the exceptional variety of media operating in China, as well as 
in many other places in the world, is clearly under the eyes of anyone looking in 
this direction; on the contrary, what’s not so clear is the impact such media 
technologies and cultural forms have on Chinese people, on their social life, and on 
their specific way of being and interacting whithin a media-oriented society.  
Mediatisation, in the present context, is as much a theoretical, as an empirical 
attempt to make sense of the significance of the effects of media (re)production of 
the social – the production of a myth, of historical knowledge, and of the modalities 
of people’s interaction with the(ir) past. The heterogeneity of terms used by 
scholars doing media studies – mediatization, mediatisation, mediatisierung, media 
logic, mediation, 媒介化 (meijie hua)124 – indicate the growing awareness towards 
explicit aspects of media processes and practices, but it also indicates the 
uncertainties arising from the various analysis about the interplay between the 
media, people and institutions. 
In general terms, the myth of Lin Zexu expressed by the cultural forms analysed 
below is seen as the cultural materialization of the mediatisation of historical 
knowledge, that is the media production of a network of signs that determines the 
means through which the access to a constructed China’s history is  experienced; 
and expliciting such access through the staging of the myth of Lin Zexu. What is 
central in this conception of mediatisation, is the idea that the cultural forms and 
social practices that are conventionally labeled as the historical (Lin Zexu’s myth 
and the imagining of the past) originate entirely from, and are almost exclusively 
dependent on the media. Even more succinctly, I suggests that the media’s 
resources (the technologies they are made of) allow them to yield an everydaly 
life’s effect that gives shape and content to the social world, emerging as the main 
source of social experience - knowledge acquisition and social behaviour. Lin 
Zexu’s media representations, wouldn’t thus be seen only as mediated cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 The Chinese translation of the term mediatisation. Used in 童兵,马凌,蒋蕾,“媒介化社会与当代中国”, 复旦大学出
版社, 2011, as well as in the Chinese version of a paper of Stig Hjarvard published in China by the Journal of Shanxi 
University (Philosophy and Social Science), Vol. 38 n.5, Sept. 2015, Stig Hjarvard “媒介化：社会变迁中媒介的角色
” (Mediatization: The role of Media in Social Change), translated by Liu Jun, and Fan Yi-xin. 
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forms representing a genre of Chinese historical knowledge, but also as processes 
yielding modalities for the expression of cultural authority, with regard to the 
production of historical knowledge. This would perhaps mean that the canonical 
production, communication, and apprehension of what is to be considered 
“historical” in China – namely the work of academic historians, the activities of 
universities, of the state/government, and of all the traditional educational system 
operating in China  – come to be renegotiated by the media itself, consequently 
transforming people’s access and interaction with their past. Historical knowledge 
is then mediatised, in the sense that is something that pertains completely to the 
media, its conception, origination, emergence, communication, and consumption. 
The myth of Lin Zexu displayed in the movie, in the documentary, in the cartoon, 
in the children song and so on, is an entity, a symbolic dimension of social action as 
Geertz claims, but also itself an incitement, a stimulus or catalyst in furthering 
social behaviours and practices. As a media artifact though, its final 
(communicated) result, in terms of the significance that its form and content are 
able to convey, are negotiated within the institutional regulation (China’s media 
policy) to which all media in China are subjected to. Therefore, one should also 
look at mediatisation in China considering the distinct institutional regulation of the 
media system, the state/governmental principles prescribing what is admissible as 
symbolic content, as well as the individual practices allowed as, more or less, direct 
consequences of media consumption. Evidently, this clearly affect not only the 
specific settings constituting and empowering the media system in China, but above 
all the kind of interactions – intended here as the media logic(s) they are able to 
deploy – that the media establish with the surrounding social world; or yet, it affect 
the way Chinese media are qualified to produce, shape and govern the social fabric 
they are unquestionably part of. Hence, an analysis of the mediatisation of 
historical knowledge in China through the media forms of Lin Zexu, requires to 
take into account those peculiarities and properties pertinent to the Chinese 
conditions of production, communication and consumption of such media products.   
New media technologies (Internet, TV) have, indeed, rearranged and transformed 
people’s interaction with informations and meanings, “suggesting and creating new 
hierarchies, hegemonies and ways of imagining society” (de Groote 2009: 94). 
What Lin Zexu’s media images illustrate is not only the kind of historical 
knowledge that the media production of the myth of Lin Zexu is made conveying, 
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but the very way through which the relationship between Chinese people and the 
“historical” materialize; moreover, as said above, the authority of traditional 
institutions come to be renegotiated in light of the modalities of production, 
communication and consumption imposed by the media. Considered such 
implications inherent in the modes the media behave and make people and other 
actors behave, it is difficult to talk about processes of mediation when they mean, 
as often do, that the media are merely channels of communication between people 
and the actors owning or using the media. Even in party-controlled media countries, 
as it might be the case of China, political institutions have to adapt to, or adopt the 
operational workings of the media, to their format and rythms, to their grammar 
(Strömbäck, 2008), as well as to their pervasiveness in/as society, and influence 
they have on the audience, let alone the meanings involved. Thereby, Lin Zexu’s 
media representations do not just stand between the social entities participating to 
the communication process (i.e. the state/governement, the market, and the media 
users), they don’t just convey meanings and ideologies that affect, influence, and 
shape the way Chinese people understand and behave within Chinese society, but 
are somewhat representative of the erosion of independence and power of other 
mediating canonical institutions such as the family, the school, the government in 
addressing the historical; to a certain extent trasforming their identities, practices 
and internal functionings, by mediatising a distinct aspect of their cultural life, the 
conceivability and production of historical knowledge. The ‘medium becomes the 
message’; “print created individualism and nationalism in the sixteenth century. 
Program and content analysis offer no clues to the magic of these media or to their 
subliminal charge” (McLuhan 1964: 19). The claim that Chinese media might 
affect people and social institutions beyond the messages expressed is, for instance, 
demonstrated by the popularization of Chinese historical knowledge that the media 
representations of Lin Zexu in part institute; the “historical” culturally becomes 
“part of an important and complex set of representational practice” (de Groote, 
2009: 4), whose access to, and consumption of, becomes only a matter of a few 
digits (in the case for example of the Internet’s browsing practice on research gates 
as Baike Baidu 百科百度 or Sohu 搜狐). The dissemination and proliferation of 
Chinese historical knowledge into vast areas of social space under various media 
forms – movies, documentaries, games, cartoons, news and so on – and of which 
Lin Zexu’s representations are only an aspect of, help shape a Chinese public that 
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becomes historically conscious. Hence, such consciousness subsume two major 
aspects, that are the core issues of this investigation: on one side one has to 
consider the analysis of Lin Zexu’s media forms in terms of their texts, meanings, 
narratives, in order to attain an interpretation of the connotative dimensions of the 
forms represented. This kind of analysis may provide clear indications of the 
ideological weight these representations are charged with, as well as the symbolic 
form Chinese past takes on, with a significant impact for the understanding of the 
‘self’, the ‘other’ and the alleged reality people live in. On the other side, a large-
scale diffusion of historical knowledge whithin Chinese society has, as a primary 
effect, the fact that people come to be ‘informed and resourced’ (de Groote, 2009) 
historically by the media, “altering the way people interact with each other when 
dealing with” Chinese historical knowledge (Hjarvard, 2006: 3).   
The totality of the modalities the media make use of, in order to generate the social 
context (the network of signs mentioned above) within which specific social 
understandings and interactions occur between the people, institutions, and other 
actors, has often being conceptualised as the media logic (Altheide and Snow, 
1979; Strömbäck, 2008), which, even though is inclined, as a mode of expression, 
towards problematic generalizations that should possibly be avoided, it neverthelss 
is worth being explored for a while for it might turn out to be useful for the present 
study.  
Media logic can be defined as the inherent rules that govern the mechanics of 
representation, or of display. The format, genre, style of storytelling, and “the 
requirement to be successful in the battle for people’s attention” (Strömbäck, 2008: 
240), are generally considered part of the media logic. Seen in this way media logic 
might seem to present a sort of ‘standardized media grammar and content formats’ 
(Altheide and Snow, 1979), whereas the many heterogeneous media that populate 
say, Chinese society, bring into question whether the media logic is a principle too 
distant, from the empirical reality of the (multi)modalities that explain the ongoing 
technological changes, the commercialization and commodification of media 
cultural products, the degree of independence of specific social institutions from the 
media influence, or even the contrasting representations of Lin Zexu’s media forms, 
where the epic cinematographic format of the yapian zhanzheng (鸦片战争) movie 
– mostly based on the presence of, and acknowledged by, a visualizing subject – 
and based as much on the teleological expression of history as on the mythological 
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representation of Lin Zexu , is contrasted by a different form of popularized media 
product, the children’s song (儿童歌曲) Lin Zexu’s ban of Opium (Lin Zexu jin 
yapian), entirely appreciated through the hearing sense, and where expressions of 
genre, style, and format denote different intentions and purposes. Accordingly, 
media logic might rather be used to indicate the general range of settings put in 
place by the media to articulate and manifest their activities, the kind of 
institutional strategies that the specificity of the media may allow to 
employ/exploit. This also means that, when looking at the different media 
representations of Lin Zexu, the distinctiveness of the media utilized may help 
explain and elucidate on the degree of mediatisation of historical knowledge 
undergoing in China. Hence, following the argumentations evinced above, media 
logic is general when it refers to the influence that the overall indistinct media 
processes within a society, are believed to exerted among indefinite actors of 
society; it is instead specific when it refers to the determined impact it has on 
people, institutions or fields of production, based on the employment of distinctive 
procedures recognizable through the identification of institutional regulations, 
formats, and genres characterizing the media in question. As maintained by 
Hjarvard (2006: 3) “media are not a unitary phenomenon. Individual media are 
dependent on their technological features, aesthetic conventions and institutional 
frameworks”, and therefore the mediatisation of historical knowledge articulated by 
the media representations of Lin Zexu, and as purported for instance by the 
Internet, will display a media logic dissimilar to that expressed for example by the 
Televisual documentary on the misterious death of Lin Zexu, or yet by the 
Children’s song mentioned above. 
The media social functions within (Chinese) society, have brought about the 
necessity to articulate a conceptualisation of the media processes that would take 
into account, not just the text-meaning production embodied in the media 
representations – as it would be when analysing the symbolic prodcution and 
arrangement of Lin Zexu’s images visualized on the Internet, and producing more 
or less precise meanings and ideologies – it rather entails an understanding of the 
built-in media procedures (accessibility, interaction, spectatorialization125), and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Spectatorialization refers, in my own understanding, to a social activity that implies a person looking at –therefore a 
subject – a spectacle, which I consider as a built-in attribute of the media. 
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impacts such procedures generate. One should think for example to the 
mediatisation of historical knowledge in China in which, as will be extensively 
demonstrated, the popularization of historical events, pratices, and symbolic 
content effected by numerous media technologies and thorough media 
representations, has subsumed the authority of traditional ‘historical’ institutions, 
and has made the Chinese media not only the primary source of access to the 
historical, but perhaps the most effective one. Mediatisation, mediation, media 
logic, all these abstractions indicate the urgence of providing an explanation, and a 
significance, to such important social occurrences that constantly provide some 
kind of social configuration, characterizing the cultural life of entire societies. 
China, again, is not an exception.  
 
 
 
- (Mediatisation of) History, Historical Knowledge or the 
Historical 
 
The myth of Lin Zexu is a cultural process entailing works of production, 
communication, and consumption. Lin Zexu is embedded in the interactions of 
social actors yielding cultural expressions, and struggling to generate, uphold, and 
increase their control over precise qualities of cultural forms circulating within 
Chinese society. Chinese media institutions126, the CPC127/Government under the 
form of directives and regulations enforced and implemented by  the Central 
Propaganda Department (中共中央宣传部), and the SAPPRFT’s128 two branches, 
GAPP129  and SARFT130 , the market actors (among which media institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Chinese media institutions indicate both Chinese media technology industries (i.e. China Broadcast Corporation, 
Tencent Holding Limited, China Broadcasting Shandong Technology, China Mobile Multimedia Broadcast, China 
Mobile, Lenovo, ZTE), as well as Chinese media content providers (Sina Weibo, Baidu Baike, Douban, Renren, Youku 
& Tudou, Sohu, CCTV, Hunan TV among others). 
127 CPC, Communist Party of China. 
128 The State Administration of Press Publication, Radio, Film and Television. 
129 General Administration for Press and Publication. 
130 State Administration of Radio, Film and Television.	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represent a good share of them), and the legions of media users, such are in very 
general terms the social actors participating to the ongoing media cultural life of 
China. Lin Zexu’s media representations – a specific form through which a precise 
aspect of Chinese historical knowledge is articulated – are not just the visualized or 
hearing outcomes of broadcasting, displaying technologies; they are not only the 
products of Chinese media content providers (movies, images, songs); nor are 
merely the result of instrumental ideological encodements; as are not exclusively 
innocuous historical informations the media users come across in their everyday 
life. Lin Zexu’s media representations are the social substance and cultural texture, 
upon which all the above mentioned actors meet, negotiate, and give shape to the  
mediatisation of historical knowledge, in China. 
Nowadays, anyone looking into the content of the Chinese media system – mostly 
TV, Film, and the Internet – besides the bewilderment caused by the wealthy and 
varied cultural forms that  populate such media, wouldn’t find it difficult to 
encounter representations that might be said to depict ‘history’, exemplify 
‘historical knowledge’, or express the ‘historical’. Internet streaming media 
services such as Youku (优酷), Tudou (土豆), and LeTv (乐视网), but also 
database information search engines as Baidu (百度), Zhongsou (中搜), and Sohu (
搜狐), and yet microblogging site like Sina Weibo (新浪微博), all these cultural 
forms, representing only a tiny quantity compared to the huge repository available, 
are social media platforms that allow users to connect with a tremendous amount of 
digital data. Movies, videos, news, articles, digital images, photographies, 
documentaries, TV shows, video sharing, e-commerce information, videogames, 
reviews, music, academic essays, e-books, online ktv (karaoke), online travel, 
online museums and many other media products inhabit and denote what can be 
labeled as a ‘media space and culture’. “The media have become the most important 
source of our experience of society. They increasingly constitute society’s center 
stage, and thus structure feelings of community and belonging” (Hjarvard, 2006: 5). 
The media today 131  supply a huge quantity of cultural symbolic materials 
circulating within Chinese society, and thereby constitute an important facilitator 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The term today is used by the author of this work to refer, conventionally, to the period that goes from the 1990’s to 
present in China. In the 1990’s in fact we assist to the diffusion of the Internet which, since then, has allowed people to 
communicate, interact, and access information in a brand new way. Television has also increasingly become more and 
more diffused among people.  
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for disparate social experiences. Among such experiences in which one may be 
subject to or encounter with, Chinese media offer a profusion of media cultural 
products that many would define as history, or that are made be understood as such.  
“History provides an infinite supply of dramatic events, stories, characters and 
conflicts” (Agger, 2013: 300), and apart from this important aspect, history has long 
served needs of territorialisation and of attachment to specific places and/or people; 
it has served the need to construct individual and collective identities, definitions of 
the self and of the other, process of inclusion and exclusion, as well as of processes 
of development and progress. Certainly, the importance of mediating the past has 
not been discovered by contemporary Chinese media, rather they have taken on a 
social function – producing the historical – which has generated a transformation in 
the way people make use of the information regarding their (alleged) past, and has 
simultaneously allowed many other social discourses to enter the-by-now opaque 
field of history. Furthermore, Chinese orthodox institutions (the CPC, universities 
and so on), more or less legitimized producers of canonical history, have come to a 
point where the need to adapt to, or adopt the media logic(s) couldn’t be ingored 
without running the risk of losing contact with the social and cultural 
transformations that media technologies have brought about in coping with the 
production of historical knowledge. Should be pointed out, especially with 
reference to the Chinese situation, that the media “influencing social practices and 
institutions with reformed logics of their own, media and other social actants co-
develop and are mutually constitutive” (Cavanagh, 2013, 93), meaning that the 
degree of mediatisation of historical knowledge that Chinese society and culture are 
experiencing, and of which Lin Zexu’s media representations are an expression of, 
need to be subject to an analysis of the Chinese rules governing the media, as these 
have a direct impact on what I have previously identified as the media logic(s). I 
shall return on this issue later on, during the analysis of Lin Zexu’s media products. 
What the media forms of Lin Zexu convey, besides the meanings and ideologies 
that its symbolic arrangements may imply, is that the apprehension and practice of 
historical knowledge become increasingly dependent upon the media, whereby 
institutionalized historical knowledge and much popularized versions of it seem to 
be combined.  
Most of the media representations of Lin Zexu available within the media space, do 
not originate from the academy, they are instead “produced and edited by the media 
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themselves and delivered through genres like news, documentaries, drama, comedy, 
entertainment etc.” (Hjarvard, 2006: 3). In China though, like I maintained in the 
previous pages, this doens’t indicate a full or incontrolled and independent 
authority, dominance and application of the media and their logics. Lin Zexu’s 
media representations, the ‘Yapian Zhanzheng’ (鸦片战争) movie, the televisual 
documentary ‘Lin Zexu siyin zhimi’ (林则徐死因之密) on its mysterious death, the 
CCTV (中国中央电视台)  cartoon ‘Lin Zexu duilian lizhi’ (林则徐对联立志), but 
also other representations of the national myth, they all illustrate the negotiations 
between a media system – the fundamental structural configurations of media 
communications and connectivities, namely the sets of practices and standards, 
required for the actualization and implementation of specific modes of 
communication (Television, the Internet, mobile media) – and the Chinese 
state/government, that is the political rules, directives, and laws that Chinese media 
institutions have to abide by. As a result, on one side there is the pre-determined 
structures and configurations of the media, instituting and imposing their own 
technicality132 over any of Lin Zexu’s representations, bringing into being a series 
of concomitant by-products (commodification, commercialization, and 
popularization discussed below), associated in part to the massive extension and 
diffusion of the media, bridging spatial and temporal distances, and in part to the 
specific organization of Chinese society which allows, and privileges to a certain 
extent, principles of economic and cultural consumerism that the media 
simultaneously institutes and take advantage of. On the other side there is the CPC, 
which evidently does not own all the media in China133,  but instead makes use of 
its Propaganda Department (中国宣传部) which oversees and is in charge of 
censorship of all media content. “At the nationwide macroscale, the Central 
Propaganda Department oversees the Propaganda and Education System 
(xuanjiao xitong) that monitors, instructs and censors all of China’s newspapers 
and magazines, film, television and radio broadcasting, the Internet, the publishing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 In the present context, one should understand technicality merely as the use of all media technologies, Tv screens, 
laptos, mobile phones, tablets, smart whatches, wireless earphones and many other and the sort of visual 
acknowledgement of culture they impose on individuals. 
133 The CPC owns the newspaper People’s Daily (人民日报), the news agency Xinhua (新华网), and the broadcaster 
CCTV (中国中央电视台). They are the country’s top three state-run media outlets.	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industry and all aspects of cultural and information production from the highest to 
the lowest levels of society” (Jun Luo, 2015: 54). Thereby, when an image of Lin 
Zexu is displayed on the Internet, on TV, or on a movie, or is broadcasted on the 
Internet via streaming in the audiovisual form of the children’s song ‘Lin Zexu Bans 
Opium’ (儿歌 林则徐禁鸦片), the range of meaning and ideology these media 
representations may convey, are accurately determined in respect of the ideological 
principles that are culturally dominant in a precise moment, and accordingly, they 
are given media forms. Mediatisation, in this case, occures when Chinese media 
and other (political) institutions have the simultaneous and reciprocal power of 
setting (changing and adapting) part of the rules that govern themselves. Chinese 
media conciliate the need of appealing media users by balancing, for instance, 
amusing and entertaining experiences along with a precise ‘sense of history’ that 
each representation of Lin Zexu must convey. By contrast, the Chinese Party and 
the government cope with the necessity of imparting the ‘right and proper’ history 
of China to its citizens while alluring the image of the national hero through much 
more enjoyable (media) forms, and yet benefiting of the wide-ranging 
dissemination of such cultural forms that the media permit, covering all national 
territory. Undoubtedly, a hierarchy is established between Chinese media 
insitutions and the other social actors, and certainly such hierarchy expresses the 
degree of mediatisation of historical knowledge materializing in China, but in no 
case this hierarchy invalidate the fact that a shared mutual influence occures.  
By embedding contemporary Chinese media in the production of media 
representations of Lin Zexu, we assist to a disembedding134 of historical knowledge 
from its traditional contexts, from the cultural agencies of Chinese High Modernity 
(traditional Chinese state-Party media such as newspapers, periodicals, journals, 
books, radio, state-television, and movies; but also the Academy, and the education 
system). “History is not so much connected to our educational systems as to our 
media culture where it is treasured by large audiences” (Agger, 2013: 302). 
Indeed, today’s (Chinese) media can hardly be labeled simply as mass media, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization defines the term “Disembedding” as follows: “Disembedding 
refers to the way in which contemporary social practices can no longer be primarily defined by their grounding, or 
embeddedness, in the local context of a restricted place and time. Social practices are now, in large part, removed from 
the immediacies of context, with the relations they involve typically being stretched over large tracts of time and space”. 
Published Online on 29 February, 2012 by Rob Stones. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog154/abstract 
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web sites, video hosting sites, online games, blogging platforms, social media, 
search engines, and many other Internet and mobile media are much more personal 
and participatory in regard to media users. These media are extensive sources of 
knowledge and meaning, of cultural exchange and interaction; they are also sources 
of economic interests as well as of political concern; but mostly they have a 
profound impact on how the myth of history is perceived and consequently on how 
Lin Zexu, exemplifying mediatised historical knowledge, circulates and it is 
culturally consumed. 
Gunhild Agger135, in her work about the role of history writing in popular culture, 
maintains that a chronicle – a factual account on historical events – is transformed 
into a story when there is a characterization of the events in terms of “inaugural 
motifs”, “transitional motifs”, and “terminating motifs” (Agger, 2013: 304). To 
look at some of the media representations of Lin Zexu, considering Agger’s three 
motifs, may elucidate what I believe can be deemed one modality of translating the 
chronicle of Lin Zexu into a popular media product of historical significance. 
Moreover, the use of the term chronicle is, in my opinion, somewhat adequate for 
the interpretation of Lin Zexu’s story, since such term implies (and, perhaps, 
ideologically imposes) a time-line chronological order and progression in the 
unfolding of the historical events, confering upon the figure of Lin Zexu two 
crucial values: first, that of being  historically unequivocable, unquestionable, and 
beyond doubts, necessitating no interpretative approach, for ‘chronicle’ merely 
designates the act of recording actions, rather than interpreting them; second, the 
chronological order of occurrence of the facts that a chronicle is distinguished for, 
assigns to Lin Zexu, and to history in general, a teleological quality, which aside 
from being of critical importance for scaffolding the entire ideological framework 
that sustains the nation-state, is essential for preserving both Lin Zexu’s 
mythological status, and its renewed versions that unequivocally serve the present. 
The media representations of Lin Zexu thought to be emblematic of a process of 
mediatisation of historical knowledge in China are, the 1997 Xie Jin’s epic movie 
“The Opium War” (鸦片战争); the 2013 televisual documentary “Archives” (档案
)136, on the alleged mysterious death of Lin Zexu “Lin Zexu siyin zhimi” (林则徐死	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Gunhild Agger, “The Role of History in Bestseller and Blockbuster Culture”, Academic Quarter, Vol. 7, Fall 2013. 
136 Broadcasted by the “Shanghai Documentary Channel” (上海纪实频道 ). 
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因之密); the 2004 CCTV cartoon “Lin Zexu duilian lizhi” (林则徐对联立志); the 
audiovisual Children’s song “Lin Zexu jin yapian” (林则徐禁鸦片); the computer 
videogame FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁鸦); the Baidu Baike database 
information result to the entry “Lin Zexu”; Lin Zexu’s representations on touristic 
travel guide web sites; and Lin Zexu’s images on the blog Sina Weibo (新浪微博). 
In all these representations is possible to distinguish at least one of the three motifs 
aforementioned, the inaugural, the transitional, and the terminating, and often all 
the three together. If we follow Roland Barthes’ reasoning in the way he considers 
that a “myth is a type of speech”, namely the system of communication that carries 
the message, we see how the myth of Lin Zexu in its media forms is given the 
narratological structure described by Agger as the motifs. There is no representation 
among those analysed in this study, which doesn’t put into the foreground the 
inaugural ‘historical event’ of the ban and burn of opium executed by Lin Zexu. In 
the movie ‘Yapian Zhanzheng’ for example, the opening and introductory scenes 
serve the need of justifying and underpin (at a denoted level) Lin Zexu’s 
recognition that opium is a vicious habit and product, and a detriment to the 
Chinese people and the Chinese nation, thus leading to the moral obligation of 
banning (and then burning) the opium for the sake of China’s own existence and 
future 137 . In the televisual documentary “Archives” (档案 ), on the alleged 
mysterious death of Lin Zexu, the presenter introduces the program to the audience 
in this way: “I believe there is no person who does not know him”, setting already 
the stage for the unconditioned reception of the myth, “he who was in Humen’s 
burn of opium and in the Opium War”, the myth is unveiled, “the national hero 
who shake the entire world, Lin Zexu”138. The Children’s song “Lin Zexu Bans 
Opium” states the inaugural formula in the title and in the first verse “Lin Zexu bans 
opium”, as well as in the second verse of the song “burning opium on the sea 
side”139. The same goes for the online videogame where the game cover depicts Lin 
Zexu with the caption “Lin Zexu Bans Opium”, while the game starts with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 The connotative meanings and the ideology (mythology) conveyed by Xie Jin’s movie are semiotically analysed 
both in the chapter on “The Opium War”, and below in this own chapter. 
138 相信没有人会不认识他，他就是在虎门销烟和鸦片战争中，让世界都震撼的民族英雄，林则徐。 
139 林则徐 禁鸦片, 焚烟土 在海边。	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fighting servant summoned to Lin Zexu’s residence, informing him of the trade 
carried out by the English opium smugglers, thus Lin Zexu authorizes the fighter to 
find the opium and to size it. In the CCTV cartoon “Lin Zexu duilian lizhi” (林则徐
对联立志), before the story of a young Lin Zexu begins, a voice-over accompained 
by rapid images introduces to the young Chinese public the personality of Lin Zexu 
by remembering, and shortly showing (the entire scene lasting less than a minute), 
his famous and audacious action of sizing and burning the opium in Humen. In the 
Baidu Baike free encyclopedia repository and supplier, out of 325 lines of written 
information on Lin Zexu, we find mention of the ban of opium as early as in the 
fourth line140.   
If these are all examples of what I regard as the inaugural motifs of the (hy)story of 
Lin Zexu and of its myth, the transitional motifs can be undoubtedly identified 
within the context of the Opium War itself, namely the strategies and tactics put in 
place by Lin Zexu and the Qing soldiers in preparing, arranging, and managing the 
conflict against the British military army. We indeed find the characterization of 
these events in Xie Jin’s “The Opium War”, with detailed descriptions of the 
concerns and preoccupations that harass Lin Zexu and the Qing rulers for 
undertaking a difficult war; in the third verse of the Children’s song, the mid-motif 
is mentioned as “fire the cannons and hit the ocean/foreign ships”141; in the video 
game, the final fight is against the english military vessels; in the CCTV cartoon’s 
introduction to the figure of Lin Zexu, the voice-over and the images displayed 
show the depictions of the war, with ships and cannons fighting strenously; and 
eventually, even the televisual documentary “Archive” on the misterious death of 
Lin Zexu shows, after having mentioned the ban and sizing of opium, images of the 
Chinese people surrendered to the english and signing the “Treaty of Nanjing” (南
京条约).  
Ultimately, Agger’s terminating motifs in Lin Zexu’s (hy)story may be identified in 
the final moral victory that he, the national hero, has accomplished by blindly 
(some argue, even too naively, see Xie Jin’s movie analysis in another chapter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1401839年，林则徐于广东禁烟时，派人明察暗访，强迫外国鸦片商人交出鸦片，并将没收鸦片于1839年6月3日
在虎门销毁。虎门销烟使中英关系陷入极度紧张状态，成为第一次鸦片战争，英国入侵中国的借口。 
141	  开大炮 打洋船。	  
	   183	  
this work) following those principle of loyalty, uprightness, and justice towards the 
nation, the people, the authority, and towards himself. This terminating narrative – 
which in the myth proper holds and surrounds the figure of Lin Zexu entirely – is 
clearly traceable in every representation of Lin Zexu, from the movie to the 
documentary, from the CCTV cartoon to the children’s song, as well as from the 
videogame to the Baike Baidu free encyclopedia; and although is often highlighted 
in the conclusive acts of Lin Zexu’s narratives, it nevertheless encompasses and 
embraces the whole story of the Chinese modern hero. Indeed, Lin Zexu as a myth 
is not an indefinite, obscure, blurry entity, for the media that constitute it define 
such myth historically as an explicit discoursive practice.  
The importance of having defined the narratological structure of Lin Zexu’s media 
representations, lies in the need of defining the actual ways by means of which, as a 
type of speech142, the myth of Lin Zexu is given historical character and relevance 
through different media, although these same media might make use of dissimilar 
genres (epic, biographical, war movie), formats (movie, cartoon, documentary, 
music, digital written information), and platforms (TV, the Internet) to express the 
same ideological meaning (at least the one regarding Lin Zexu, and not necessarily 
the discourses associated to him). In this way Lin Zexu as historical knwoldege, is 
“ubiquitously presented in all genres and on all platform” (Agger, 2013: 300), 
coming to be a mainstream cultural media product, and sharing some of its 
distinctive historical codes (the three motifs aforementioned) with other social 
institutions – the school, the party’s ideology and propaganda bureaus, the 
governement, the academia – but nonetheless, setting off the processes for 
imagining the past, understanding and dealing with the present, and dreaming the 
future, in a  mediatic way.  
There is not, therefore, a ‘history’ as a merely formal academic field of production, 
there is rather a field of history production, for which the media analysed in this 
study (TV and Internet) make up an important portion of the various 
representations circulating within Chinese society. Lin Zexu illustrates how the 
production of historical knowledge by means of the media above mentioned, 
represent the dominant existing forms of historical awareness, and of all the aspects 
linked to it (national attachement, collective identities, legitimacy of nation-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See Roland Barthes, Mythologies, 1957. 
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building processes). In China, Lin Zexu’s forms of media historical knowledge are 
just a tiny part vis-à-vis the huge number of historical media products that are 
included in mainstream media content, or to contemporary popular culture; still, the 
popularization and fictionalisation of the figure of Lin Zexu imparted by/as the 
media, is actively involved in the national process of mediatisation of historical 
knowledge in China, drastically imposing people’s engagement with the past, as 
well as the significance of the ‘past’ itself. History emerges out of this process not 
as a delegitimised practice or as an obsolete knowledge-related institution, but as an 
heterogeneous and multiplying social process in which the media play, definitely, a 
central role. “The breadth of access to history – either embodied re-enactment, 
interactive exhibit or actual archival materials (however digitised or virtual) – and 
the bleeding of genres into each other suggest that, as Raphael Samuel argued, 
history is a socially and culturally constructed and consumed entity, able at once to 
hold within itself difference and sameness, to represent otherness and familiarity, 
and to remind the individual of their distance from the past while enabling them 
through that difference to understand themselves somehow in a way more complex 
than hitherto” (de Groot, 2009: 4-5). In China, the media productions of Lin Zexu 
do not question the traditional historical assumptions or the present paradigmatic 
discourses around Lin Zexu and Chinese history. There seem to be no 
interrogations about Lin Zexu and the Chinese past it refers to, not at least those 
kind of interrogations that might challenge, somehow, the official beliefs. 
Nevertheless, if we look at the characteristics of the media representations 
disclosed in this study, we can appreciate how many new forms and new aesthetic 
dimensions get involved in the media popularization of Lin Zexu – new forms and 
aesthetics that are peculiar aspects of the mediatisation of historical knowledge – 
allowing other social discourses to be addressed through such popularization of the 
myth; or, in the other way around, enabling Lin Zexu as the ‘historical’, to 
penetrate (or create) other realms of Chinese cultural life.  
Having to look at all the representations of Lin Zexu that circulate in the Chinese 
media may provoke a sense of bewilderment, arousing from the dissimilar genres, 
formats, and fucntions to which Lin Zexu is exposed; shifting from the 1997 
blockbuster movie “The Opium War”, celebrating the handing over of Hong Kong 
to mainland China, and thus becoming the hallmarking of an era; to the Internet 
format, in which Lin Zexu takes on the form of an audiovisual children’s song “Lin 
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Zexu jin yapian”, found in the website “mama bang” (妈妈帮)143, literally ‘mama 
helps’, where (allegedly female) users are asked the following question: “Do little 
children know the opium war?”; or to the somewhat investigative television 
documentary “The mysterious death of Lin Zexu”, fictionalising the alleged last 
days of the national hero in the guise of a popular crime investigation genre, or 
detective story genre, so fashionable these days among popular media products. 
The interactions of Lin Zexu with contrasting social discourses – the political re-
unification of Hong Kong to China, the (pedagogical) amusement of children, the 
entertaining function of a TV program in scheduled sets of activity within (a 
mediatised) everyday life – which indeed reflect the interactions historical 
knowledge has with other aspects of Chinese cultural life (economy, politics, art); 
these interactions indicate the intricate and complex network within which popular 
culture takes action and carries on its claims and contentions.  
Understanding the relevance of the mediatisation of historical knwoledge embodied 
in the present context by Lin Zexu’s media representations among others, means 
not only acknowledging that the ways the past functions and is expressed within 
society is relevant “to ensure or express social cohesion and identity and to 
structure social relations” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 267), but also 
recognizing that the ways audiences engage with, and create their sense of history 
suggest sophisticated, if not refined, approaches to historical discourses and to the 
multiplicity of social experiences that the media convey. According to the 
representations disclosed in the present context, Lin Zexu’s narrative may be 
experienced as a movie, as an evening TV program, as a children’s song, as a 
cartoon, as an online encyclopedic information, as a videogame, as a touristic 
attraction, and as a discussion or digital image on a blog. What they all have in 
common is, on one side, the fact that the traditional discourse on Lin Zexu has 
become much more intricated, because more complex is its interaction with people 
(as a result of the media technology involved); on the other side, such media 
representations express the peculiar valuing of historical knwoledge as a 
commodified practice, a commercial product which, as for all media products, is 
organized around “the consumption of images” (Best and Kellner, 1997: 4), 
meanings and experiences. When the symbolic system of values associated to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 http://www.mmbang.com/bang/446/112850. 
	   186	  
myth of Lin Zexu (the national hero, the loyalty, the uprightness, and so on), is 
attached, by means of the media, to other social activities or services, or to other 
values, such as going to a movie, to a museum, or to a trip, or is associated perhaps 
to the entertainment of children through cartoons or songs, or to the general public 
through a documentary after a difficult or boring working day, or is yet associated 
to the debating of, more or less serious, issues on Internet’s blogs; when this 
happens, it means that the media culture Lin Zexu is expression of, is also a 
consumer culture; and thus media culture is understood as the realm where 
consumption controls the web of significance that is produced and uttered to such 
an extent that the distinction between the two (media culture and consumer culture) 
becomes almost irrelevant (Eskjaer, 2013).  
If I consider for example the representation of Lin Zexu displayed in the Internet 
web site eLong Tourist Guide (yilong lǚyóu zhinan)144, I have a clear example of 
the above mentioned reasoning about the interrelation of media culture with 
consumer culture. Lin Zexu’s media representation in the web site is articulated in 
such a way as to re-present Lin Zexu as an historical touristic attraction worth a 
visit, and definitely a stay, in the city of Fuzhou (Fujian Province). Firstly, the page 
on Lin Zexu is included, in the web site’s touristic section, among the “Historical 
Units Protected at National Level”145, naturalizing in this way the fact that history 
is something so much essential to the country, as to justify its protection with the 
intervention of the state, and simultaneaously naturalizing the fact that history is 
experienced, and consumed as a product, a commodity. Indeed, alongside the text 
telling the story of the venue representative of Lin Zexu – originally an ancestral 
temple built during the reign of Qing Emperor Guanxu, in 1905 (an information 
which adds historicity to the place) – and next to the mythical official narrative 
reporting the ‘historical’ deeds of the national hero Lin Zexu, we find for instance a 
digital city map indicating the exact location of the touristic place, ironically 
suggesting that the experience (and consumption) of history may produce the need 
of spatial orientation among people146. Right under the text about the ancestral 
temple and Lin Zexu’s tale, which is no longer than 5 lines,  there are a series of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 艺龙旅游指南 website address: http://trip.elong.com/fuzhoulinzexujinianguan/. 
145 国家级文物保护单位。 
146 Actually, it demonstrates the normative quality of the representation in spatial terms.	  
	   187	  
promoted hotels offering discounted prices for overnight stays. Pictures of double 
and familiar rooms, along with prices and additional offered services, populate the 
rest of the online page, thus implying how the autonomy of commercial strategies is 
negotiated in relation to both the use of media technologies, namely web sites pages 
on the Internet, and the mediatisation of historical knowledge through the media 
representation of Lin Zexu. Lin Zexu as history is therefore touristically 
commodified, allowing  “eLong Tourist Guide” to make direct use of the medium 
of the Internet, and supposedly of a digital screen connected to it, in order to 
popularize the historical figure of Lin Zexu in service of its commercial strategy for 
selling holiday stays, at specific hotels. “Past is fast attaining the attributes of a 
commodity… Consumption practices influence what is packaged as history and 
work to define how the past manifest [or is made manifest] itself in society” (de 
Groot, 2009: 2). In the case of the touristic website above descripted, we see how 
the historical knowledge epitomized by Lin Zexu’s media production, become a 
cultural background, a popular imagination supporting the articulation of economic 
practices, and promoting specific discourses of leisure that are associated, in this 
case, to fixed and definite ‘historical’ values. Lin Zexu’s indirect (non-
institutionalised) pedagogy, comes to be higly commercialised and linked to 
advertising and consumptive logics. 
Reflecting on the above example just examined one may ask, how does the process 
of mediatisation of historical knowledge occure? If we consider the ideological 
importance that ‘history’ has traditionally had in China – in the Maoist period 
‘history ideology’, as Zhou Jiachen147 calls it, strictly served the political ideology 
of the party, being therefore kept within the bounds (official academia, party 
intellectuals, professional historians) established by-then rulers – it appears 
reasonable to think that before the advent of the media, or at least before the 
contemporary Chinese liberalization of the media (commercialised Television, and 
the Internet), history was somewhat a distinctive field of production, highly 
regulated both in ideological terms and institutionally, so that those who (the CPC 
and the government through “multiple layers of administrational bureaus from the 
provincial, municipal or prefectural levels to the county level”148) controlled then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Zhou Jiachen, “Discuss the philosophy ideology of Mao Ze Dong's poem”, Journal of Suihua University 2006-04. 
148 Jun Luo, “Media System in China: A Chinese Perspective”, Academy for International Communication of Chinese 
Culture 2015, p. 52.	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traditional mass-media (newspapers, periodical journals, books, radio, television, 
but also movies), at the same time controlled the institutions or individuals that 
were in charge of producing official historical knowledge. Today, the media in the 
hands of private media institutions, of private individuals, of market actors, of 
cultural agencies, of political actants and others, allow a myriad of discourses to 
intersect and intertwine in a way that is fast changing even the basic rules for 
controlling and managing the infinite flow of data and information communicated 
whithin Chinese society. Nowadays, the tension between the state/government and 
the media system, is the result of such heterogeneousness of media authority on one 
hand, and the grip that political institutions as the CPC and the government, 
through their political power and agencies have, in imposing certain restrictions on 
the production and dissemination of specific ideologies. The media have moved 
‘historical knowledge’ from one field of production (the academy for example), to 
the entire social arena, where media products and forms account for a great part of 
all the cultural symbols circulating in society; moreover, people are free and 
encouraged to appropriate the media as instruments of socialization, interaction, 
and participation, as well as are free to appropriate – with respect to the ideological 
component of the representation – explicit ‘historical discourses’ to shape, 
legitimize, address, translate, defend, advertise, other cultural activities and values, 
as “eLong Tourist Guide” has broadly demonstrated. Thence, the media and their 
logics have come to conduct an activity (the production and dissemination of 
historical knowledge), previously conducted in other social arenas; although, what 
they mostly did has been transforming that activity to such an extent that speaking 
of history before the media, and history after the media sounds quite inadequate. 
Lin Zexu’s media representation, or Chinese mediatised historical knowledge “have 
multiple meanings, all of which might be simultaneously in operation within [read: 
as] culture” (de Groot, 2009: 13). As a matter of fact, the Internet users consuming 
the kind of historical knowledge offered by “eLong Tourist Guide”, while 
purchasing the touristic services addressed by that same historical narrative, are 
actually also consuming self-understanding and self-presentation, “producing 
themselves as the source of value” (Sassatelli, 2007: 149). Indeed, in the Chinese 
society where tourism as a leisure activity is increasingly being regarded as an 
important and constitutent value in the overall organization of society, and where 
(touristic) experiences of the other serve mainly to define the individual self as a 
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standardized value recognized by the collectivity, we see how the newly media 
association of historical knowledge to individual commercial strategies, generate 
cultural practices and social formations that can hardly be related to traditional 
conceptualisations of history. Thereby, I identify history as popular culture within a 
mediatised everyday life.  
Another interesting example of the mediatisation of historical knowledge may be 
captured in the CCTV cartoon “Lin Zexu duilian lizhi” (林则徐对联立志). The 
cartoon has been produced in 2004 by “China Central Television Animation 
Department Youth Centre” (中国中央电视台青少中心动画部), and is the 33th 
production of a large-scale animation series, which gathered together a total 
number of 52 Chinese historical figures149 in as many short cartoons, with the 
official aim of inspiring Chinese future generations. Here lie again a major 
characteristic of the Chinese process that I call mediatisation of historical 
knowledge. On one side there is the ideological hold of the party/government that, 
this time directly, oversees the symbolic content that has been conveyed throught 
the figure of Lin Zexu. CCTV, in fact, is the main state television broadcaster in 
China, and a minister of the State Council (国务院) of the People’s Republic of 
China is the chairman of CCTV. No doubts then, on where the interests lie. 
Although, the cartoonish format and narrative of the “Lin Zexu duilian lizhi” (林则
徐对联立志) media product tells us more than just the fact of being a state-lead 
propaganda production. At stake here, there is not only the ideological aim of the 
animation, namely being “informative, interesting, educational; an effort to 
transmit an eccellent story, a rich and funny cartoon, providing children with 
happiness, being entertaining while letting the kids watch the course of the story, 
making them understand that only through an assiduous study and incessant effort 
one can attain to reason.”150 What really draws the attention, in the pursuit of an 
analysis able to account for a mediatisation process, is the clear and simple fact that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Here are some of the historical figures (historians, painters, writers, calligraphers) used to produce the CCTV 
animation series:	  万斯同，少年包，陆羽弃，陈平，唐伯虎. 
150	  The text reported has been translated from the Chinese by the author of this work, and is only a part of a longer 
account on the entire animation series published on Baike.Baidu.com. What follows is the original Chinese text: 这部动
画片集知识性、趣味性、教育性于一体，力图通过精彩的故事，丰富的卡通趣味，给孩子们带来快乐，同时又
寓教于乐，让孩子们在观赏的过程中，懂得只有通过勤奋好学，不断努力，才能成才的道理. 	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the myth of Lin Zexu, the ‘historical’, has been produced and communicated by 
Television in a specific media format (cartoon/animation), and in a precise genre 
(historical/educational). The effects of such media representation of Lin Zexu on 
the perception of history, are arguably significant. Evidently, children’s 
accessibility to historical knowledge increases substantially. After all, it’s not by 
chance that expressions like media pedagogy, media didactics, and media education 
have already been objects of analytical research on the educative impact of certain 
media representations (Norm Friesen, Theo Hug, 2009).  Choosing the animation 
format to represent Lin Zexu, enables the producers to place the historical figure of 
Lin Zexu within the realm of fantasy, and of the imagination, thus allowing peculiar 
modalities of reasoning and of conceptualising, pertaining to the childhood stage. 
The use of a cartoonish Lin Zexu, promoting specific ways of imagining both 
Chinese past, and Chinese society is not an isolated attempt. Examples of ways of 
mediatising historical knowledge through cartoons abound in China. Of singular 
interest is the one regarding the 3D-cartoon “Princess Fragrant” (天香公主)151, an 
adaptation of the wuxia (武侠) novel “The Book and the Sword” by Jin Yong (Zha 
Liangyong). The cartoon tells the story of a Uyghur princess who married the 
Qianlong Emperor in 18th century China. The cartoon has been produced by the 
Shenzhen Qianheng Cultural Communication Company, and the production of the 
cartoon series is part of the “Xinjiang authorities' endeavor to develop the 
animation industry, with the aim of maintaining social stability by boosting cultural 
exchanges and understanding between Han and Uyghur people and culture”152 as 
said by Sheng Jun, a deputy director of cultural industry office at the Xinjiang 
Bureau of Culture. Historical knowledge as expressed through such media 
products, come to be a cross-reference point for engaging with a multitude of social 
actors and issues (Uyghur and Han, Chinese modernity, social stability, market, 
entertainment, moral values), by means of a consumption practice that is sustained 
by a visual culture inherent in the media logics. Children, through the cartoon of 
Lin Zexu, or the “Fragrant Princess”, get access to the past by (learning how to) 
deploying sets of necessary skills that accord hegemony to the visual sense among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Tianxiang gongzhu. 
152 Interview of the China News Service (http://www.ecns.cn/2014/08-25/131213_2.shtml).	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the others, as the only one capable to get full understanding, or emotional 
involvement, of the knowledge imparted. 
In the case of the CCTV cartoon “Lin Zexu duilian lizhi” (林则徐对联立志), the 
mediatisation of historical knowledge is promoted directly by the 
State/government, since the relationship between media, history and audience is 
directly produced and shaped by a state-led broadcaster institution (CCTV), having 
an impact on the packaging of history as a popular product, and on the re-
presentation of the past as a fictionalisation of the official ideology. In addition to 
this, children are acquainted with a media culture whose main feature is that of 
(naturally) implying the use of media technologies as the primary sources for 
accessing knowledge, that is culture and society. In particular, how mediatisation of 
historical knowledge functions, and how Chinese  people consume history, is a 
feature that needs to be addressed every time, through the examination of the 
specific media forms in question.  
Movies, for instance, are incredibly efficient and powerful media forms, 
encouraging precise representations of history, and thence specific understanding of 
the past. In China, movies have long-established a preferential modality to access 
the past, popularizing figures and fictionalising stories that needed, and still need 
the contributions of novelists, play-writers, producers, curators, film-makers, 
instituting actual apparatuses often made of non-professional historians that 
populate the cultural industry associated to film production, and whose work 
alienate the paradigmatic concept of history from traditional social domains 
(although the paradigm survives the alienation  in most cases), by placing it within 
the contested realms of the cultural industries that yield (media) everyday life. The 
sort of commodity quality, which history is provided with, and the mediatisation of 
historical knowledge brought about by movies, can be exemplarily illustrated by 
the 1997’s winning prize movie 153 , “The Opium War” (鸦片战争 , Yapian 
zhanzheng), by Chinese film-maker Xie Jin.  
In chapter one, I have already put forward the ideological significance of the 
movie’s narrative through a text-meaning analysis, including a detailed semiotic 
investigation of the system of symbols deployed in the movie in order to display the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 The Movie has been the winner of the 1997 Golden Rooster and, in 1998, of the Hundred Flowers Awards for Best 
Picture. 
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conveyed specific sets of ideas, values and principles. What, the chosen format and 
genre of the movie may tell us about the kind of history imparted? A history 
produced in relation to the commercial nature of the movie, and its obvious 
relations with the political celebrations of the handing over of Hong Kong to China, 
ending more than 150 years of British colonial rule. What kind of mediatisation of 
historical knowldege does Lin Zexu’s representation in “The Opium War” 
expresses? 
 Xie Jin’s movie was released to coincide with the Hong Kong handover ceremony 
in July 1997, an event which, thanks also to the movie, has made symbolize the 
restitution of China’s dignity in front of a global audience (the myth of Lin Zexu 
conveying moral righteousness), and the strengthen of China’s authority over its 
territory. The movie has been screened simultaneously in Beijing and Hong Kong 
on July 1, 1997 and as said above, set to coincide with the restitution ceremony of 
Hong Kong. What peculiarly characterizes “The Opium War”, is the 
unconventional format that has been assigned to it. If it undoubtly expresses all the 
qualities applying to a cinematic motion picture, its format had somehow been 
staged as a celebratory event, which – differently from other form of media popular 
culture produced for precise consumer segments – deserved a total media coverage 
inasmuch as it was part of an international event of historical proportions. “The 
Opium War” has been part of an accurate selection, organization and presentation 
of an (informational) event, that made it the only social stage where all the 
important social activities worth ‘looking at’, are occurring. In this sense, the media 
logic put forward in the media presentation of the movie, goes even beyond its 
cinematic format, staging it as a sort of live social phenomena, celebrating history. 
This kind of cultural production and staging of “The Opium War”, is likely to allow 
the media to express their most powerful authority by being simultaneously the 
only (visual) stage by means of, and upon which the myth of Lin Zexu as a form of 
historical knowledge is produced and cognitively understood, as well as to convey 
at an extraordinary extent, a strong ideological impact over the audience.  
The myth of Lin Zexu identified in this work, and its being expression of the media 
production of historical knowldege (mediatisation), emphasize in particular the sort 
of alliance that the CPC and the Chinese government – through the legislative 
power that they can exert upon the media – have been engendering with the media 
institutions (see the state’s indirect support to the production of Xie Jin’s movie in 
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chapter one) by virtue of political strategies and logics, as some may call it 
(Strömbäck 2008, Mazzoleni 1987, Livingstone 2009), manifest in a nation-
building process in which, Lin Zexu’s media representations, media rituals 
(Couldry, 2003) and celebratory media events are integral elements. All Lin Zexu’s 
media forms are the materialization of a kind of mediatisation of history that indeed 
has enabled the Chinese rulers and institutions to benefit from it; indeed “The 
Opium War” is an example of the effectiveness with which the Chinese state has 
gained influence upon the proliferation of media technologies and content in the 
last twenty years, tanslating more effectively and disseminating more widely its 
ideological attempts of creating a sense of nation and in order to legitimise its 
rulers. Exploiting media logic has therefore been a clear political strategy effected 
by the Chinese Party/State through the backing of the epic movie “The Opium 
War”154.  
History as a media popular product is mobilized for a multipurpose cultural 
activity, whose very practicability is assigned by the media’s 
appropriation/production of a discourse of history. The complexities with which the 
historical figure of Lin Zexu is endowed with, are part of the power of media 
logics. The simple fact of being identified with a historical, political and diplomatic 
event like the handing over of Hong Kong to China after more than 150 years of 
British rule, suggest that the movie should be taken as a serious and almost solemn 
matter. Moreover, the movie functioned as a backstory that narrativized the whole 
ceremony, providing visual authenticity to the (media) stage by setting the 
historical context in which the (media) event of the ceremony rested. Chinese 
history as expressed by “The Opium War” became the dominant imagining of a 
contested past that finally obtained the world’s recognition. The cinematic 
construction of the historical figure of Lin Zexu in Xie Jin’s movie has idealised 
Chinese past, re-producing its mythological status and showing the people the 
genuine values and ideals that distinguished its long-standing past. What’s more, 
the moral regulation that the media representations of the myth of Lin Zexu is able 
to impart, is indicative of the cultural arrangement of the media entity called history 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 “The Opium War” initial budget was backed by the China National Culture Promotion Society, The Sichuan 
Chengdu United Bank, and Xie’s own Xie Jin-Hengtong Film and Television Company, which at the end of the 
production amunted to almost 15 million dollars, making it the most expensive production in Chinese movie history, 
until then. 
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that the media themself create. History has also been fetishised through the use of 
precise artifacts, constumes, and settings that re-create an environment supposedly 
able to represent history and suggest, accordingly, emotional responses. Thereby, 
the myth of Lin Zexu has been turned into a popular form whose ornaments, 
clothing, cosmetics and manners, are a matter of national identity, of political 
legitimacy, of technological development, and last but not least of (mediatised) 
social reproduction. 
The media representations of the myth of Lin Zexu reveal how much (Chinese) 
history, as a social discourse concerned with a peculiar sense of an alleged national 
past, exists only in the present. Political authority, national integrity and identity, 
traditions, culture, and self-understanding, are only few of the forms that the 
‘historical’ may take on during the phases of its consumption. This is, as a matter of 
fact, the fundamental quality attributed to the term mediatisation in this chapter. 
The diverse media forms through which the myth is uttered, may show by means of 
an analysis of the network(s) of signs disclosed in the representations, the kind of 
access to the mythical past provided and accordingly the present actor-oriented 
motivations that sustain the media representations disseminated as culture, within 
culture. On this account, history as a popular cultural phenomena, requires an 
engagement with contemporary media (popular) conventions able to afford a better 
perception of its nuances. The following media forms of the myth of Lin Zexu, will 
attempt to bring to light such conventions that help stage the Chinese hero’s 
mythology as indicative of a broader mediatisation process of historical knowledge. 
In the television documentary program “Archives” (档案, Dàng àn), on “The 
mysterious death of Lin Zexu” (林则徐死因之密, Lin Zexu siyin zhimi), one finds 
another interesting version of the media popular phenomena called history. 
Broadcasted by the “Shanghai Documentary Channel” (上海纪实频道, Shanghai 
jishi pindao) during night prime hours, the documentary places itself as a 
mediatised everyday life component in which “people feel a fundamental need for 
orientation in time” (Ludvingsson, 2003: 14), and gain access to a peculiar 
expression of history as a popularly eastheticized media product. Among the high 
number of historical documentaries that anyone can get access to through Chinese 
cable and satellite television, a very great deal of them are manifestly ideological 
tools of visual literacy to further and boost historical education and tutoring. The 
documentary on Lin Zexu follows this tradition, and as a matter of fact is rather 
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formal and serious, sober and predictable, and although there are some narrative 
detours – with regard to the trope distinctive of the figure of Lin Zexu – that might 
persuade one to think otherwise, in reality these are only tactics used to lure the 
audience’s attention, and to respond to both the sophistication of contemporary 
audiences brought about by the new media technologies, and the need to entertain 
them. The program is in fact an expression (and thus a creator) of an everyday life 
media schedule – it’s been broadcasted on TV at 9:30 p.m. – and practice, which 
necessarily makes it an entertaining program with the aim of easing and relaxing 
the mind of the Chinese working subjects who, while are delighted with the figure 
of their national hero, are also consuming one of the last media feature of their 
routinezed daily life; therefore the need to be modestly undemanding. The 
documentary resorts to the investigative story genre, fabricating a representation of 
history whose fictionalisation falls into the transnational conventions of the crime 
genre (犯罪类型), of which the investigative (调查) is a subgenre. China had 
known forms of detective literary fictions155 since the mongol Yuan Dynasty, 
although in many ways they differed from contemporary ones. Here, the 
investigative genre I refere to, describes the documentary on the death of Lin Zexu 
following the popular transnational conventions of the genre, requiring a narrative 
that follows an investigation, and a presenter (for documentaries often have a 
presenter that guides the audience within the narrative) that functions as a 
detective-figure. The documentary is a televisual media product, framed through 
the articulation of diverse modes of representation. The main investigative narrative 
is directed by the presenter who acts as the director of events, while experts and 
historians clarify specific details of Lin Zexu’s life, “providing the clues as to 
where to go next” (de Groote, 2009: 22). Furthermore, the documentary made use 
of a fictional film in the form of re-enactment of the events occured, to help the 
audience empathise with history, and visualize the figure of Lin Zexu and the entire 
ongoing investigation. The visualization of the past provided by the use of re-
enactment in documentary, is a trope popular to the crime, investigative, and 
detective genre at a transnational level, and serves as de Groot maintains to 
dramatise narratives and place history into a discourse of performance (de Groot, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Some well known stories include the Yuan Dynasty story Circle of Chalk (灰闌記), the Ming Dynasty story 
collection Bao Gong An (包公案) and the 18th century Di Gong An (狄公案) story collection. For further information 
see the work of Dutch sinologist van Gulik. 
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2009). Through re-enactment historical knowledge can be imparted by means of 
precise images that evoke explicit imaginings of history. The realism of re-
enactment experienced by the audience, confers to history a twofold characteristic: 
on one hand the artificiality of re-enactment is visible to everyone (they are often of 
very poor quality), meaning that the audience is aware of the fact that what is being 
broadcasted is a fictionalised version of history, allowing a cognitive process that 
temporally dinstances history in a past that is gone, and thus othering it from the 
present. On the other hand, the visualization of such fictionalised history that the re-
enactment offers, enables the audience to have a perception of the historical that 
can be leisurely consumed, thence integrating it as part of the self. Authenticity is 
somehow not required by the audience in documentaries. “Televisual and visual 
versioning of the past are increasingly influential in a packaging of historical fact 
and a creation of history as leisure activity. What is produced is, for all it might 
attempt to be ‘real’ or ‘educational’, a subjective version of a constructed history” 
(de Groot. 2009: 147). Lin Zexu’s documentary, as a Chinese form of mediatisation 
of historical knowledge is devoid of postmodern features such as pastiche or 
collage, unless one considers the re-enactment as being part of these qualities; this 
is mostly because the producer of the media product in question has to respect 
fundamental attributes linked to the ideological mood of the narrative, for there 
cannot be bias associated to (the myth of) Lin Zexu and the arrangement of 
information concerning its mythical status. The documentary “Lin Zexu siyin zhimi” 
(林则徐死因之密) presents a reconstruction of the historical – effected by the 
presenter, the guests and the actors – that avoids any kind of complexities, and that 
consciously simplifies the historical knowldege produced to adapt it to the media 
logics (low or absent level of interaction156; visualization practice), to the media 
conventions (format and genre), and to political and commercial requirements 
(ideology; entertainment). The trope distinguishing the national hero and its myth, 
the narrative of the investigation (based on the hypothesis that Lin Zexu has been 
poisoned when at 66 year old he died of a sudden mysterious stomach disease), and 
the general treatment of history, create at a cognitive level, a progressive and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 “Jerry Kuehl, producer of ‘The World at War’, long ago noted the problem of immediacy: ‘One characteristic of 
television as a communication medium is that it offers its audience virtually no time for reflections. It is a sequential 
medium, so to say, in which episode follow episode, without respite. This really means that the medium is ideally suited 
to telling stories and anecdotes, creating atmosphere and mood, giving diffuse impressions’.” In Jerome de Groot, 
“Consuming History –Historians and Heritage in Contemporary Popular Culture ”, Routledge, 2009, p-151.  
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sequential processing of the matter object of the TV program, so to enable the 
teleological quality of such regardfully consideration of the historical, to emerge as 
the main structure of past human experience, the limitless onward progression of 
ideas and reasoning, the progress that the figure of Lin Zexu, in all its media 
representations since the 1980’s, has been made conveying as a universal right and 
duty of the people. 
The ideological stage on which Lin Zexu stands and the leisurly dimension of the 
documentary, along with the general handling of history as a result of both the 
ideology and the spectacle, mitigate the vaguity of a chaotic everyday life by 
forwarding a Chinese media national cultural programming that values leisure time 
activities as both amusing and educational. In this sense doesn’t sound improper to 
say that history, seen from the point of view of mediatisation is not so much about 
knowledge epistemologically conceived, but aesthetically, meaning that 
visualization is regarded as the primary sense for constructing sign-originated 
knowledge. Furniture and artefact displayed in documetaries’ re-enactments, bring 
into play aesthetic codes and attributes able to inspire and value explicit sense of 
history and historical themes. “The breadth of this historical imaginary, 
demonstrates the grip that the historical has on cultural production. The range of 
audiences addressed similarly illustrates that history has a breadth, scope and 
range of influence that demand attention. These texts also demonstrate the 
fetishising of history and the commodification of the past through its being turned 
by the cultural industries into consumable product” (de Groot, 2009: 181). In “Lin 
Zexu siyin zhimi” (林则徐死因之密) costume drama157, furniture and heritage 
artefacts tend to deliver and sell Chineseness as a commodity. The setting of these 
cultural objects on the filmed stage, trigger the materialization of history itself. 
They are able to convey appearances, surface, depth, thickness to Chinese history, 
and even tactile feelings are suggested by these objects’s visualization. In the Lin 
Zexu’s documentary such costumes and artefacts look very conservative, reflecting 
traditional, westernized commonplaces of Chinese culture and past, showing no 
postmodern aesthetical attributes that would render the cultural material 
environment of the documentary more flexible with regard to the rigid aesthetical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 A television or film production set in a particular historical period, in which the actors wear costumes typical of that 
period. 
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standards showed. These costumes, furnitures and artefacts, allow the viewer to 
recognise the past – and concurrently themselves – through recurrent tropes, 
promoting a consumption of historical knowledge that goes beyond the canonical 
unfolding of historical narrative where only events and figures are highlighted. 
Although, such commodified materialization of history does not challenge the 
viewer’s well defined and solid knowledge of Chinese history, it rather displaces it 
by attaching to it additional discourses and values so to render it an interconnected 
popular product. Costume drama, furniture, artefacts, in the overall adornment of 
the myth of Lin Zexu, they all serve to establish the cultural hegemony of a certain 
kind of Chineseness, and the cultural supremacy of the Han’s ethnicity. 
Mediatisation of historical knowledge pass for the cultural valorization of cultural 
items and objects that the media produce by naturally associate them to the general 
understanding of the cultural form communicated; in this way too, history is created 
as something liquid and multifunctional. 
Different media technologies provide diverse experiences of historical knowledge, 
experiences that reflect also the technological arrangements and developments of 
the forms communicated, and utter knowledge as a synonym of information. The 
dual interchanging condition of the knowledge-as-information, brought forth by the 
wealth of connections that information have with notions as currency symbol158, 
real-time communication and database information, and around discourses upon 
identity, relationship, participation and so on, is ascribable to the use and diffusion 
of the Internet as a way of structuring communication, social relationality, and 
cultural productiveness. 
In China, as Jun Luo observes, Internet media and mobile media are usually 
controlled and established by telecommunication carriers or mobile service 
providers (China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile), whereas the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology159 is responsible of their online and mobile 
media services provided (Jun Luo, 2015). The Internet and (especially, but not 
only) the mobile media that make use of the Internet, constitute a fundamental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 A sign representing a (figurative) currency. One may think for instance, at the significance of information in 
connection with the political notion of leverage, where the use of precise knowledge/information against political actors 
may procure positive outcome to the one who possessed and valued them as such. 
159 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (中华人民共和国工业和信息化部) is a regulatory body in 
charge of the manufacture of electronic and information products, the communications and software industry, as well as 
the promotion of informatization of the national economy and social services in the country.	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social institution and social space for/of interactions (through microblogs, instant-
messaging, information database, online games). The Internet, as a repository of 
diverse media logics and forms of the myth of Lin Zexu enables the mediatisation 
of history, providing access to knowledge/information in such an interactive way 
(enfranchisement160) as to empowering specific cultural imaginations in different 
realms or aspects of social life. Moreover, by integrating both mass communication 
(Baike Baidu, 百度百科 database informational web site, the “free Chinese online 
encyclopedia”), interpersonal communication (microblogging site Sina Weibo, 新
浪微博), and interactive communication (Lin Zexu’s online game, 在线游戏), the 
Internet introduces novel social forms that transform istitutionalized social practices 
(the use of books, the reading of history). Access to Chinese past has never been 
easier, and historical knowledge seen from the point of view of the Internet is just a 
matter of a few digits; and since media forms of Chinese past are as varying as 
many media format and genres exist, the Internet allow users to input/create, 
retrieve, and engage with specific representations of Chinese past in an 
individual/customized way.  
Internet in this sense has been groundbreaking, it in fact allowed a myriad of social 
actors and agencies to organize their entire range of “activities” around the 
functions and communication opportunities offered by the Internet medium itself; 
not only by accomodating its functions (real-time connectivity, retrievability of 
information, increased visibility for actors and/or their products, and so on), but by 
incorporating them as intrinsic activities of their own social existence. This process 
occures to an extent whereby an actor’s social existence (cultural manifestation), 
ensues from the media’s own ability of culturally reproducing the actor itself.    
The myth of Lin Zexu, as a cultural entity circulating within society, is by and large 
mostly represented in the Internet, although TV plays its part, too. The great variety 
of historical forms and representations presented by online resources, suggest the 
increasing production and communication of historical knowledge in China. Lin 
Zexu’s historical myth, since the opening up of knowledge accessibility, ensured 
for instance by the online databases and weblog’s activities, has been part of a 
popularization process led by the exponential growth of its digital re-productions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Enfranchisement is a liberal mode of theorising access to media-provided knowldege/information. For a concept of 
enfranchisement of the individual into the past see Jerome de Groot, 2009 p-59. 
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serving disparate needs and interests, and thereby altering history’s traditional 
function (a form of knowledge imparted in literate societies, as well as an 
institutionalized ideology) and engagement. 
Baike Baidu’s historical knowledge of Lin Zexu, is the result of a collaborative 
built encyclopedia, meaning that Baidu’s registered users abiding by the Chinese 
law, may decide to edit knowledge/information on Lin Zexu, and thus render these 
informations public and accessible to anyone online. Baike Baidu is today China’s 
largest online encyclopedia, an immense online repository of shared informations, 
higly influential with regard to popular knowledge. The interactivity expressed by 
the Internet and Baike Baidu (retrieving information based on persoanl interests and 
needs; being able to contribute personally to the production of knwoledge), render 
online cultural consumption much more complex and articulated than the passive 
engagement offered by movies and television products. The consumption of the 
myth of Lin Zexu expressed by the users’ exploitation of the heterogeneous 
Internet’s functions, materialize in the Baike Baidu’s retrieval service, which is 
based on the stated desires of the users. This has a profound impact on the way 
people acquire historical knowledge, for Lin Zexu becomes a mere online 
information that can be almost instantly checked and consumed, and which 
definitely challenge traditional hierarchies of knowledge (de Groot, 2009). People’s 
engagement with the(ir own) past is therefore radically changed, becoming a 
commodified knowledge which can be barely distinguished from other cultural 
media product participating to the immense digital archive represented by the 
Internet. Furthermore, even though Lin Zexu’s historical ideology is constantly put 
under control and supervision by various censorship authorities – among which 
self-censorship is the most effective and popular – its born-digital representations 
(images, texts, songs) represent an important issue, challenging any previous 
engagement with the historical, with uncertain results and effects. “Born-digital 
historical documents profoundly affect the way that people use them and the types 
of knowledge that are accessed and created. There is a new and emerging sense of 
dynamic textuality and technological literacy” (de Groot, 2009: 92-93). Thence, 
mediatisation and censorship are likely to coexist, because historical knowledge 
interacts with, and often reproduce, social actors and institutions mostly at a 
structural level (communication as format and accessibility), as well as other social 
fields by discursively producing them. 
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Following this reasoning, Baike Baidu’s representations of Lin Zexu become a 
matter of generating the transmitted information and interacting with them - by 
means for example of “information architecture” (the discipline for organising and 
presenting information), and “information designs” softwares (linked to the concept 
of user experience).  
Baike Baidu is thence one modality, an influential one, to engage with popular 
historical knowledge, with Lin Zexu. But the Internet offers hetergeneous ways of 
producing, consuming and interacting with the historical. Everyday many people 
find themselves immersed in media practices that include, consciously or not, 
coming into contact with their past. This may happen through the reading of an 
ebook (very popular among China’s commuting urbanites), or by watching a TV 
program, a movie, or by listening to the radio, or yet it might occur in a more 
personal and interactive way, by (micro)posting a comment or discussing a 
historical topic in a microblog. Sina Weibo (新浪微博) is a Chinese microblogging 
website 161  which, with its 100 million daily users, is contributing to the 
popularization of historical knowledge within a broader public sphere of social 
interaction, where the intrusion of the state is relatively scarce162 and the people can 
give voice to individual narrativization163 of Chinese past.   
Sina Weibo (新浪微博) is thus a form of online social platform allowing people to 
express, create and engage with new forms of popular history. Lin Zexu becomes 
the subject of the most disparate online discussions – on his researchs and 
publications conducted during the exile in Xinjiang, as a suggestion from a blogger 
as a topic for a school essay, an evaluation of its handwriting skills, a picture of its 
statue taken on a trip, or an image on a Chinese painting – in likewise dissimilar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Other famous Chinese microblogs are: Tencent Weibo, Sohu Weibo, and NetEase Weibo. 
162 On August 2014 an article entitled “Reverse-engineering censorship in China: Randomized experimentation and 
participation observation”, focusing on Chinese censorship, showed the “first large-scale experimental study of 
censorship by creating accounts on numerous social media sites, randomly submitting different texts, and observing 
from a worldwide network of computers which texts were censored and which were not. We also supplemented 
interviews with confidential sources by creating our own social media site, contracting with Chinese firms to install the 
same censoring technologies as existing sites, and—with their software, documentation, and even customer support—
reverse-engineering how it all works. Our results offer rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticisms of the 
state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real-world events with collective action 
potential are censored”. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. 2014. “Reverse-Engineering Censorship in 
China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation”, Science, 6199, 345: 1-10. 
163 Should be pointed out that all postings I’ve read and analysed, they all reflected the state’s view, that is, Lin Zexu 
has been always addressed as the national hero (民族英雄), and/or as a moral authority.	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contexts (the blog as a personal individual journal or diary, or as a form of 
concerned public involvement). In this way, Lin Zexu symbolizes the aptness of 
blogging as a media social practice, producing historical knowledge as a form of 
inter-activity, or promoting the emergence of community building processes, 
sharing their own form of past as the result of the blog’s user-generated content. 
The active participation of individuals to the creation, dissemination, and 
consumption of historical knowledge as in the case of blogs or of other social 
media networks, suggest a peculiar apprehension of the mediatised historical 
information, bringing about new ways of owning history, of being part of the public 
constitutive process that makes up forms and senses of Chinese history. 
An additional configuration of online historical knowledge through which Lin Zexu 
emerges as a cultural form, is expressed by the online video game164 (在线游戏) 
FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟). As a leisure activity, online videogames are 
part of an overall digital cultural expression introduced by the Internet media along 
with computer technologies, giving rise to an interactive form of socialization led 
by the extensive invasion of media culture in people’s life. Videogames are a 
storytelling media that are usually consumed in connection with other cultural 
goods as television, movies, and music (Borowiecki and Prieto-Rodriguez, 2013). 
Moreover, the flourishing game industry and the equivalent economic market 
behind the huge consumption of videogames in China, makes it an important 
‘media form’ that shapes the socialization of millions of people, as well as the way 
through which precise social experiences and related meanings are popularly 
addressed. The historical, intended as a variety of knowledge utterance referred to 
an alleged shared past, is largely represented in online videogames culture, indeed 
people “engage with past through their immersion in these virtual and ludic worlds, 
attaining some kind of – albeit skewed – historical awareness through an active 
engagement with a representation of the past” (de Groot, 2009). In the specific case 
of the online computer game FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟), the experience 
with the ‘historical’ is quite poor, although the myth of Lin Zexu is successfully 
conveyed. The active engagement de Groot refers about, is strictly tied to the 
embodied virtual experience that a game’s technological development is able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Video game in the present context refers only to the game played on a computer, as “Lin Zexu jin yan” is an online 
game played through access to the Internet. 
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provide. The FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟) is a very poor quality game, not 
comparable with contemporary products able to fully absorb – thanks to their 
displaying characteristics and requested interaction from the user – the players’ 
attention in an almost full embodied projection of the user within a virtual reality 
graphics. FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟 ) is a rather passive gamely 
experience, requiring minimum cognitive and body interaction, and thereby lacking 
complexity at a diegetic level. To start with, FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟) is 
not a point of view game, ergo the ‘historical experentiality’ is quite impersonal. 
The images flow from right to left as in a flat one-dimensional surface, without any 
deep perspective. Consequently, the eroic individuality (supposedly incarnated by 
the soldier sent by Lin Zexu to fight the English opium smugglers) with whom the 
player should embody through the structural interactivity of the game, is somewhat 
weak. The experience of history is thus distanced and othered, not as a result of a 
narratological choice, but as a technological unsophistication inherent to the game’s 
design and structure. The narrative sustains somehow the official ideology 
associated with the historical figure of Lin Zexu. Although there seems to be no 
institutionalized learning or educational activity imparted through the game, it is 
nevertheless “keen to stress the legitimacy of their [the state’s ideology] view of the 
past” (de Groot, 2009: 138), since the myth of Lin Zexu understood with Barthes is 
conveyed by a discourse that the player is somehow obliged coming to contact 
with. In the FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟) online game, a fixed and static 
model of history is represented, however linked to other social discourses related to 
leisure-time activities, and commercial interests. The visual immersion in historical 
environments is moderately uninfluencing, not allowing the emergence of a strong 
sense of history. Although, regardless of the poor quality game through which the 
popular figure of Lin Zexu is addressed, the past in this game is framed within very 
clear boundaries, both at a software-complexity level (the actions permitted in 
terms of digital interactivity), and at a narrative level (win against the British, or 
lose). What the FC “Lin Zexu jin yan” (林则徐禁烟) online game suggest is that, 
despite the unemotional experience of history provided by such media form, the 
Chinese national history conventionally designated as the “opium war” (yapian 
zhanzheng), is to a certain extent spectacularized by the media representation of a 
digital-born Lin Zexu, whose significance lie so much in its ideological positioning, 
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as in the everyday life displacement of the historical knowledge for which it stands 
for. 
 
 
 
 
- Conclusions 
 
Lin Zexu’s media representations and the myth they convey are an agency 
moulding what I’ve so far called the ‘mediatisation of historical knowledge’. They 
express advantageous modalities to encourage social practices arising from a 
transforming cultural network they contribute to create, in which the Chinese 
media, the State/government, diverse market actors, and the people/users, all 
contribute to the staging, working, and performing of their, moderately elastic, 
social functions and activities.  
Mediatisation, in this study, is the result of a precise conceptualization of the media 
practices meant as the social power the media produce and generate within Chinese 
society meant as the result of the media production and dissemination of networks 
of signs ’s that provide substance and signification tothe cultural texture that we 
conventionally call society. It also represents the interaction and interdependence 
with other Chinese institutions and actors (the Party-state, the Governement) 
materializing through process, by way of the media frame and shape the means 
(technological/ideological) through which historical knowledge is created and 
communicated – according also to people’s taste and commercial interests – and to 
a certain extent apprehended.  
In China the media stand somehow between the political system and the market, 
sometime embodying the one, sometime the other, often both of them, with the 
result of articulating a mediatisation process whose overall configuration is to be 
searched in the tension between the political insitutions, representing the regulatory 
boundaries whithin which the media are allowed to operate, especially at a content 
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level165. Thereby, the Chinese institutional setting, expressed by the regulatory 
organs and the monotoring bodies (censorhip agencies and practices), partially 
determines the degree of ideological freedom allowed to the media, or at least try to 
contain and manage it accordingly. “In China, as elsewhere, increasing penetration 
of media and media technologies into the lives of individuals is reshaping the ways 
in which people relate to each other, to society in general, and to the government” 
(Sun, 2104: 89). The Chinese media in fact, by means of their capacity of 
producing and shaping people’s relations and social experientiality – of instituting 
integrally Chinese society by actually defining people’s imagining of it and of 
their-self (and therefore of reality), and by giving the illusion of connecting all 
realms of social and cultural life as if they were existent beyond the media – “they 
form a culture of real virtuality in which our symbolic environment is, by and large, 
structured in an inclusive, flexible, diversified hypertext, in which we navigate 
everyday” (Kramer, Ludes, 2010: 12). 
Entertainment, tourism, economy, national belonging, identity formation, they all 
rely, to a process of mediatisation of historical knowledge exemplified by the 
various representations of the myth of Lin Zexu in movies, tourist wesites, 
videogames, children’s songs, documentaries, Internet database information and so 
on. The wealth of complexities represented by these media forms, indicate on one 
side the various modalities through which mediatisation of historical knowledge is 
effected – Internet blogs’ representations of Lin Zexu definitely reveal a divergent 
mediatisation process than, say, Baike Baidu’s result to the entry Lin Zexu – on the 
other side, they all contribute, although independently, to the popularization (and 
often also to its fictionalisation) of the historical knowledge that the myth of Lin 
Zexu embodies. 
History, as it is illustrated by, and assumed to be in Chinese media, is organized 
and structured around a strict binary system that doesn’t allow for any ideological 
crossing, and most importantly offers a vision of the Chinese past that, despite the 
fact of being media-culture-as-culture, it produces the contingencies of/as the 
everyday life, like sharp distinctions between self/other, national/foreign, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 “In 2011, the SAPPRFT issued new rules restricting commercials from interrupting TV dramas, allowing them to air 
only back-to-back between programs. It has been reported that the restrictions, which went into effect at the beginning 
of 2012, were intended to spur broadcasters to show more cultural programming, helping them to uphold a ‘’public 
service (Burkitt 2011)”.  Jun Luo, “Media System in China: A Chinese Perspective”, Academy for International 
Communication of Chinese Culture, 2015, p – 55. 
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male/female, law and order/caos and criminality, political/civic and son on, 
confining and limiting the potential infinite ideological expressions of Lin Zexu 
within society. Indeed, even though looking at the diverse media representations of 
Lin Zexu, might elicit the feeling or impression of being looking at a multiplicity of 
viewpoints – thus undermining the idea of a singular history – it is rather the 
opposite, for the main historical narrative of such representations re-tell the by-now 
familiar story of Lin Zexu highlighting the same old meanings and values166, 
necessary for legitimising the ruling class and to sustain the nation-building process 
among others. “The idea of constructing a country’s history through rating its 
figures- emphasising the individual rather than imagining a shared space – 
presents a multiple conceptualisation of nation, in some ways the sum of 
extraordinary parts rather than the slow accretion of significance” (de Groot, 
2009: 27). The popularization of Lin Zexu steered by the media, demonstrates that 
Chinese national histories (at least when mythically personified) have some kind of 
appeal on people’s imaginings of their past. Lin Zexu as a precise and peculiar form 
of mediatisation of historical knowledge in China, is a form of media popular 
culture in a mediatised everyday life, which is a merely media social space (of 
struggle), to obtain people’s attention and consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 This is actually true only in part, because the contemporary ideological function of Lin Zexu as a national hero 
promoting openness to the world, technological development, and progress can be traced back only till the end of the 
1970’s (since the ‘gaige kaifang’). During the Maoist years, Lin Zexu’s ideological role had particularly focused on the 
anti-imperialistic rethoric, and on the  promotion of (Maoist-oriented) communist values. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In the course of this study I have explored many heterogeneous media 
representations of Lin Zexu, produced, communicated, and consumed within China 
proper since the commercialization of Chinese television, and the setting up of the 
Internet in the 1990’s, and on. The main objective leading this research has been 
that of providing convincing answers to a series of questions involving critical 
aspects of Chinese society, of the Chinese nation, and the media system, through an 
overall analysis of the media representations of the myth of Lin Zexu circulating 
through TV and the Internet. Among such questions, the most important ones were 
concerned with issues regarding the formation of individual identities in China; the 
identification of the self and of the other; the characterization and commodification 
of styles and ideas in the everyday life; the formation of collective identities; the 
ideological apparatus that sustains the nation-building process; the deployment of 
banal nationalism; the particular relationship between the Chinese media, the 
State/government’s institutions, and the market; and the peculiar engagement of 
people/users with media-generated popular history.  
Many important works 167  in the academic field of Chinese media and 
communication studies, as I have partly verified, tend to highlight the problematic 
matter of the state control over the Chinese media system, focusing their attention 
on state-led censorship and on the lack of independence of both editors and 
journalists. Using the paradigm of Western democracy, these works often base their 
interpretations of the functioning and social significance of specific aspects of the 
Chinese media landscape, by resorting to alleged universal (Western)168 ethic and 
moral values and principles that highlight distinct ideas of freedom, of social 
participation, of political expression, and of democratic elections, thus looking at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Yuezhi Zhao (1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2009, 2012); Lee Chin Chuan (2000, 2003); Wanning Sun (2002, 2009, 
2012, 2014); Clement So (2000, 2001, 2011); Chan M. Joseph (1998, 2002). 
168 “The decolonization of anthropology require that we cease colonizing other parts of the world simply to validate 
Western theories of modernization, marxism, feminism, socialism or capitalism. If we continue to use pre-articulated 
categories of Western knowledge we are merely redeploying our particualr vision in transnational descriptive 
narratives.” Aihwa Ong, “Anthropology, China and Modernities” (p-65), in Henrietta L. Moore (ed.) “The Future of 
Anthropological Knowledge”, Taylor & Amp; Francis Ltd, 1996.	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the multiple inter-relations between the Chinese media, the State/government, the 
market, and the people as evidences of the authoritarian rule of the CPC, and often 
addressing the media (especially the Internet) as a cultural expression, potentially 
able to emancipate the people’s energies towards a (western-driven) democratic 
society. Now, let aside my personal opinions with regard to such issues, this work 
distinguishes itself for its focus on precise cultural articulations (media practices, 
ideologies, consumerism), and social formations (enhanced sign communication, 
individualism, nationalism, mediatisation of historical knowledge), that the analysis 
of the media representations of Lin Zexu have so far disclosed. I have demonstrated 
how by way of a semiotic approach to culture, Internet (and TV) has certainly the 
power of promoting and advocating dominant ideologies and practices that uphold 
and legitimate the ruling classes’ vision of the world, quite in contrast with any 
liberating effect. Furthermore, the complexity of the mediatisation process 
purported by the media forms of Lin Zexu, namely the mediatisation of historical 
knowledge, has on the one hand showed the (legislative) procedures through wich 
the state/government regulate the degree of independence of the media practices 
within Chinese society (an attribute common in every media-saturated society), and 
at the same time showed to what extent the media practices associated to each 
different media, are able to generate “the performative requirements for producing 
authority and representing expertise” (Hjarvard, Petersen, 2013: 4).  
China’s political and cultural policy in the 1980’s, 1990’s, and in the 2000’s are the 
result of the new economic course inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping since 1978, 
leading to an increasing integration of Chinese economy to global capital and 
culture. Since the 1980’s, the development of a new economic path brought about 
changes and more or less gradual transformations in many areas of social and 
cultural life, beginning to question “people’s ability to interpret and control 
reality” (Iovene, 2002: 7). This socio-economic transformation in China, was aimed 
at technological development and global integration. The introduction of principles 
of market competition, of new information technologies, the globalization of capital 
and labour, the convergence with global culture, were all factors that precipitated 
social changes and shaped contemporary Chinese society. However, only in the 
1990’s the strive for modernization led to the materialization of such changes, for in 
the 1980’s, as Jing Wang maintains, “the syndrome of leaping toward the future 
was so strong that modernization emerged as a utopian discourse rather than as a 
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material practice” (Wang, 1996: 38). In fact, it is only a few years after Tian ‘an 
men (1989) that the socialist market economy gradually became a space for the 
introduction of new cultural activities originating in the new media – remarkably 
the Internet, towards the end of the decade, and Television somewhat already in 
vogue – bringing forth forms of popular culture such as blockbuster movies, 
popular music, TV dramas, and an infinite flow of digital images. A new 
expression of national space begun to unfold, a space where transnational flows of 
cultural expressions, local-based traditions and habits, hybridization of values, 
folklore manifestations, peculiar ideas of lifestyle, but also new forms of political 
propaganda and civic education, all converged in an indistinct cultural network 
whithin which the individual emerged as a subject in constant search for identity. 
The emancipation sought by the New Era169’s intellectual and artists (particularly 
through the adoption of new techniques, methodologies and technical experiments), 
was de facto achieved, though quite differently than that desired, through the 
1990’s and 2000’s with the colonization perpetrated by countless media forms and 
technologies, that gave rise to new aesthetics and trends in all cultural forms with 
an explicit and unambiguous preference and deference accorded to representation 
and visuality. The extraordinary wealth of media devices (TV, mobiles, pc, laptops 
) possesed by always more segments of the populace, the new forms of 
communication and connectivity (satellite data transmission, Internet, cable 
antenna, bluetooth) with which such technologies were integrated, and the 
exceptional abundance of cultural resources produced by the media and consumed 
by the people, became the symbol of national modernization. “As the Chinese 
nation furiously modernizes itself to overtake the postmodernity of advanced first 
world societies, culture and art have inevitably become matters of consumption and 
marketing handled by corporations and businesses” (Liu Kang, 2004: 142). 
The new self-awareness put forward by the new media cultural forms populating 
Chinese society, caused the emerging of a networked subject exemplified by the 
young generations, that since the 1990’s have increasingly differentiated their 
social complexity, founding theirselves bombarded by an extraordinary wealth of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 The New Era (新时期) is the conventional denomination used to describe the new artistic expression and production 
during the 1980’s in China that followed the “cultural revolution”, which saw the emergence of an intellectual and 
artistic sensibility that looked forward new way of expression of the subject (see Jing Wang, Sheldon H. Lu, Xiaobing 
Tang, Lin Yiping, Chen Xiaoming, Zhang Yiwu). 
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media images and styles, and therefore captured in the constant need of articulating 
multiple and heterogenous identities.  
Clearly enough, this quite chaotic and challenging social configuration that Chinese 
society underwent and still copes with, and within which the media found 
themselves and simultaneously produce, gave rise to a legitimation crisis caused by 
the inevitable erosion and induced dismissal of the previous (Maoist) ideological 
apparatus that had somehow lend legitimacy to the ruling class. If we accept the 
distinction provided by Manuel Castells (2004) between capitalism and statism 
(both of them being modes of production, which regulate the appropriation of 
surplus in the production process), where capitalism is oriented toward profit-
maximizing, while statism toward power-maximizing, it is possible to understand 
part of the contradictions that gripped the Chinese state ideological orientation – its 
progressive alienation – and the difficult of its organization to follow a coherent 
path. In this sense, the will to merge a distinct state-led ideological apparatus (a 
socialist one) with a capitalist mode of production, has generated a katabasis of the 
state capacity to orient itself and the society, and to control (if not produce) the 
changes and transformation that Deng Xiaoping, since the “Reform and Opening 
up” (改革开放 , gaige kaifang), had inaugurated. Thus, the Chinese state’s 
disorientation originated “in the inability of the modern nation-state to navigate the 
uncharted, stormy waters between the power of global networks and the challenge 
of singular identities” (Castells, 2004: 304). This meant that the guiding ideological 
role of the Chinese nation-state (the CPC and the government), needed to be 
redefined in function of the new mechanisms of cultural and social re-production 
that the openess to global capital and culture, and the overcoming of the media as 
the central catalyst of cultural expression, had engendered. 
The study of specific forms of popular culture and of the Chinese media, are thus 
important phenomena to study, if one wants to get insights into the socio-cultural 
circumstances that characterized China during the 1990’s and 2000’s. 
The grown and intesified role of the media institutional setting, and the complex 
media forms that sprang from their practices within/as Chinese society posed, with 
their ability of overlapping different temporal and spatial configurations, much 
more concerns than those they worked out. “They [the media] form a culture of real 
virtuality in which our symbolic environment is, by and large, structured in an 
inclusive, flexible, diversified hypertext, in which we navigate everyday. The 
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virtuality of this text is in fact our reality, the symbols from which we live and 
communicate, the enclosure of communciation in the space of flexible media and 
the media become the essential space of politics” (Kramer, Ludes, 2010: 12). The 
media representations of Lin Zexu displayed and scrutinezed in this work are, as 
Kramer and Ludes suggest, part of the Chinese symbolic environment, and an 
aspect of the essential space of politics that characterize both China’s identity, and 
China’s attempts to cope with such identity. Lin Zexu media forms – as media 
culture produced, communicated and consumed – served to articulate conflicts, to 
legitimize power, to displace politics and knowledge, and to control the ongoing 
social transformations and crisis experienced by society at large and by the Chinese 
state. But what has been central to this study, is that Lin Zexu’s media 
representations are first of all the expression of the transformations caused by 
China’s convergence with global capital and culture, as well as the expression of 
the role that the popular media had in facilitate this convergence, and of being 
simultaneously its  product. 
Lin Zexu in contemporary China has proved to be a media consumption activity 
within a media-induced “symbolic environment” that structures or frames the 
everyday life among Chinese people. Lin Zexu, as the official culture, as the myth, 
as the discourse on/of the nation, as the language of the state and of nationalism, as 
the ideology of power and domination, as historical knowledge, as all these features 
altogether, Lin Zexu is the “culture of real virtuality” or the culture of virtual 
reality that the Chinese media generate within the social network they are part of. 
Lin Zexu has therefore been the symbolic manifestation (and response) of an 
emancipatory practice elicited through the media by the wished ‘gaige kaifang’ (改
革开放) process that soon became “uncharted, stormy waters”. If what Jing Wang 
says is true, namely that an emancipatory practice (the Reform and Opening up 
itself) requires the arrangement of the terms of emancipatory goals (Jing Wang, 
1996), then the myth of Lin Zexu, as uttered by the Chinese media, is ‘official 
ideology’ in the sense that it reacts to the lack of planning and preparation of a 
system of radical reforms that now haunts the present-power elite. Although Deng 
Xiaoping and his successors rejected, or believed to reject, those cultural forms 
associated to the Maoist ideological apparatus – for they considered them to be too 
radical or revolutionary – they actually inherited a great deal of their styles and 
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forms, as Lin Zexu’s media forms (since the 1980’s) may prove to be170, having 
them just been reshaped and adapted to the new disocurses and necessities, 
producing new (digital) aesthetics. 
The myth of Lin Zexu, in all its media forms, thus points to two well delineated 
objectives: on the one hand it is called to represent in toto the affection and patriotic 
pride for the long standing Chinese nation, for its glorious past and its  
distinguishing culture – though, we know that Lin Zexu produces rather than 
represents such ideas of nation and culture. On the other hand the national myth is 
called to provide both a term of conclusion to an alleged pre-modern era 
characterized by the blindness of the Qing Dynasty and the national humiliation (国
耻) of the foreign aggression and defeat, while bringing a sense of new beginning 
distinctively inclined toward the recognition of the need for technical and industrial 
development that (quite unclearly) is supposed to define the Chinese idea of 
modernity. This double aim underlined by the myth of Lin Zexu is achieved by 
granting visuality a primary role for the engagement with (ideological) knowledge 
(being also a constitutive quality of the media analysed in this work), and by 
encoding specific signified to the commonly accepted appearance(s) of Lin Zexu. 
Nevertheless, Lin Zexu’s function is not so easily concluded. In fact, if we consider 
the Chinese state from the twofold perspective of performing 1) the dominant 
interests and values that have characterized it historically, and 2) that of (the only 
one declared) representing the citizens as in its modern acceptation, then the myth 
of Lin Zexu conveyed by the media representations come to embody a new 
motivation, that of providing an interface that superimpose on the State’s functions 
mentioned above, and thence bestowing political and social stability.  
In this way, the media play a major role in simultaneously producing and 
communicating forms of domination through appearances of legitimation, 
determing the presence or absence of a balance (the role of Lin Zexu’s media 
forms) central to the stability of all social institutions, being them political, 
economic, cultural. 
Over this study the myth of Lin Zexu has been analysed in its cinematic form, 
amply demonstrating that a movie such as Xie Jin’s 1997 “The Opium War”, whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 I have in the course of this study touched upon some of the major differences between the Maoist ideology, and the 
new China course’s ideology. 
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first evident feature is its entertaining function, is able to convey strong messages 
of national unity and of patriotism while offering a high level entertaining 
experience, mixing the consumption of a leisure activity with the delivering of 
(encoded) ideological meanings. This cinematic product allowed the CPC to carry 
on its ideological commitment by means of a cultural product, somewhat 
expression of the new course of economic liberalization undertaken by China. The 
cinematic medium, through the representation of the myth of Lin Zexu, instituted a 
particular relation between the Chinese state and its institutions, the government, 
the people, the territory of the state, and the imagining of history, namely the 
Chinese past. The releasing of “The Opium War” has indeed been made to coincide 
with the ceremony of the British handing over of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 
1997, and required to provide a background narrative upon which staging the entire 
ceremony.  
Lin Zexu’s myth in its cinematic framing and staging, showed a state-led 
ideological complexity that perhaps was novel in the history of Chinese cinema, for 
the encoding process that ideologically shaped its figure, encompassed a very wide 
range of potentially connoted meanings, merging together then-contemporary 
Chinese issues concerned with matters of national and international politics, with 
cultural industry’s economic interests, with social peacefulness, with national unity, 
patriotism, political legitimation based on economic success, with the need of 
military technological advancement, with the depoliticization of the masses, the 
territorialization of specific values and beliefs, the transnationalisation of a Chinese 
cultural product (the movie itself) and its convergenge with global culture where, 
for once, the foreign countries were part of an interested and also quite satisfied 
audience. 
Lin Zexu in “The Opium War” provides the means for the imagining of the Chinese 
nation by highlighting the ‘extraordinary’ – for the hero transcend the everyday 
space of the quotidian – which is set out against the routinized lives that most 
people live, therefore problematizing the distinction between the lived and the 
imagined, and allowing the media to be the arbiter of such matter. Moreover, during 
the Maoist period Lin Zexu had mostly served the legitimation of China’s 
isolationism by conveying meanings that blamed the Westerner for China’s 
backwardness, and its myth thus evoked and encouraged anti-imperialist feelings 
and ideas. With the new China’s trajectory inaugurated by the Deng’s Reform and 
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Opening up era, whose emphasis  mostly aimed at cacthing up with the 
development of Western countries, Lin Zexu’s previous ideology had to adjust and 
adapt to the new circumstances (T. Hjellum, 1996), and accordingly to the shift of 
paradigms development171, which saw the myth of Lin Zexu lend legitimacy to 
capitalist modes of appropriation. Thereby, disengaging from the previous Maoist 
mythology/ideology, and justify the new policy has certainly been one of the 
multiple function of the myth of Lin Zexu in the movie, demonstrating the media’s 
ability to generate,  through a sophisticated popular cultural form, a precise cultural 
network. 
In the proceeding of this work I analysed the communicational landscape172 of 
diverse digital images of Lin Zexu found on the Chinese Internet. The investigation 
of these images have unveiled some modern conventions and social discourses 
present in the arrangement and functioning of the modern aesthetics in China. In 
fact by engaging directly the very notion of (modern) representation, and by 
analyzing the specifics of those representations exemplified in the images of Lin 
Zexu, I called the attention upon both the methaphysics of representation that 
epistemologically sustain the media representations of Lin Zexu, and on the system 
of certanties substructuring such metaphysics on the basis of a specific “ordering, 
distributing and enframing” (T. Mitchell, 1998). All elements that allowed me to 
underline the specific procedures in the production of knowledge historically built-
in in the mode through which the representations of Lin Zexu are granted the 
validity and the authority of defining and assigning a quality or a set of qualities to 
that social world that we call China. Indeed, such analysis revealed that every 
digital image of Lin Zexu circulating in the Internet and displayed in the chapter, 
embodies a “certainty of representation” which depends first of all on the 
separation between representation and reality; meaning that a representation doesn’t 
pretend to simulate reality in order to substitute it, but that it can only approximate 
it. In fact, only by conceiving a model (read: image) as an approximation we are 
reassured of the existence of an original, of a real beyond representation. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 One of the ideological shift the representation of the myth of Lin Zexu underwent, is about its identification with the 
entrepreneur class. In fact under the Maoist ideology, Lin Zexu was seen as hostile to the class of merchants, for they 
represented the Chinese alliance with the imperial capital. However, since the Reform era, Lin Zexu is represented as to 
symbolize the natural convergence between politics and private business.  
172 The trajectories that an image activates through the mobilization of things. Its communicational network, namely all 
the things that make an image speak for itself, and allow it to activate its own network.	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separation is fundamental in order to constitute a correspondence between reality 
and representation, thus enabling the power of the latter to merge with the 
circumstances of the former, and thus giving way to that real virtuality mentioned 
above. I have thus demonstrated that the way we accord a representation the ability 
to resemble something that somehow is present in what we call reality, cannot be 
regarded as self-evident, but rather designates a distinct, partial and mediated 
visualization based on the arrangement of the representation around a common 
center, and the positioning of the visualizing subject in this center; and that as a 
consequence the arrangement of the symbolic content of an image, and its 
understanding are dependent to the specific way of seeing that has conventionally 
been established. Furthermore, through a semiotic deconstruction of the image as a 
digital-born representation, I have shown how the mythical status of Lin Zexu in 
these images is constructed not only through the connotation of the meanings 
conveyed, but primarily by the constitution of the equation graphic/form – 
design/meaning, as a first semiological system, where graphics is the 
materialization of a substance on a surface, and design the intentionality, the 
ideological apparatus that provides passion, care, meaning to the sheer, naked 
substance of graphics. This allowed me to identify representation as the sum of 
graphic/signifier and design/signified, ensuring the constitution of the sign in the 
second semiological system, the myth system (Barthes, 1957). However, it also 
permitted me to acknowledge the media forms of Lin Zexu as  representations, 
which meant to look at them as modern conventions  produced to make sense of the 
social, but ceasing to be self-evident and returning back to their being cultural 
procedures of production, communication and consumption. 
Another form of digital representations of Lin Zexu I have dealt with, are a 
collection of online digital photographs supposedly representative of actual spaces 
– memorials, museums, squares – all dedicated and/or entitled to the historical 
figure of Lin Zexu. These images of Lin Zexu’s representational places are digital 
renditions of urban places and landscapes which, seemingly, are naturally bound to 
its mythical figure. Here, I suggested that these media representations are used as 
complement to architecture, urban settings, historical artifacts, as well as to 
speeches and written texts in the production of social (national) space. Indeed, the 
apparently banal photographs of such commemorative places in which Lin Zexu is 
regarded, conceal a complex knitting of concrete social relations and social 
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reproduction that regulate the way people make sense of social space, both physical 
and in the media. Through the exploration of the procedures that regulate what I 
called in-place photographs (the act of taking a photo), and thus of performing and 
practicing physical space, I argued that a media photograph works also in order to 
epitomize how space has to be seen or looked at, and how as a result has to be 
acknowledged, treated and practiced. As a social product, the native house of Lin 
Zexu does not contains the social relations of production that created it, it rather is 
the expression of these social practices and actions that impose - and are 
simultaneously regulated by – the order of a specific symbolism. The very 
modalities through which this space has been materially produced and charged with 
signs that provided meanings to it, transformed it  in a place, the native house of 
Lin Zexu, often lived and practiced by the people. As a place, it has become an 
ideological instrument for the expression of naturalized values that seem to emanate 
genuinely from the territory, the national space, while it is used for the production, 
exchange and consumption of collective ideas, values, meanings and photographs 
that render such place a commodity as any other.  
The representations of Lin Zexu have therefore come to be associated not only with 
the symbolic space they mythologically call the attention to, but also to the 
performative requirements for practicing and understanding the national space, the 
physical territory within which people’s experience (such as taking a photograph) 
occur. Lin Zexu’s media representational places, I’ve shown, are intrinsically 
informed by traditional assumptions on the idea of space as something existing 
prior to human action and understanding, something natural that can be found any 
moment, anywhere.  
The relation between Lin Zexu’s places as online digital photographs and specific 
constitutional aspects of the production of social space, have stressed a built-in 
correspondance between the two, so that Lin Zexu’s digital photographs show the 
way people invent, embody, and perform landscape, both in-place and in the media, 
and this is so because the physical places we live in, and the virtual places we look 
at when before the photograph of Lin Zexu’s native house or museum, are the 
combination of materiality, meaning, and practices that become constitutent agents 
in building, shaping and organizing people’s perception of the social, both at 
individual and collective level. By trying to reconstitute in its specific structure the 
code of connotation of a mode of communication as important as the press 
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photograph we may hope to find, in their very subtlety, the forms of our society (R. 
Barthes, 1977: 31). Lin Zexu’s digital representations of its commemorative places 
are thereby  specific aspects of a Chinese media culture that may be designated as 
territorialized, that is, related to the nation-state as the reference focus. In fact, 
these online photographs as contemporary communication technology are the 
reworking expression of the bond between the Chinese nation-state and the citizens, 
between territory and people, as well as conveyors of spatial regulatory praxis. 
The wide ranging functions of the media representations of Lin Zexu extend 
considerably, involving another important aspect of Chinese society, the 
manifestation of historical knowledge. Lin Zexu’s media forms, have in fact proven 
to exemplify a cultural phenomena that I understood as the mediatisation of 
historical knowledge. This means that the canonical production, communication, 
and apprehension of what is to be considered “historical” in China, namely the 
work of academic historians, the activities of universities, of the state/government, 
and of all the traditional educational system operating in China, come to be 
renegotiated by the media itself through the various and heterogeneous cultural 
media forms in which Lin Zexu is consumed, transforming consequently people’s 
access and interaction with their past. Media technologies have, indeed, rearranged 
and transformed people’s interaction with informations and meanings, “suggesting 
and creating new hierarchies, hegemonies and ways of imagining society” (de 
Groot 2009: 94). What Lin Zexu’s media images illustrate is not only the kind of 
historical knowledge that the media production of the myth of Lin Zexu is made 
conveying, but the very way through which the relationship between Chinese 
people and the “historical” materialize. Lin Zexu’s media representations are a  
specific form through which a precise aspect of Chinese historical knowledge is 
articulated by the media practices pertinent respectively to the TV and the Internet 
via televisions, laptops, pc, mobile phones, tablet and so on. Mediatisation occures 
when Chinese media and other (political) institutions have the simultaneous and 
reciprocal power of setting (changing and adapting) part of the rules that govern 
themselves. Chinese media conciliate the need of appealing media users by 
balancing, for instance, amusing and entertaining experiences along with a precise 
‘sense of history’ that each representation of Lin Zexu must convey. By contrast, 
the Chinese Party and the government cope with the necessity of imparting the 
‘right and proper’ history of China to its citizens while alluring the image of the 
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national hero through much more enjoyable (media) forms, and yet benefiting of 
the wide-ranging dissemination of such cultural forms that the media permit, 
covering all national territory. By embedding contemporary Chinese media in the 
production of media representations of Lin Zexu, we assist to a disembedding of 
historical knowledge from its traditional contexts (traditional Chinese state-Party 
media such as newspaper, periodical, journals, books, radio, state-television, and 
movies; but also the Academy, and the education system). Lin Zexu’s media 
representations, wouldn’t thus be seen only as mediated cultural forms representing 
a genre of Chinese historical knowledge, but also as processes changing the very 
ideas and authority of historical knowledge and historical institutions in China. 
The mediatisation of historical knowldege reveals how much history, instead of 
being a matter concerning only the past, exists also in the present. Political 
authority, national integrity and identity, traditions, culture, and self-understanding, 
these are only few of the forms that the ‘historical’ may take on during the phases 
of its production, communication and consumption. As a popular phenomena 
history requires an engagement with contemporary media popular conventions able 
to afford a better perception of its nuances.   
The Chinese media in fact, by means of their capacity of shaping people’s relations 
and social experientiality – of becoming an integral part of Chinese society by 
actually defining people’s imagining of their self, and of reality, and by producing 
all realms of social and cultural life – the media turn to be an “omnipresent 
symbolic environment creating an essential part of the societal definitions of 
reality” (Schulz, 2004: 93). 
In conclusion, the historical figure of Lin Zexu has demonstrated to be extremely 
useful, and a multifunctional cultural resource over time. Its media representations 
and its mediated myth have been present throughout the historical development,  
and more or less gradual colonization of the media in China. Lin Zexu media forms 
have served the need of the Chinese state of adopting a neo-conservative political 
programme, to reject the principles of class struggle and mass participation, to 
advance and affirm economic principles of liberalism, and to legitimise the gradual 
penetration of global capital and culture in China since the 1980’s. The myth of Lin 
Zexu in its media forms has been an important contribution to the consolidation of 
Chinese nationalism, which has truly transformed the people’s acknowledgement 
and relationship with the Chinese nation-state, its institutions, and the territory, 
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discarding the previous Maoist ideology. The cultural forms of Lin Zexu analysed 
in this study, are also fundamental tools triggering a strong sense of patriotism 
among the people, highlighting specific moral values and beliefs that contribute to 
the ideological construction of collective identities as the result of a definition of 
the self in contrast to an alleged other. They have also demonstrated how much the 
role of the media has been, and is crucial for the effectiveness of the ideology that 
Lin Zexu as media popular culture conveys. As the commercialization of Chinese 
culture and historical knowledge, the encounter between the media and Lin Zexu 
have triggered complex processes that had a radical impact on political institutions, 
on people, and on the economy. 
This research indicate that the role of the media within Chinese society needs to be 
followed in all their manifestations, and that popular myths are not only still 
present, but they have been assimilated by the media activities generating a wealth 
of historical popular forms that, although seem to provide only the means by which 
produce a leisure-time activity, they instead are networked with crucial elements of 
Chinese society, where the very existence of the governing political institutions of 
the country is dependent upon, as well as the people understanding of the self and 
their behaviour in society is determined by. The contemporary extraordinary 
dissemination of popular cultural forms, especially historical ones, that China is 
facing through the production of countless TV series, online movies, images and 
music, require an immediate attention and exploration for they represent the 
substance by way of, the cultural network contradistinguishing China’s multiple 
manifestations both at home and abroad, is materializing. 
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Appendices: 
 
 
Chapter 2: Image of Lin Zexu 
	  Appendix 1: Lin Zexu in the CCTV cartoon “Lin 
Zexu duilian lizhi”. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Image of Lin Zexu, digital illustration 
of an article on corruption of the Chinese daily newspaper “Zhongshan Daily”	   (中山日
报), published on 7th July, 2011. 
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 Appendix 3: Image of Lin Zexu, posted in the 
forum section (论坛 luntan), BBS portal of the Chinese site zhongsou.com, on 2012-05-
30 at 12:52. 
 
 
 
	  Appendix	  4:	  Lin	  Zexu,	  digital	  production	  promoting	  the	  
Guangdong College of Industry and Commerce. 
 
 
	  Appendix	   5:	   Lin	   Zexu,	  digital reproduction of 
an oil on canvas, produced in 1999 by Chinese painter Guo Beiping 郭北平 (1949) in 
occasion of the celebration for the returning of Macau to China’s sovereignty. 
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 Chapter	  3:	  
	  Appendix 6: Digital reproduction of the Lin Zexu’s 
commemorative Stele in the Shaojiao Fort, in Humen County (Guangdong province). 
 
 
 
 
 
	  Appendix 7: Lin Zexu Memorial Hall in Pucheng 
county 蒲城县, a former residence of Lin Zexu in Shanxi province 陕西省. 
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 Appendix 8: The “old pool” (池旧) in which, in 1839 
Lin Zexu (in Humen town) supervised the destruction of about 20.000 boxes of opium 
sized to the British opium smugglers. 
 
 
 
	  Appendix 9: Lin Zexu Old Residence in Nanhou Street, 
Fuzhou. 
 
 
 
 
	  Appendix	   10:	   Statue of Lin Zexu in the omonym 
square in Fuzhou, Fujian Province. 
 
 
 
 
 
